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Abstract 
As more people obtain online access and the finance sector becomes transformed 
by networked technology, opportunities for internet fraud grow. In recent ý ears we 
have seen the maturation of new digital environments in which financial 
transactions can take place while at the same time we have seen an explosion in 
incidences of identity theft. This unprecedented rise in internet fraud is depressing 
growth in e-commerce activities and is creating growing demands by governments, 
the commercial sector and also the public for an appropriate model of policing. 
This thesis will explore the policing of internet fraud and it will argue the scope of 
police work with regard to white collar crime, because the public belieN e that 
police forces do not effectively control internet fraud and non-internet fraud. 
By drawing upon various global sources this thesis analyzes the tensions between 
the respective interests of the public and the private sectors. Such tensions raise 
concerns about how public resources are most effectively allocated in the public 
interest. Although internet fraud is a globalized phenomenon and indeed the UK 
and the US are notably mentioned, the analysis has specially focused on South 
Korea. 
At the core of the thesis is the observation that a major conflict of interests emerges 
when the private and public models of policing compete for "ownership" over 
internet fraud, so before exploring the laws, rules and enforcement models for 
policing internet fraud, it is first necessary to remove the tensions that exist 
between and within policing bodies. 
Two significant tensions were examined: firstly, the tension caused by different 
characteristics and objectives of private and public models of policing. Whereas the 
public police pursue the public interest thorough a public model of justice, the 
private sector polices problems in their own private interest along a 
private/corporate model of justice. Secondly, tensions are also created within the 
public policing sector by intra-govemmental competition. For example, the South 
Korean National Police have attempted to obtain independent investigatory powers 
while the Prosecutors' Office strongly defends its ownership of investigatory 
powers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction - Internet Fraud and the 
Information Age 
1.1 Background 
Internet fraud has become one of the major threats to online shoppers and e- 
business markets as more people and businesses use the internet as a major 
vehicle to purchase and sell their goods. It has decelerated the deNelopment 
of e-commerce activities. The reported loss from internet fraud in 2007 \ýas 
$239.09 million dollars (IC3,2007) NNith a median N,, alue of $680 per 
complaint in the US which was more than the loss from other crimes. This 
was noticeably increased from 2006 ($198.44 million). In the UK, monthly 
internet shopping sales rose by 80 percent to f4.2 billion from f2.34 billion 
in July, 2006. Annually, online retailers pay f580 million in response to 
internet fraud (Samport, 2008). While e-business industry pays huge 
amounts for the prevention of internet fraud, fraudsters have developed neNý 
methods to deceive innocent consumers. However, existing counter- 
measures for internet fraud are very limited. The most NvelkknoNvn method 
is the chip and PIN system for credit card transactions used in the UK. It has 
significantly decreased credit and debit card related frauds. Therefore, 
fraudsters have moved their focus to card- not-pre sent transactions. 
Despite the fact that internet fraud has a significant impact on e-commerce 
activities worldwide, the policing of internet fraud has not been written 
about in the criminal justice literature. Existing literatures simply introduce 
internet fraud as a type of cybercrime and consider the policing of 
cybercrime as a whole. There appears to be no further study about policing 
fraudulent activities in cyberspace. Therefore, this thesis particularly argues 
that whether the public police have adequate capabilities to deal with 
internet fraud or not, the private sector has much better knowledge and 
resources to deal with internet fraud. This thesis suggests an effective cross 
sector partnership model for policing internet fraud in the course of 
removing tensions residing between the two sectors. Consequentlý', the 
introduction of an ideal model for policing internet fraud in South Korea is 
the focus of this research. 
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1.2 Brief outline of existing literature 
With regard to this thesis topic, no research on policing internet fraud 
appears to have been done in South Korea and other nations. Fortunately, 
similar work (although it does not focus on internet fraud) has been done bý 
McKenzie (2006). His thesis introduces an ideal partnership model for the 
policing of electronic crime. Despite the fact that it does not directly detail 
the topic of internet fraud, it provides useful ideas about partnership 
policing for electronic crime. For the panoramic vision, David \Vall's (2007) 
'the internet's order maintenance assemblage' model inspires the 
construction of this thesis. His thesis sho\\ s the role of each participant with 
regard to policing cyberspace. For the basic concept of policing, the idea 
was borrowed from Reiner (2000) and Wall (1997: 223) 'cybercrime is not 
routine activity of the public police which includes cross border 
investigation'. 
Grabosky and Smith (2001: 29) reported that *security in cyberspace 
depends on the efforts of a wide range of institutions, as wel I as on a degree 
of self-help by potential victims of digital crime' and it is more likely to 
depend on a 'mix of law enforcement, technological and market solutions'. 
Technological intervention such as biometric authentication and filtering 
software can be good counter- measures to prevent and to control internet 
fraud (Grabosky and Smith, 2001; Green, 2001). Recent research by Burns 
et al. (2004) show that 64.2 percent of participants reported that there was 
very effective cooperation among law enforcement agencies. These findings 
indicate the need for a central clearinghouse of information available to all 
law enforcement agencies. A clearinghouse of information in ýýhich 
agencies involved with intemet fraud enforcement efforts could share 
'technical information, the names of expert witnesses, advice from 
experienced prosecutors, or the location of available labs NNrhich would 
greatly assist law enforcement effort' (Burns and Whitworth, 2002: 18). 
Private and public sector partnership was strongly recommended by 
Grabosky and Smith (2001) who suggested that public awareness 
programmes by relevant public agencies and financial institutes are needed. 
For better coordination and cooperation, the Financial SerNices Antit'raud 
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Network Act of 2001 was established in the US (Bums et al. 2004). 
However, it is less effective for the private sector. Recently it has been 
discussed that law enforcement agency oriented information sharing has to 
be expanded to the entire criminal justice agency (Bums et al, 2004). An 
international level of response by Europol and Interpol has been obserýed. 
however, more efforts at the international level of cooperation have been 
emphasized. The international levels of law enforcement agencies have 
shown efforts to adapt to the policing of cybercrime, while the local level of 
response has still been below the appropriate level. 
1.3 Summary of the problem 
As suggested by the literature review, public police do not have sufficient 
resources and knowledge to deal with internet fraud. Cross sector 
partnership is imperative to perform appropriate levels of policing. However, 
there are various tensions residing between the two sectors. Without 
removing those tensions, effective partnership of policing internet fraud 
cannot be achieved. In particular, the local level of response against internet 
fraud is far behind that at the international level of response due to those 
tensions. It was also found that few nations have specialized law 
enforcement units to handle internet fraud. Unlike the public sector, the 
private sector has performed much better in policing and investigation 
activities. According to Williams, the 'Forensic Accounting and Corporate 
Investigation (FACI) industry' (2005: 317) has positioned itself as a 
supplier of a unique and highly specialized form of investigative and quasi- 
juridical labour geared to the resolution of 'business troubles' ranging from 
the theft of intellectual property, to the misappropriation of corporate assets, 
to breaches of financial security. However, Brodeur and Kempa (1995; 1999) 
argued that the public-private dichotomy fails to account for the diversity 
and heterogeneity of actors participating in the governance of security or 
policing, including the policing of internet fraud. The distinction bemeen 
public and private forms of policing are increasingly difficult to maintain 
and have been proven somewhat outdated. given the emergence of complex 
and multi-dimensional 'sec ur ity -networks' (Johnston, 1996: Shearing. 1996; 
Loader, 2000; Newburn 2001) or forms of 'nodal governance' (Johnston 
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and Shearing, 2003: 18). Therefore. policing internet fraud has to be studied 
in the light of the *order-maintenance assemblage' suggested b,, Wall 
(2007). 
1.4 Scale of the study 
This research is a partially comparative study. I choose the United Kingdom 
and the United States to compare with South Korea, mainly with re, -'ard to: 
How they police internetfraud? Who polices internetftalid? and I Vhat ICAvs 
they use for the control of internet ftaud There are three reasons for 
choosing these countries. First, the United Kingdom and the United States 
are historically and politically strong alliances to South Korea. Korean 
government does not have any negative preoccupations ýý ith their sý stems 
Therefore, comparison of the policing model and laws of these countries is 
applicable and admissible in South Korea. Second, most available resources 
for this study are to be found in the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Although a large volume of useful information is available in Australia, 
South Korean people are not familiar with Australian systems, so it \\as not 
chosen as a primary comparable subject for this study. Third, the researcher 
of this study studied in the United Kingdom so it was more reliable and 
comfortable when conducting the research. 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
The primary aim of this thesis is to identify the tensions that surround the 
policing of internet fraud, such as lack of trust, different investigation 
philosophies and negative publicity. These have negatively influenced the 
maintenance of the correct balance between the private and public models of 
policing internet fraud. Each sector has different interests and cannot 
abandon its policing authority. In order to provide a more effective and 
efficient method of internet fraud control, we also aim to suggest an 
appropriate level of policing internet fraud for the two sectors. 
In order to establish the above mentioned aim, the following objeak es ha\ c 
to be achieved: 
Identification of tensions produced by internet fraud. 
5 
0 Definition and classification of internet fraud because internet fraud 
does not fit into the existing category of white-collar crime. 
Identification of correct balance of policing internet fraud. 
Examination of governance of internet fraud. 
Examination of relationship existing between and within the public 
sector. 
Investigation of major faults and lack of the South Korean policing z: 1 
system in respect to its treatment of internet fraud. 
0 Analysis of factors that promote and resolve tensions. 
& Examination of internet fraud control at the local, national and 
international level. 
This thesis will also examine the laws, rules, and policing strategies that 
could help to eliminate these tensions. Suggestion that the removal of 
tensions may achieve effectiveness and efficiency in policing internet fraud 
provides good grounds for academic debate. This legally and politically 
sensitive issue may catch the attention of many policý makers, law 
enforcement staff and criminal justice scholars. 
1.6 Research questions 
Research questions about resolution of tension and an appropriate policing 
model for the response to internet fraud will be answered by using existing 
data and informational sources for South Korea, the UK and the US, while 
an additional qualitative study for Korea will be undertaken as very little 
existing literature considers the current situation in Korea. 
Both private and public police have hypothesized that removing tensions 
between the private and public models of policing will enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency in enforcing correct behaviours on the internet. 
In order to prove this hypothesis. it is necessary to develop pertinent 
research questions for the interviewees. Therefore, the main research 
questions ask: Hou, do tensions influence policing" Hoit, do teuýions 
influenceyour work in terms o our iiorking practices for respo"'Ise", Whi, it ýfy 
is important to remove tensions? Since *tension' in policing internet fraud is t-- 
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not well known to the general public. the term *tension' needs more 
conceptual building in order to address the issues properly. Using a vague 
meaning of tension in the research would confuse interviewees. Therefore. 
some examples of tension need to be addressed. 
There are also additional questions asking: Why are tensions produced" 
How can tensions be removed? Can the government or your organization do 
anything to help remove these tensions? How can partnership policing be 
promoted? These questions will find out the best solutions to reduce or 
remove tensions. 
If negative tensions are found to be impeding the effective and efficient 
policing of internet fraud, it will suggest the adoption of an appropriate 
policing model by which these tensions could be removed. The correct 
balance of policing internet fraud should aim to be mutuallý' beneficial to 
the private and public sectors while preserving their interests. 
It is believed that cross-sector partnership policing is the best \\aý to 
maintain the correct balance for policing internet fraud. HoN\ ever, there has 
not been any standard upon which to decide the correct balance between the 
two sectors. 
The following sections outline the design of a programme of qualitative 
research that aims to critically examine the questions and issues raised by 
tensions between the private and public models of policing internet fraud, 
from which normative guidelines for implementation might be proposed. 
1.7 Methodology 
The research questions in this thesis call for qualitative study and normative 
analysis, which is an analysis based on a judgment about what is desirable 
and what is not desirable. Simply, normative analysis suggests ho\N policing 
internet fraud ought to be. Tension is a normati\, e concept, that is: 
'evaluative, denoting or implying goodness, desirability, \\hat ought to be. 
or the negation of these denotations. Compassion, eqUality, and exploitation 
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are such normative concepts. Clearly. the same concept may be used 
descriptively or normatively depending on context and intent. Ho\ýever. 
some concepts have a built-in evaluation that even a careful descriptive 
analysis may not avoid, such as with the concepts murder, torture. 
exploitation, charity, and love' (Rummel, 1981: 320). 
Normative analysis 'attempts a rational and principled exploration of 
moral/political justifications for a given course of action' (Bottoms, 2000: 
48). It is not simply to find true explanations of social phenomenon. 
Normative theorists should consider whether there is a relationship between 
the normative proposition and real-life situation or not. WithoLit justification 
of reliable criteria, rational, normative analysis cannot be implemented. As 
stated in McKenzie (2006: 95), 'it is also crucial to provide explanatory 
accounts of current practice' of investigation of electronic crime. According 
to Berg (2000: 230), 'explanatory case studies are useful NN,, hen conducting, 
causal studies. Particularly in complex studies of organizations or 
communities, one might desire to employ multivariate cases to examine a 
plurality of influences'. Tensions are a good example of the independent 
variable. The concept of tension can be directly observable and as such may 
be viewed as an objective in policing internet fraud although it 'requires 
consideration of the individual's own perception and understanding' (Berg, 
2001: 11). 
Positivists assume that reality is objectively given and can be described by 
measurable properties that are independent of the researcher and his or her 
instruments. Positivist studies generally attempt to test theory in an attempt 
to increase the predictive understanding of phenomenon (Myers, 1997). 
Removing tensions in policing internet fraud is a predictive phenomenon so 
therefore a positivist perspective is appropriate and valid for this research. 
1.8 Qualitative research strategy 
The researcher used a qualitative research method to obtain the core 
research values that determine the balance bem een those mentioned three 
models of policing internet fraud. 'Qualitative methods allow a researcher to 
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share in the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore hoNN 
people structure and give meaning to their daily lives' (Berg. 2001: 7). 
According to Noaks and Wincup (2004: 15), the qualitative research method 
'helps to inform the development of policies of crime control'. However, the 
main reason why the researcher chose a qualitative research method is 
because it is the most efficient and effective method to obtain necessarý, 
answers to the research questions, from the private sector of securitý experts 
(such as CSOs (Chief Security Officers), IT security staff, risk management 
staff at financial institutions, corporate legal department lawyers. and 
corporate marketing department staff) and the public sector of securitý, 
experts (such as public police officers, public prosecutors, government and 
intelligent agents), perceiving the tensions between and ý\Ithin their 
domains. 
It would not be easy to obtain clear answers from respondents since the 
topic of the thesis is politically sensitive in the study focus area - South 
Korea. Since most research questions require non-numerical ansxýcrs, a 
qualitative research method is the most appropriate for this research. A 
qualitative research method reflects real-life that includes 'not only 
emotions, motivations, symbols and their meanings, empathy, but also other 
subjective aspects associated with the naturally evolving lives of individuals 
and groups'. These elements may also represent 'their behavioural routines, 
experiences, and various conditions affecting these usual routines or natural 
settings' (Berg, 200 1: 10- 11). 
In order to undertake a qualitative study of tensions between the private and 
public models of policing internet fraud, it was necessary to adopt a research 
method that would ensure an in-depth understanding of tensions affecting 
the policing of internet fraud. Qualitative interviewing fits this research 
purpose because respondents provide valuable information that cannot be 
experienced by others. The respondents most appropriate for this study are 
experts in policing cybercrime. Their role is not simply to reveal their oNýn 
views in relation to an event, but to describe what actually happens in the 
policing of internet fraud. 
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Prior research revealed a distinct lack of research that attempts to explore 
tensions affecting the policing of internet fraud. Similar researches 
conducted tended to deal with partnership policing of e-crime and found 
factors affecting the investigation of e-crime to include detection of 
incidents, under reporting of e-crime, prioritization of different types of e- 
crime, obtaining evidence, and inadequate staffing (Mckenzie, 2005). 
After examining various possible research methods, qualitative intervieNN ing I 
was chosen as the most useful and creditable means to obtain the necessary 
information required answering the research questions. Other methods. such 
as survey or self-administered questionnaires, ýNere considered to be 
insufficient. 
In this study, the semi-structured interview was mainly used to obtain 
information from respondents. It has an advantage in that interviewers are 
allowed freedom to wander; 'interviews are permitted to probe far beyond 
the answers to their prepared and standardized questions' (Berg, 2001: 70). 
The interview schedule consisted of four sections. The first section asked 
demographic information about the respondent with a structured intervie\ý 
schedule. The second, third and fourth sections asked about the nature of 
tensions, appropriate policing models and the resolution of tensions. 
Throughout the interview, respondents were encouraged to speak their 
opinion based on their experience. The semi-structured format of the 
interview schedule allowed the order of questions to be varied in accordance 
with the direction and 'flow' of any given interview. The purpose of the 
interviewing process was to attempt to access the perspectives of the 
subjects, rather than those of the interviewing researcher; and the less 
structured form of the interview allowed subjects to define the world in their 
own perspectives. The key point of this qualitative research is to obtain an 
in-depth understanding of tensions between the private and public models of 
policing. 
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Interview schedule 
Tensions between the private and public models of internet policing found 
in this study cannot be applied to other non-police organizations or agencies 
since partnership policing is different from other business collaborations. 
Partnership policing creates interplay of disagreement, power play and inter- 
dependency (Mckenzie, 2006). Therefore, in the light of these 
considerations, the research method in this study, including the primary 
instrument of the interview schedule was appropriately designed (See 
Appendix 2). 
An interview schedule was developed that was designed for interviewees of 
the private and public sectors. Interview schedules aimed to answer 
questions such as: What are the most serious tensions. ' What is an 
appropriate model ofpolicing Internetfraud? How can tensions be removed" 
As mentioned earlier, the interview schedule consisted of a pool of 
questions divided into four sections: 
" Section 1: demographic information of respondent; 
" Section 2: questions on tensions; 
" Section 3: questions on policing internet fraud: 
" Section 4: questions on resolution of tensions. 
The first section was structured, with a mix of closed and open questions, 
and the other three sections were semi -structured, with a mixture of closed 
and open questions. Usually, obtaining demographic information of 
respondents does not require open questions. However, for this research, it 
was important to know respondents' daily activities and experience. These 
could not be described by 'yes' or 'no5 answers. 
The pilot study 
A pilot study was undertaken prior to the data collection phase and the first 
two interviews Nvith the private and public sector personnel. The purpose of 
sample interviews was to evaluate the interview schedule in terms of 
whether it covered the full spectrum of policing internet fraud, NNhether its 
questions were properly formulated. and what adjustments might be 
required with respect to them; what sequence of questioning N'Vould work 
best; how best to establish a good rapport and confidentialitý bet, %Neen 
interviewer and subjects; what would be the best way of taking down notes: 
and what time-frame would be required to complete the intervieNNý. 
Since in-depth interviews might prove more intrusive and involved in terms 
of qualitative methods, and because of possible subject discomfort and 
sensitivity of the subject matter involved in the interviews, the study ývas 
carefully explained to each of the two subjects prior to obtaining their 
agreement to participate in the pilot study. The subjects were each informed 
that their respective interview would be confidential and that theý could 
terminate the interview at any time. They were also advised that they could 
answer, choose not to answer, or go into further detail, on any question that 
might be asked in the interview. Additionally, throughout the course of the 
actual interview process, the subjects were repeatedly asked if they were 
comfortable to continue with the interview. Neither subject expressed 
uneasiness during the course of the interview. It was clear that theý did not 
feel pressured by the interview or by the questions posed to them in the 
interview; quite to the contrary, they easily identified with the objectives of 
the larger study, as well as with those specifically attached to the interview 
itself. The fact that most of the questions were not of a personal nature, but 
rather, were directed at the subject's experience of policing internet fraud 
and of the factors (tensions) surrounding that event, could have been 
contributory to the creation of an image of a hostile relationship between 
private and public sectors that prevailed throughout the interview. 
During the course of the pilot study, it was found that overall the proposed 
questions were valid for the formal research. The researcher asked questions 
such as: What are the most serious tensions? Why are those tensions 
produced? and When is it appropriate to involve (a) private rather than 
public policing mechanisms (b) public rather than private policing 
mechanisms? Interviewees believed that those questions were relevant to the 
aim of this research. 
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However, it was found that some questions contained the same meaning. 
For example: How do those tensions influence your working practices for 
response? and Is it important to remove tensions" If so, why. 1 The 
researcher recognized that those questions could be expected to reNCA 
almost the same answers so one had to be deleted. The researcher deleted 
the latter one: Is it important to remove tensions? If so, why. "' 
The duration of the interviews varied from twenty-five to thirty-five minutes, 
which was thought to be generally within the expected duration that had 
been scheduled for them. The recording of the interviews \vas done through 
note taking only since it was done informally. Since the changes that needed 
to be made to the interview schedule and process were only minor in 
character, the decision was taken to include these cases in the total sample 
of research cases that were analyzed and interpreted in the study. The pilot 
study was an important phase in the research process of the studý', one that 
allowed the researcher to familiarise himself with appropriate intervie\\ 
techniques, so that the quality of the data collected in the study could be 
improved. 
Sampling 
Most data for this research were collected between November 2006 and 
January 2007 from both the private and public sectors through face-to-face 
interviews in Korea. Overall, 16 people in the private and public sectors of 
security were interviewed who were considered to be internet crime 
investigators or IT security experts. There was no specific job title of 
internet fraud investigator since internet fraud investigation does not 
exclusively belong to an independent agency or organization. There are 
many policing bodies participating in the policing of internet fraud as a part 
of their overall policing activity in cyberspace. 
The researcher selected interviewees based on the nature of the organization. 
The rationale for selecting samples from those organizations is that theý can 
not only represent each category of sectors, but also address fraudulent 
activities of each sector in the literature review of this thesis. 
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For the private sector, eight experts were interviewed. Interviewees were 
selected from IT security companies (Ahnlab), ISAC (Koscom). CERT 
(CONCERT), an online auction company (Auction Corp. ), a major credit- 
card company (BC Card), a famous portal site (DAUNI). non-profit 
organizations: GCN (National Council of the Green Consumer's N. ''emork in 
Korea) and YMCA (National Council of YMCA's of Korea). Each 
interviewee was selected from internet fraud response related organizations. 
They are reliable and valid human resources to provide evidence for, the 
research questions. 
Separately, a corporate legal department lawyer and a member of corporate 
marketing department personnel were also interviewed in order to obtain an 
answer for the question regarding tension betýýeen corporate legal 
department lawyers and corporate marketing departments. However, the 
researcher was not able to obtain any valuable information from them since 
they do not want to answer for the sensitive questions so that the question 
about tension between corporate legal office and marketing department was 
deleted. 
For the public sector, eight experts were interviewed. lntervieý\ees were 
selected from the National Police Agency (CTRC), the Supreme Prosecutors' 
Office (ICIC), the National Intelligence Service (NCSC), the Korean 
Information Security Agency (KISA), the Financial Supervisory Service 
(FSA), Korea Internet Security Center (KrCERT/CC), the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (KFTC), Korea Information Security Agency 
(KSRC). A public cyberpolice officer, the public prosecutor's internet crime 
investigator and other government agents represent the public sectors. The 
researcher believes that interviewees have profound knowledge and 
experience that will enable them to provide reliable information. 
Gaining access to the subjects 
The nature of the research question can be a politically sensitive issue so it 
was not easy to arrange interviews without special recommendation. Some 
places, such as NCSC/NIS (National Cyber Security Center of the National 
intelligence Service) do not alloNN, other people to contact and visit their 
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office to get information, whether it is classified or not. Generallý. 
NCSC/N1S is publicly known as an impregnable fortress. It is almost 
impossible to access the NCSC/NIS as an individual researcher. HoweN, er. 
the researcher's long-term membership of criminal justice societies. such as 
Korea Police Studies Association, Digital Forum of the National Congress 
and an alumni relationship made it possible to access the respondent's office 
without any official procedure. The initial interviewee at the NCSC NNas 
changed unexpectedly due to his regular reassignment. HoNNever, the neNý 
agent at his office was very cooperative and agreed to the intervie\\. The 
interview was held at the NCSC/NIS office in Seoul, but he did not allow 
the researcher to look around their operation room. The respondent was a 
high-ranking agent of NCSC and understood the overall Korean situation 
regarding this research topic. The interviewee provided a very analytical 
perspective of policing cyberspace and crime. 
Access to the CTRUNPA (Cyber Terror Response Center of the National 
Police Agency) was relatively easy in comparison to other agencies since 
the researcher is a member of the Digital Forum of the National Congress. 
Through the previous conference, there was a close rapport between the 
researcher and the interviewee. The interview was held outside the National 
Police Agency. The interviewee provided very useful information that was 
pertinent to the research question without any concealment of the nature. 
For the interview with the prosecutor, the researcher visited the Cheong-Ju 
District Prosecutors' Office. It was located about one and a half hours from 
Seoul. The interviewee was officially dispatched to the Ministry of 
Information and Communication as a legal advisor before relocating to the 
Cheong-Ju District Prosecutors' Office. He was famous for investigating 
and prosecuting many cybercrime cases. He used to work closely with the 
NIS for industrial espionage cases. Because of his various legal experiences, 
the researcher was able to obtain information on legal issues related to the 
policing of internet fraud. 
Other non-police public agencies welcomed the researcher because those 
agencies are open to the public and their nature of work does not include 
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highly confidential matters. Therefore, the researcher convenienti) ý isited 
their offices for the interviews without any problems. Among those agencies, 
KISA (Korea Information Security Agency) has subsidiary units such as 
KSRC (Korea Spam Response Center), KrCERT/CC (Korea Information 
Security Center), and PRIVACYNET. The researcher was able to conduct 
four interviews in the same building. 
Most respondents in the public sector are linked via membership of the 
Korean National CERT council which is formed by nine government 
agencies: National Intelligence Service, National Police Agency. The 
Supreme Prosecutors' Office, Korea Information Security Agency, Korea 
Financial Telecommunications and Clearings Institute. Defence Security 
Command, Ministry of Information and Communications, Ministry of 
Science and Technology, Ministry of Government Administration and 
Home Affairs. 
The public sector is well linked so each respondent tended to know each 
other officially or unofficially. During the course of the interviews, it was 
easy to identify the correct respondent who could provide reliable 
information regarding this research. Overall, the interview process in the 
public sector was relatively easy and comfortable. Most respondents showed 
a very friendly manner during the interview process. It was assumed that the 
individual researcher would not complete the research unless there was 
special recommendation by the higher authority. Fortunately, the 
researcher's long time maintained human network in the Korean Police 
Studies Association helped this research Nv, ithout any obstacle or delay. 
Some respondents recommended finding another useful topic for the thesis. 
While the public sector respondents were linked by the membership of the 
Korean National CERT council, most private sector respondents were 
linked by the membership of the CONCERT (Consortium of CERT) 1. 
Unlike the public sector, private sector respondents Nvere more cautious and 
unfriendly. It may be attributed to the nature of their work in that they 
' Consortium of CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) 
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protect the most important business information of their company. Each 
company had different perspectives and interests in terms of NNhy and ho%N- 
they deal with internet fraud so it was necessary to convince each company 
of the benefits of this research for the private sector. After the explanation, 
respondents expressed their interest in balancing private and public models 
of policing internet fraud. They agreed that it is essential to remove tensions 
for promoting effective and efficient policing. 
The first interview was held at CONCERT since it is known as a hub for 
private IT related companies and organizations. The president of 
CONCERT is a leading expert of Information Security and currently is 
working at SungKyunKwan University as a professor of the computer 
science department and a director of the te lecom rnun i cation bureau. The 
interview was held at the interviewee's university office where he spends 
most of his time teaching and working. The interview appointment was 
made through his university secretary. The researcher was ý\, elcomed by the 
interviewee. The interviewee expressed interest in the fact that this research 
will contribute to promoting the policing of internet fraud. His expert 
perspective was remarkable and can be used as a good reference for further 
research. 
The second interview was held at the CTRC (Cyber Terror Response Center 
in the National Police Agency in Korea) because CTRC is the first 
government office to begin policing cybercrime 2. A veteran cybercrime 
investigator was introduced by the director of the CTRC. The interviewee 
was also a very well known police liaison officer in both the private and 
public sector. He was aware of current issues and knows almost everybodN 
who works in online security. The researcher was satisfied that the first two 
interviews were held with the right people. Through these two intervieý, \s, 
the researcher also confirmed that other interviewees would be good 
selections for the research. 
Hacker investigation division was found in October, 1995. 
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Interviews with other respondents were subsequentlý scheduled. Most 
respondents in the private sector and from private companies required 
permission from higher authorities in order to be interviewed by the 
researcher. Some respondents attempted to confirm the identitý, of the 
researcher. The researcher provided a copý of identification or a letter for 
cooperation with the research. The majority of respondents did not require 
confirmation of the identification of the researcher since the researcher 
introduced himself through e-mail or telephone when the researcher 
arranged interviews. Compared to other organization's access, NGOs (Non 
Government Organization) did not have any high threshold through NNhich 
to delay the timetable of the interview. Approval of the interview was 
almost made at the time of request. NGO respondents were very cooperative 
since they are not profit organizations. They provided an objective 
perspective through which to address the current issues of policing internet 
fraud. 
Respondent demographics 
Despite the fact that the research used a small number of participants these 
respondents represented experts in the policing of internet fraud and 
cybercrime in Korea. It was unnecessary to involve invalid samples in order 
to inflate the number of the sample, which would not enhance the validity of 
this research. 
Table 1-1 displays information regarding the 16 respondents who 
participated in the study. All security experts interviewed from both the 
private and public sectors were well known within the IT security, fraud 
prevention or internet crime investigation. 
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Table 1-1: Respondents by sector 
Sector Organization Frequency Percent 
Public Sector CTRC 1 6.25 
ICIC 1 6.25 
NCSC 1 6.25 
FSA 1 6.25 
KFTC 1 6.2-5 
KISA I 
KSRC 1 6.25 
KrCERT 1 
6.25 
6.25 
Sub-total 8 50 
Private Sector Ahnlab 1 6.25 
KOSCOM 1 6.25 
CONCERT 1 6.25 
Auction 1 6.25 
BC Card 1 6.25 
Daum 1 6.25 
GNC 1 6.25 
YMCA 1 6.25 
Sub-total 8 50 
Total 16 100% 
Figure 1- 1 indicates that the majority of respondents were between 31 and 
40 years of age; this majority (12 respondents) makes up 75% of the 
following sample. 
19 
Figure 1-1: Age of respondents 
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Most respondents (under the age of 40) reported that they had no other job 
experience before joining their current office. They could be considered the 
'true' IT generation. In contrast, older respondents (over the age of 40) 
reported that they had other job experience before joining their current 
office. Their skills upgraded accordingly as technology advanced. 
It is also assumed that age and experience are not in direct proportion. Thus, 
older experts do not necessarily have more experience than younger experts 
since the emergence of the internet is a recent event. 
Compared to the terrestrial level of policing, respondents in the private 
sector reported that they had no law enforcement experience before joining 
their current company. This implies that previously there were not many IT 
security experts in the law enforcement field. 
Table 1-2 indicates that respondents in both the public and private sectors 
consisted predominantly of male security staff members (n=13,81.25%). 
There were more female respondents in the private sector; 25% of females 
work in the private sector, whilst only 12.5% of females work in the public 
sector. This is indicative of the fact that the private sector permits more 
females to participate in policing cyberspace than the public sector. The 
public sector tends to have a notably more conservative em-ironment that 
20 
the private sector. Other than the IT security dk, ision, female employees are 
outnumbered in IT related companies in Korea. 
Table 1-2: Sex of respondents 
Male Female Total 
Private Sector 6 (37.5/75) 2 8 
(12.5/25) (50/100) 
Public Sector 7 1 8 
(43.75/87.5) (6.5/12.5) (50/100) 
Total 13 3 16 
(81.25%1 11 Q 
Table 1-3 demonstrates that all private and public sector respondents had 
attained an undergraduate university degree or higher, ý\ ith 63% of 
respondents having obtained a Masters or PhD degree. Participants \\ere 
asked whether any special qualifications or training in relation to the 
policing of internet fraud was required for their role. Law enforcement 
agency respondents (police, prosecutors, and intelligence agents) reported 
that they had special training after they joined their offices. Other 
respondents reported that they had received IT security training before 
commencing work at their current positions. It seems that the public sector 
needs more advanced techniques to respond to internet fraud. 
Table 1-3: Higher education attained by respondents 
Private Sector Public Sector Total 
PhD 2 (12.5) 2 (12.5) 4 (25) 
Master 3 (18.75) 2 (12.5) 5 (31) 
Bachelor 3 (18.75) 4 (25) 7 (44) 
High School 000 
No response 000 
Total 8 (50%) 8 (50%) 16 (100%) 
Although many people in IT security institutions have higher education, 
displacement of human resources is a common occurrence, especiall, \ in the 
public sector. For example, a prosecutor or investigator \Nho is assigned to 
the Internet Crime Investigation Center (ICIC) usually does not sta\ there 
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more than two years due to regular personnel transfers performed by the 
Supreme Prosecutors' Office. 
Compared to other parts of occupation, it indicated a much higher 
educational level of respondents. The majority of respondents achieN, ed their 
academic degrees before joining their current offices. Respondents were 
qualified as experienced or professional when they were emplo) ed by each 
sector. Demographic information gathered, including respondents' level of 
education, was very important for this research in order to determine 
whether the reliability of the respondents was consistent across sectors. This 
data collection procedure shows the validity of the sample. Therefore, 
profiles of respondents show that they are well-educated elite people in 
Korean society and their responses for this research are trusmorthý, and 
valid. 
Interviewing 
All of the interviews were conducted face to face at the interviewees' place 
of work or near the perimeter. Prior to the appointment with intervieNvees, it 
was impossible to know in advance whether there would be any potential 
subject available for interviewing on any given day. Fortunately, using the 
human network in Korea, every interview was tightly scheduled. Interviews 
varied in length, but most of them were less than one hour. It was difficult to 
have longer interviews since respondents claimed their workloads were too 
heavy. Before each interview began, the researcher explained to the 
interviewees the main purpose of the research and how it contributed to 
policy making for internet fraud. All personnel were aware of the aims of 
the research project and were given assurance of anonymity. 
Prior to the interview beginning, interviewees were asked to read and sign 
an informed consent form. They were informed that the interview would be 
audio taped for later review by the researcher, but assured that their 
responses would be confidential. Interviewees were informed that they did 
not have to answer any questions that made them uncomfortable and that 
they could Nvithdraw from the interview at any point without loss of 
experimental credit. From the beginning of the research, eN erv single part of 
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the process was based on voluntary participation. This týpe of research 
guarantees that no manipulation is involved. 
A digital tape recorder was used in intervieýýs and for documenting 
conversations. Recording took much less time than typing or writing would 
have done, it interfered or disturbed the process less, and allowed a precise 
record to be made of the interviews. Interview notes were written up on the 
scene and were often checked for validity by asking participants for 
clarification of comments and accuracy of recorded notes. Some additional 
notes were made upon completion of the interview. In these notes, interN iew 
acts were conceptualized, and descriptions and analyses of the interview 
process were recorded. 
In general, the interviewees gave impressions of self-confidence. Theý vvere 
able to relate to the researcher in a friendly manner, and they seemed to 
discuss most topics and questions openly and in relation to personal 
experience. Some of them, however, were nervous at the beginning of their 
interview. Later, they relaxed as the interview progressed and eventually 
become completely involved in the interview. There was no delay during 
the interview due to note taking because the interviewer only recorded key 
words and concepts that were emphasized. However. some respondents 
opposed to the use of a digital recorder for their interviews. Especially, 
respondents in the public sector expressed more opposition to the use of a 
digital recorder. It was guaranteed that all audio tapes, notes and copies of 
transcripts would be destroyed on completion of the research. 
Conversation between the interviewer and the intervieývee was not always 
easy to record, as some voices were more easily captured on the digital 
recorder than others. This became obvious when attempts were made to 
record interviews with a few subjects ývho were softly spoken. In the case of 
these subjects, to continuously request that they speak up was disruptive, 
and it was stressful for both parties. Therefore, the researcher allowed the 
loss of some words from the subject's responses rather than have to request 
the subject to raise their voice and speak louder, particularly as keý concepts 
were also being recorded in note form. 
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Ethical issues 
Before conducting the interview, the researcher collected secondarý data 
related to internet fraud and overall cybercrime information from 
CTRC/NPA, ICIC/SPO and NCSC/NIS websites. These resources are open 
to the public and do not require any approval to see them. The Korean 
Information Disclosure Act established in 1996 and in force in 1998 al IoNý s 
the general public access to most governmental information, except 
information directly related to national security. The researcher also 
collected secondary data from the private sector. Secondary data collected 
from private companies were examined carefully to avoid data that could be 
biased or manipulated because the private model of policing focuses on the 
private interest only. The psychological well-being of an individual 
participating in research was not negatively influenced by participation. The 
researcher protected their rights, interest, sensitivities and privacy based on 
the ethical guidelines of the British Society of Criminology (Gelsthorpe, 
Tarling, and Wall, 1999). 
A researcher has responsibilities not only to the principles of pursuing the 
truth and searching for knowledge, but also to the subjects of the research. 
The research has also always to take into account the effect of the research 
and of the researcher's action during the research process, upon those 
subjects; and must act in such a way as to preserve the ri0hts, dignitN. and 
integrity of the subjects as human beings. Given that this research 
interviewed policing internet fraud experts as research subjects, it was 
possible that information obtained could subsequently harm a subject who 
had taken part in the study. This possibility raised a range of potential 
problems, involving the issues of informed consent, assurances of 
confidentiality, and dissemination. According to the BSC code of ethics, a 
'researcher should endeavour to avoid contractual conditions that limit 
academic integrity or freedom'. 
The ethical guidelines of the British Society of Criminologý (2005), and of 
the British Sociological Association (2002), both state that participation in 
criminological research should be based on the freely given, informed 
consent of the subjects of the research. The British SocietN of Criminolo(, y 
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(2005) further defines informed consent, as requiring that the researcher 
carefully practice their responsibility to explain as fully as possible. and in 
terms understandable and meaningful to the potential participating SUbjects. 
the following key aspects of the research: ýNho the researcher is; xvhat the 
research is about and why it is being undertaken; what Nýill be required of 
participating subjects in respect to the research; how and in NN hat form, aný 
findings of the research are to be disseminated; and ýNhat, if aný. are the 
anticipated potential consequences of the research. The guidelines of these 
British professional bodies, also state that researchers should make fullý 
clear to potential participating subjects, that interviexNees ha\e the right to 
refuse permission whenever and for ýN hatever reason they \\ ish. 
For this research, the participation of each interviewee was voluntarý. and 
permission from them to conduct the interview, was obtained on an 
individual basis. The researcher kept in mind that interviewees must not be 
adversely affected by participation this research and the responsibilltv to 
ensure the physical, social and psychological well-being. Bet-ore 
participating, the researcher asked each interviewee for verbal consent, and 
this process was audio taped, as well as the subsequent intervieýN itself. The 
researcher did not contact higher-level staff members of the participant 
office to obtain interview permission. However, some interviews had to be 
approved by their agencies. Some public agencies and private companies 
misunderstood the fact that this research was an evaluation of their job 
performance. However, that was not the intent of this research. In order to 
resolve this problem, the researcher sent an interview schedule for approval. 
Some agencies, such as NCSC/NIS have very strong regulations regarding 
the protection of information. NIS agents cannot reveal or disclose aný 
information obtained during their service by law. This law applies even after 
their termination of duty. For this research, the Deputy Director of NCSC 
was interviewed. Interviewing with a field agent is almost impossible since 
he or she has no authority to decide his or her participation in the interview. 
The NIS code of ethics requires a high standard of job performance 
including confidentiality of their work. However, the Deput), Director did 
not ask about any part of the agreement of confidential it-,. 
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Figure 1-2: Staff ethics of the National Intelligence Service 
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Source: http: //eng. nis. go. kr/docs/about/ethic. html 
In particular, participants in the police, prosecutors and intelligence Nvere 
likely to ensure that their information would not be used for anything other 
than the original purpose of this research. It was mentioned that without 
participant's permission, individual data would not pass to any third party. 
The researcher explained the degree of anonymity and confidentiality for 
the research. It is known that providing anonymity and confidentiality to 
participants are key points in gaining valuable data that represents an 
objective viewpoint (Gelsthorpe, Tarling, and Wall, 1999). Some 
respondents in the private sector asked for more anonymity and 
confidentiality than the public sector respondents. They were concerned that 
what they said about current policing may irritate the public sector agency. 
Most respondents were interested in 'how the research results would be 
usedT The researcher discussed any potential use of data by other 
researchers in advance. Respondents were informed that the research result 
might be published in a few journal articles such as 'Journal of Criminal 
Justice', Journal of Criminal law and Criminology' and *British Journal of 
Criminology'. However, respondents' identities would not be disclosed and 
sensitive information would not be included. It is also assumed that the 
research results may be used as good guidelines for future policy and law 
making. All participants agreed that the research result would be 
disserninated for the public interest purpose. 
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Although it may not happen in this research, it is very useful to knoýN 
additional information regarding internet research. *When conducting 
Internet research, the researcher should be aware of the boundaries between 
the public and the private domains, and also any legal and cultural 
differences across jurisdiction' (BSC, 2005) 
'The researcher should be aware of the additional difficulties that occur 
when undertaking comparative or cross-national research, involving 
different jurisdictions where codes of practice are likely to differ* (BSC. 
2005). 
Transcription and analysis of data 
First, it was decided that digitally recorded interviews would be transcribed 
in the Korean language. Since the researcher required more profound 
familiarity with the contents of the digital recorder, transcription was made 
by the researcher without any assistance. This provided a means to discover 
practical understandings of meanings and actions. In order to discover 
patterns of human activity, action, and meaning, the researcher organized 
and reduced the data appropriately. When it came to selecting quotations 
from the completed transcription, it was decided to exclude *oN, erstated' 
words, 6repetitive phrases', or 'related encumbrances' that significantly 
obscured the clarity of the meaning of that mentioned by the intervieNý ee. 
The next stage, translation of written interviews from South Korean text to 
English text was important. It was not easy to translate from Korean to 
English since some nuances cannot be fully expressed in other languages. 
However, the research confirmed the translation by undertaking a reverse 
translation from English to Korean. For this process, the researcher asked a 
person whose major is English translation. It was found that there was not 
much difference between the Korean and English version of the interview 
transcription. Minor differences found that English transcription was more 
direct and simple in character compared to the Korean transcription. This 
might have been due to linguistic differences. 
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In terms of actually analyzing the transcribed recordine. the first level of 
this analysis took place while the recording Nýas being listened to during 
transcription. Interview recordings \Nere replayed and reviewed maný times. 
particularly if any statement was unclear. The transcription had to be 
analyzed with repetitive listening, writing and reading. The second level of 
analysis occurred when the process of transcription was completed. In this 
stage, key words/codes were analytically developed or inductively identified 
in the data and affixed to sets of notes or transcript pages. The selected key 
words/codes were examined for both the commonalities and disparities that 
emerged across the responses of the different individual subjects. In this 
stage, all materials were examined to separate meaningful patterns and 
processes. These key words were also transformed into categorical labels or 
themes. 
This categorization constituted the third level of analysis. In this level, the 
researcher examined the small sets of generalizations established and 
identified patterns in the light of previously established conceptual 
frameworks and research expectations. The themes that emerged through 
this process include those such as 'tensions', 'appropriate policing', 
'resolution of tension', and so on. This confirmation stage was able to 
determine whether the original research aims and objectives had been 
maintained or not. 
Finally, the researcher accomplished the data analysis with coding frames 
and analyzing any correlations between respondents' answers and the main 
research questions. Initially, the researcher thought of using an Nvivo 7 
programme to analyze the data. However, it was not used due to the 
relatively small size of data. Wincup (1997: 69) stated that a 'software 
package consumes too much time for sorting and retrieving data at the 
expense of writing'. The concept of data display was used to accomplish 
this analysis. Data display involves 'tables of data, tally sheets of themes, 
summaries of proportions of various statements, phrases, or terms, and 
similarly reduced and transformed groupings of data' (Berg, 2001: 36). Data 
display helps the researcher to understand the pattern of data and to 
determine whether additional analysis or actions are required. The 
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researcher used the concept of data display from the beginning of the 
research to monitor the overall research process. 
Criteria for 'trustworthiness' of the research 
This research was tested for 'trustworthiness' by four criteria (credibility. 
transferability, dependability, conformability) suggested by Lincoln and 
Guba (1985). This research result satisfied those four criteria since the 
subject of this research was accurately identified and described; the 
conclusion of this research can be generalized; the process of this research 
was well documented and reasonably stable over time; and neutrality of 
research and minimization of bias are in the research. 
This study made every effort to maintain a high standard of research 
integrity and 'trustworthiness', in accordance Nvith the four criteria 
described. The credibility of the findings of the stud), was largely grounded 
in the scientific methodology used for data collection and analysis, in the 
meaningfulness of the descriptions given in conjunction NN ith that data 
collection and analysis, and in the way in which the results and findings of 
the study were systematically linked to the conceptual frameNvork. With 
regard to transferability, the qualitative approach followed in the study did 
not allow for generalization applied to a population Nvider than that involved 
in the study. However, in as far as the findings were congruent with, or 
confirming of, the conceptual framework of the study, it is possible to speak 
of the study having analytical validity; and this may allow for theory- 
connected transferability of findings. Dependability of the study was 
enhanced by the fact that the research questions, research strategy, and 
conceptual framework of the study, were all constructed on a strong 
theoretical basis, within clearly defined research parameters. Finally, to 
increase the conformability of the study, the research design, methodology, 
and procedures that guided the research process, including the collection, 
processing and analysis of the data, were well described and documented. 
and were executed in the most objective manner possible. 
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1.9 Expected contributions 
I believe that this thesis will provide a useful contribution to the 
development of internet fraud prevention in the design of South Korean 
internet fraud law and policing policy. Although South Korea is recognized 
as a strong IT nation, its current laws, rules, and policing strategies are 
insufficient to deal with the rising level of internet fraud. Since internet 
fraud shares a characteristic of transnational crime in that it is not 
constrained by national borders, the results of this research maý well be 
applicable to other nations' policy making. 
1.10 Overview of the thesis structure 
Chapter I introduced the subject of policing internet fraud and aimed to 
familiarise the reader with the purpose of the study and the intended 
structure. This chapter also explained the method and considered the 
questions to be answered through the qualitative research strategý. One of 
the main objectives of this chapter was to describe and explain the 
qualitative interviewing process used in the study, and how that process was 
customized to suit the particular requirements and conditions of the study as 
a whole. The qualitative interview method used in this study ývas designed 
to obtain a distinctive and informative perspective on tensions between the 
private and public models of policing internet fraud in South Korea. The 
techniques of data collection and analysis have been documented, and 
relevant ethical issues were also addressed. 
Chapter 2 aims to introduce the current situation of internet fraud in South 
Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. This chapter discusses 
the definition of internet fraud, types of internet fraud and statistics of three 
nations. Different types of internet fraud which are prevented through 
different jurisdictions are discussed and introductions to major incidents can 
help us to see the trends of internet fraud. Comparison of statistics show 
that internet fraud has rapidly increased regardless of jurisdictions. 
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Chapter 3 discusses the main theme of this thesis about 'policing internet 
fraud' in South Korea. It first introduces policing cý berspace in the sense of 
'the internet order-maintenance assemblage' model by David Wall (2007). 
Subsequently this thesis introduces internet fraud regulation, policing bodies 
and internet laws in South Korea. Finally, an explanation of the historical 
background and reform of the criminal justice system reveals \\ hy the 
Korean police force is struggling over the ownership of policing cý bercrime. 
Chapter 4 examines the UK policing model for internet fraud NNhich 
illustrates a much more fragmented and specialized form of policing 
compared to the South Korean policing model. This chapter also indicates 
the relationship between private and public sectors, multi-agency cross 
sector partnerships and barriers to hinder the development of partnership 
policing. Particularly, this chapter discusses tensions produced between 
sectors while taking part in policing internet fraud. 
Chapter 5 examines the US policing model for internet fraud which focuses 
on public security and crime prevention by the public policing bodies. This 
chapter shows how enhancement of national security shapes the laws related 
to cybercrime. Kozlovski's 'designing accountable online policing' model 
emphasizes the transformation of policing cybercrime. It compares 
traditional law enforcement model strategies and structures to the 
cyberpolicing model. It shows why the current criminal justice system has 
to be changed in order to respond to cybercrimes. Finally, it introduces the 
US model of multi-agency cross sector partnership through illustrating the 
CIPAC (Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council) that *provides 
the operational mechanism for carrying out the sector partnership structure. 
Chapter 6 examines serious tensions between private and public models of 
policing internet fraud in South Korea. This chapter identifies the most 
serious tensions between and within the two sectors. The chapter explores 
the origin, resolution of tensions and ideal partnership from the local to the 
international level. The interviews reveal cultural differences in policing 
internet fraud and other policing activities. 
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Chapter 7 proposes the promotion of effective partnership policing and 
correct balancing of policing between the two sectors in order to provide the 
most appropriate policing model to the general and corporate victims. The 
chapter recommends the ideal model of policing internet fraud from the 
local to international level in both sectors. The International Internet Fraud 
Control Agency (IlFCA) would become a hub agency for policing internet 
fraud. 
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Chapter 2: Internet fraud problems in Korea, the UK 
and the US 
2.1 Introduction 
The policing of Internet fraud may be simply explained with ýNords such as 
the regulation of internet fraud or internet fraud control. HoweNýer. the 
concept of 'policing' is more appropriate here to help understand the 
tensions between private and public policing models. In order to appreciate 
the main research question about tensions between private and public 
models of policing fraudulent activities in eyberspace, it is necessary to 
examine the characteristics of internet fraud, private and public policing 
models, internet fraud regulation and tensions surrounding the policing of 
internet fraud. 
In addition to the benefits it has brought, the emergence of the internet has 
had some negative impacts on society. It 'has not only radically changed the 
means by which one communicates, conducts business, and engages in 
recreation, but has also brought new avenues for criminal pursuits and ne\\ 
forms of victimization' (Bums et al., 2004: 477). Internet fraud has 
attributed to a significant loss of e-commerce (FTC, 1998) and is a 
significant impediment to commercial growth. Recent research reports that 
internet fraud is on 'the increase and that a lack of awareness, and 
inappropriate, limited or absent countermeasures have aggravated the 
negative impact of Internet fraud on society' (Malakedsuwan and Stevens, 
2003: 18). 
The emergence of the internet has made fraudulent activities easier than 
ever, because internet fraud does not require office space, employees, or 
long periods to convince target audiences. The internet saves time and 
money. Furthermore, it does not require people to congregate. The internet 
has attracted many people to commit fraud in cyberspace. Cohen (2002: 5-6) 
said that 'throughout the centuries, people have perpetrated frauds of all 
sorts in order to gain through taking advantage of others'. The crime, having 
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moved to the internet, is made more diffusible and harder to identitý' readily 
as a real threat. 
According to the Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants (2001), 
reports of consumer based internet fraud indicates that between 5 to 10 
percent of online transactions may involve fraud. Internet fraud affects all 
members in society in a number of ways that are different to traditional 
street crimes because of a lack of victims' computer networking knowledge 
and vulnerable targets, such as retired seniors, homemakers and children. 
Furthermore, victims may be unaware that they have been victimized. There 
are no corresponding estimations for fraud involving business and 
government transactions conducted electronically, although it is likely that 
fraud rates would be similar. 
Smith and Urbas found high rates of concern about internet fraud risk 
among consumers, businesses and government agencies, and these concerns 
continue to hinder the development of electronic commerce globally (Smith 
and Urbas, 2001). This demonstrates how internet fraud can cause fear of 
crime even in the digital era. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
nature and implications of internet fraud as a crime. 
As described in the following section, internet fraud can display different 
characteristics to traditional economic crime and therefore requires new 
strategies for detection and prevention. Non-reactive strategies would 
require private and public agencies to work together in ways that would 
most likely transcend the traditional private/public dichotomy (Brenner. 
2004). 
2.2 Defining internet fraud 
Internet fraud has characteristics that are completely different to those of 
traditional fraud being, for example, impersonal, anonymous, instantaneous, 
accessible, and convenient. Baker (2002) reported that the internet enables 
fraudulent, low cost schemes to be circulated to a Nvide audience. Wall 
(2006: 12) stated: 'they are small-impact, bulk-victimizations \\ith a large 
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aggregated loss, but spread out globally across a range of jurisdictions'. 
Corbett (2006) similarly stated that internet fraud cases often invoke 
multiple one-time victims who have only lost a small amount of money. The 
internet offers more ranges of products to buy as well as providing more 
opportunities to commit fraudulent activities. 
Internet fraud is also different from the traditional forms of fraud in terms of 
the use of technology in the criminal act and shares some characteristics 
with what Wall called 'hybrid' and 'true cybercrimes, respectively those 
criminal behaviours that are either traditional crimes transformed bý 
networked technologies or wholly new forms of criminalitý such as 
spamming, phishing and pharming (Wall, 2006). True cý'bercrime is a type 
of crime that would disappear if the internet was removed, thus internet 
fraud is not a part of true cybercrime as fraud will always remain a form of 
crime. These new forms are distinguished from more traditional forms of 
criminal behaviour which only use the internet for communications. 
According to Wall (2007), cybercrime tends to fall in one of three basic sub- 
criminologies: computer integrity crimes, computer-assisted crimes and 
computer content crimes. Internet fraud falls into the category of computer- 
assisted crimes, which use networked computers to commit crimes. In 
particular, many auction frauds use manipulated sites to entice innocent 
victims. However, the distinctions are not always so clear because true 
cybercrime, such as 'phishing', involves more than one of these three basic 
categories. Wall (2007: 49) explained that 'offenders engage their victims 
through spam (integrity), steal their personal information (computer-assisted) 
by deceiving victims into logging on to a bogus website (content) which 
they think belongs to their bank. Phishers then assault the integrity of the 
victim's own financial system to perpetrate a fraud'. 
However, internet fraud does not conveniently fit into existing categories of 
crime. It is therefore classified as a white-collar crime since there is a 
preconception that the internet is only used by Nvell-educated groups of 
people. However, although it shares minor characteristics, since internet 
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fraud contains unique attributes that contrast with conventional fraud. it is 
not easily classified as white-collar crime. Its differences are four fold. 
Internet fraud has a global reach capable of targeting a wide range of 
victims (Fried, 2003) virtually instantaneously. 
0 Internet fraud requires a wide range of policing since it transcends 
individual jurisdictions. 
9 Internet fraud requires a relatively small amount of mone. y to commit 
crimes. 'No longer there is a need to rent office space, hire 
employees and spend hours on a telephone pitching to targeted 
audiences' (Fried, 2003). 
0 Internet fraud does not require high levels of education or training to 
commit crimes. Actually, modern computers make it possible to 
commit fraud easily without any professional assistance. Computers 
provide not only the device for the fraud, but also ne\N opportunities 
for fraud. 
These characteristics are similar to the general characteristics of cybercrime. 
These show us that internet related fraud should be treated differently from 
the traditional criminological point of view. 
Although internet fraud shares a large proportion of characteristics with 
white collar crime, it does not mean that it has to be dealt with through the 
same method of crime prevention and investigation. Internet fraud is a new 
type of crime in the digital era. Therefore, it needs distinctive analysis in 
criminology. The following section addresses how internet fraud is to some 
extent linked with white collar crime. 
Historically, Sutherland coined the term 'white collar crime' in 1939. Marx 
and Engels recognized that the powerful and the privileged commit 'crimes!. 
Such crime is associated with the character of the capitalist economic 
system and the special status of the privileged (Friedrichs, 1996). Ross 
(1907) promoted the notion of 'the criminaloid' that inspired SLItherland: the 
businessperson who committed crime to maximize profit under the 
camouflage of respectability and piety. Sutherland criticized *those 
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behaviours and actions of "big business" that corrupted and threatened the 
laudable aspects of the American economic system' (Sutherland. 1949: 
1983: 90-93). The generally accepted definition is that ýýhite-collar crime is 
the illegal and harmful actions of elites and respectable members of society 
carried out for economic gain in the context of legitimate organizational or 
occupational activities (Friedrichs, 1996). Another definition by Tombs and 
Whyte (2001: 319-20), is: 'a heterogeneous group of offences committed by 
people of relatively high status or enjoying relatively high levels of trust, 
and made possible by their legitimate employment .. 
White-collar crime refers to acts defined by criminal IaNN and adjudicated in 
criminal proceeding (Tappan, 1947). There are conceptual controversies 
over whether white-collar crime should refer to acts committed by higher 
status individuals or institutions, or those committed in the context of a 
legitimate occupation, regardless of socioeconomic status: NNhether it should 
refer to acts involving economic and financial activities only, or other acts 
involving physical harm as NN'ell. and whether it should refer to acts of 
people only, or organizations only, or both (Friedrichs, 1992). 
Traditionally, white-collar crime has been perceived as less serious than 
conventional crime (Schlegel and Weisburd, 1992). The public tends to be 
unconcerned about business crime and even expresses sympathy with the 
offenders after they have been arrested. White-collar crimes involving fraud, 
illegal price fixing, or other purely financial losses have tended to be 
regarded as less serious than those causing physical harm. However. if a 
significant amount of money is involved and it was obtained under false 
pretences, it might be considered more serious than housebreaking (Levi. 
1991). 
It is believed that 'white-collar crime victimization is diffusible and Victh-n*s 
attributes are especially heterogeneous' (Mcshane and Williams. 1992: 262). 
-Not all crimes committed NN ith high technology are NN hite collar crimes, but 
techno-crime/ hi-tech crime has been described as a subset of white collar 
crime, or alternatively as a distinctly new form of white collar crime' 
(Parker, 1980; Wasik, 1991). According to Reichman (1993) the internet 
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plays a chief role in insider trading cases by providing the facilities to hide 
illegal profits and market positions, transfer mone, \ to offshore bank 
accounts, and to park stocks and hide stock ownership. 
The internet has been used as a tool for developing fraudulent businesses 
(Attaran, 1999). Online business is favoured by the fraudster since it does 
not need a physical space, office supplies or staff. The mobile technology of 
the internet attracts more fraudsters making policing of internet fraud even 
more difficult. It is common that offenders, servers and victims are located 
in different countries. Therefore, fraud in the information age must be 
treated in a different way to that of conventional fraud, because the criminal 
environment has changed significantly with the emergence. of information 
technology in the last few decades (Cohen, 2002). Each type of crime needs 
a different formula and level of policing. However, it is not easy to 
determine what level of policing would appropriately fit to a specific type of 
crime. It is a very difficult research question since there has been 
insufficient previous work done to date. 
Internet fraud is equivalent to the traditional form of fraud in that it 
incorporates deceptive behaviour (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2003) that causes 
financial damage to innocent people. One advantage of using the internet as 
a tool is the offender can distance him or herself from the victim. 
Impersonal and anonymous contact between the offender and victim can be 
one of the factors helping to facilitate internet fraud. Internet fraud is also 
defined as any act of dishonesty or deception carried out with the use of the 
internet, or directed at the technologies that support the internet. By 
definition, internet fraud takes place in a 'virtual environment' (Williams, 
2000). 
Internet fraud has similar general characteristics to traditional fraud, but in 
being reorganized into the virtual environment it is fundamentallý 
transformed (Cohen, 2002). It is more a technolog) based crime in contrast 
to traditional cybercrime which is computer based. The nature of this 
transformation depends on what particular features of the internet are 
exploited. The internet is used by both those with an interest in efficient 
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exercises of 'traditional' criminality as well as by those familiar with the 
possibilities of altogether new forms of criminality (Grabosky. 2000). 
Potential internet fraud is encouraged by a failure on the part of policy 
makers to realize that the internet offers access to an area beyond the reach 
of traditional policing and traditional legislative firameýý'orks (Graboský. 
2000). Therefore, we need more studies about the legal response to internet 
fraud. How to regulate internet fraud in cyberspace without infringing other 
innocent internet users' rights is a priority matter. 
Just about every facet of commerce has been transformed by the internet; 
we now have many more opportunities to undertake e-commerce through 
the internet. However, it appears that online securities utilized by the private 
and public sectors do not perfectly counter internet fraud. As more people 
use the internet to purchase and sell their goods identification theft is also 
increasing. We have often heard that large portal sites or companies, 
websites have been hacked and customers' personal information has been 
stolen. 
3 According to the long tail theory by Chris Anderson (2 1007) , the emergence 
of the intemet enables anybody to easily access useful information that he or 
she has never accessed previously. The internet has provided unlimited 
opportunities to deceive vulnerable groups of people without spending the 
high cost normally incurred by firaudsters. Easy access and the low cost of 
using the intemet have enabled fraudsters to find new victims in cyberspace. 
According to the Anti Phishing Working Group (APWG), phishers no 
longer only exploit the famous banking brand names. The study indicated 
that 80 percent of fraud concentrated on the 15 top brands but 20 percent of 
fraud aimed at previously unknown brands. This shows the long-tail effect 
started in cyberspace crime (Broersma, 12/09/2006). Foremski (22/03/2008) 
said that 'long-tail businesses are based on aggregating huge numbers of 
micro market'. The cost of maintaining a micro market is low and the cost 
of data storage and servers are rapidly becoming cheaper. He believes that 
'long-tail businesses' will eventually collapse e-commerce. Because of this 
'Editor in chief, 'Wired' magazine and author of 'The long tail' (Hyperion and Random 
House). 
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reason, a fraudster's business can be seen as a micro-market based 'long-tail 
business' which will eventually disintegrate the level of e-commerce 
activities. 
It is evident that it is difficult to narrowly define internet fraud, but ýý ith a 
broad idea of its characteristics, the following section now aims to introduce 
different types of internet fraud and consider their impact on individual 
internet users' e-commerce activities. 
2.3 Types of internet fraud 
Major internet fraud includes identity theft, credit card fraud. online auction 
fraud, short firm fraud and advanced fee fraud, as described below Ný ith 
reliable data from trustful agencies such as APACS - the UK payments 
association, Australian Credit Card Fraud Survey (ACCFS), National \Vhite 
Collar Crime Center (NW3C), Federal Trade Commission (FTC), National 
Consumer's League (NCL), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and 
Internet Crime Complaint Center (10). These data sources provide an 
overview of major internet fraud activities in the United Kingdom, the 
United States and Australia. 
Identity theft 
According to an APACS (2005: 28) report, '15 million adults used internet 
banking and 22 million adults purchased goods or services over the internet' 
in 2004. This reflects the fact that more people are using the internet as a 
major means for managing their financial affairs. Therefore fraudsters have 
used the internet to defraud banks using loan frauds and through money 
laundering and identity theft. 
As credit cards have become a more widely used payment method, 
fraudsters have focused on credit and debit card payment fraud. With more 
technologies being used by fraudsters, credit and debit card payment fraud 
has become a true cybercrime. This fraud is mainly divided into two t), pes: 
input and output fraud. Input fraud relates to a fraudster accessing credit 
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card information while output fraud is 'to obtain goods. services or money' 
(Wall, 2007: 72). 
Recently, phishing and pharming have been used by fraudsters to collect 
personal information (passwords and account details) of credit card holders. 
Wall (2007) stated that this has brought about the automation of cybercrime. 
Phishing emails usually direct someone to a deceptive URL and ask for the 
recipient's personal information in order to protect them from potential risks 
from an urgent security breach, while pharming automatically directs 
recipients to a bogus website. 'DNS poisoning. *cache poisoning' or *DNS 
spoofing' are also other names for pharming. Pharming does not use social 
engineering methods to obtain the victim's information. Pharming emails 
contain malicious codes that poison or hijack the domain name server 
(DNS). The main point of pharming is to confuse recipients so that they are 
4signposted to internet sites different to those intended, or their e-mail maý' 
be rerouted to mail servers not authorized to receive it' (Wall. 2007: 77). 
Those two methods are based on automated technology used by fraudsters. 
In order to protect innocent internet users from those harmful activities, 
public awareness programmes provided by the government, financial 
institutes and other relevant private entities are important. Because most 
phishing and pharming fraudsters target credit card and auction site users 
(Murphy and Murphy, 2007), these companies have to prepare advanced 
internet security systems. 
Following identity theft, credit card fraud, online auction fraud and Nigerian 
advance fee fraud are the most notorious offences in terms of seriousness 
and size of loss (Smith, Holmes and Kaufmann, 1999). There are many 
complaints from consumers who use internet shopping mall and auction 
sites. However, the statistics of victimization appear to show that it is in 
inverse proportion to the actual number of victims due to lack of reporting 
by victims. 
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Credit card fraud 
The most frequently committed type of online financial fraud involves the 
use of a credit card fraud as the payment instrument; it is flexible and can 
target anyone from the individual consumer to the large corporation. 
According to APACS statistics in 2007, internet card payments (using a 
credit card payment or debit card) by UK customers increased by 400 
percent between 2003 and 2007, to 34 million. As more customers have the 
facility to use internet card payments, e-commerce activities have globally 
developed. More people are also purchasing goods from the online market 
in which businesses are not locally based. For example, Korean customers 
are using e-Bay and Amazon to purchase items. However, prosperous e- 
commerce activities have increased risks when using internet card payments 
(Smith and Urbas, 2001). Customers' risks and liabilities have also 
increased while e-commerce activities have become major business methods. 
However, financial institutions do want to take any risk for paying 
customers' losses from internet fraud so customers have to take all financial 
burdens in terms of liability for loss (Gibbons, 2001; Lang, 1999; 
Parliament of Victoria, 2002). 
The absence of face-to-face confirmation of internet transactions has 
promoted the development of online trading by credit card (Gibbons 2001; 
Shankar and Walker 2001). For online transactions, customers are only 
required to provide their name, address, credit card number and expiry dates. 
This non-personal contact and transaction has facilitated internet fraud 
(Gibbons, 2001; Smith, 1999; Westpac, 2000). 
A United Kingdom study found that 57 percent of businesses had reported 
online credit card fraud incidents to police (Experian, 2001). It is difficult to 
assess the losses associated with online credit card fraud since losses are 
associated with card -not-pre sent frauds. However, the introduction of chip 
and pin decreased the loss from CNP (card -n ot-pre sent) fraud from 2119 
million pound to 209 million pound in the first six months (APACS, 2006). 
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There is another problem that promotes online credit card fraud and this 
relates to the demographic information gathered from fraud; traders are 
under reporting and absorbing the fraud cost (Kennedy, 2000). Until theý 
receive a chargeback from their financial institution, they are not aware of 
their liability and risks (Levi, 2002). 
The Australian Credit Card Fraud Survey (ACCFS) in 2003 indicated that 
the prevalence of online credit card fraud does vary by business type. with 
II percent of florists, 17 percent of booksellers, 15 percent of recorded 
music retailers, II percent of toy and game retailers, 13 percent of computer 
hardware small retailers, and between 26 and 43 percent of online 
businesses having been victims of fraud (Australian Institute of Criminology, 
2003). In spite of the risk of online credit card fraud, and the potential 
consequences of an incident of fraud, most online traders were largely 
satisfied with e-businesses. Only 5 percent indicated that they were likelý' to 
discontinue online trading in the future. More than 50 percent of businesses 
believe that online trading has significantly increased sales in their 
businesses and expect more businesses will join e-commerce within the next 
two years (Charlton and Taylor, 2004). This indicates that the rapid growth 
of e-commerce will not be deterred, despite the fact that some significant 
adverse effects, such as internet fraud, have occurred. 
The recent Interpol website for a Universal Classification System for 
Counterfeit Payment Cards provides up-to-date information on trends and 
techniques for forgery of payment cards and fraud (Broadhurst, 2005). This 
site has a unique clearinghouse function and serves as an example of how 
international agencies can assist with essential tasks, such as secure shared 
intelligence, and the potential role of the individual in the prevention of 
financial crime. 
Online auction fraud 
The internet's new digital commercial environments, such as eBaN have 
created new criminal opportunities for online auction fraud. In addition to 
generating public concern, auction fraud is a useful example of the neNN 
generation of cybercrimes. Although auction fraud existed before the 
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emergence of the internet, the onset of digital auction environments, such as 
eBay, has required the establishment of new bidding systems and safe 
payment methods, such as PayPal (Wahap, 2004). 
In the US, the National Consumer's League Internet Fraud %Vatch (1998) 
reported that the largest number of complaints relating to fraud in e- 
commerce concern online auction sites (NCL, 1999) and noted that fraud 
involving online auctions occurred far more frequently than other forms of 
internet fraud, and there was an average loss per complaint of $518 in 2001 
(Internet Fraud Watch, 2002). According to an FBI report in 2002. online 
auctions account for the majority of complaints about internet fraud. The 
Internet Fraud Complaint Center, a joint operation of Federal Bureau of 
Investigation and the National White Collar Crime Center said it referred 
16,775 complaints in 2001. 'These statistics indicate the significance of 
Internet fraud and the need to identify the readiness of law enforcement at 
all levels to prevent and control Internet fraud' (Burns and Whitworth, 2002: 
1). The monetary loss associated with fraud more than tripled, to $54 
million from $17 million, in the same period. Auction fraud accounted for 
46 percent of complaints referred to law enforcement. Internet auction sites 
have strengthened user responsibility by reinforcing the real-time name 
verification system and adopting strong countermeasures to minimize fraud 
cases. According to IFCC, internet fraud comprised 71 percent of referred 
complaints and 190,143 complaints referred to law enforcement in 2004 
(NW3C, 2005). The total loss from internet fraud was $68.14 million with a 
median dollar loss of $219.56 per complaint. The average loss per person 
increased from $527 in 2003 to $895 in 2004. Websites were still the most 
prominent medium, with 75% in 2005, utilized for conducting fraud (NCL 
and NFIC, 2005). 
According to Gregg and Scott (2006), the FTC's (Fair Trade Commission) 
internet auction fraud data comprised 71.2 percent of the reported 
complaints with an average loss of $765 in 2004. After auction fraud, non- 
deliverable merchandise and non-payments Nvere the second largest category, 
accounting for 20.3 percent of complaints. In 2005. IC3 received 231,493 
complaints, 62.7 percent related to online auction fraud \\here 41 victims 
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lost an average of $385 and most related to online auction complaints about 
non-delivery of ordered items and manipulation of reputation s) stems (Chau, 
Pandit and Faloutsos, 2006; Zhang and Zhou, 2008). 
The majority of online auction fraud occurs on el3aý because it is the 
biggest auction site: eBay had roughly 69 million registered users 
worldwide and $1.2 billion of net revenue in 2002. Nearly 8 million bids are 
placed everyday (Kirshner, 2003). These auctions range from small toý s to 
consumer durables and antiques. 'eBay promotes itself as a community 
where people come to shop, get to know others, discuss issues of mutual 
interest, and have fun' (Duh et al, 2002). In its mission statement, May 
'offers a wide variety of educational tools, features, and services that enable 
members to buy and sell on the site quickly, safely, and conveniently. These 
services include online payments by PayPal, tips on safe trading, and the 
Developers Program for community members who would like to develop 
their own technology solutions' (eBay, 2006). 
The FBI (2006) reported that auction fraud outnumbered any other type of 
cybercrime. Approximately 45% of reported cybercrimes come from 
auction fraud. According to the IC3 statistics, 86,000 complaints ýý'ere 
officially reported to the law enforcement agency. The average loss per 
victim was $724, totalling up to $198.44 million, $15 million more than 
2005 losses. Complaints rose by around 21% from 2005. 
Along with its fast growing market and business volume, the number of 
complaints is increasing. In response to these complaints, the FTC started a 
database to gather and organize online auction complaints for legal 
enforcement purposes (Guidera, 2000). As is the case with most internet 
fraud, the fraud on auction sites is diffused and varied, making it difficult to 
counteract. 
There are many different forms of auction fraud including shill bidding, bid- 
siphoning, bid-shielding, refusal to pay, misrepresenting characteristics of 
goods offered for sale, and selling illegal or stolen items. According to the 
National Consumers' League (2001). among the various kinds of fraud, I 
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shilling is the hardest form of auction fraud to detect (Kauffman and Wood, 
2003). Shilling is the most widely reported fraud in online auctions. It is the 
practice of sellers posing as buyers and submitting bids to driý e up the price. 
For example, the seller may register under another alias and submit bids that 
appear to come from an independent buyer (Duh et al. 2002). Bid siphoning 
is the practice of a seller posting an item for sale and observing the e-mail 
addresses of interested buyers, and then contacting them with intent to sell 
directly to avoid the auctioneer's service charges. When a seller receives 
money, however, the buyer never receives the item and does not have the 
remedy of reporting the swindle through eBay's feedback system (Ray, 
2000). In bid shielding, two or more bidders plan to keep other legitimate 
buyers from bidding. The high bidder withdraws his bid just before the end 
of the auction giving some excuse, and his partner gets the item for the 
lowest price that he or she bids. eBay could discourage bid shielding bý 
allowing sellers to specify a price above which bids are automatically 
accepted when the auction terminates. Refusal to pay is another problem. 
Since eBay conducts no credit checks, a person can bid an), amount of 
money on any item, even without the means or intent to pay for them. 
Sellers are often accused of misrepresentation of goods or failing to supply 
the item listed for sale to the winning bidder (Simpson, 2000). Some eBay 
users have formed a 'shill group' to expose suspected frauds on an internet 
discussion group by requesting the actual user name behind the screen name 
from eBay (Simpson, 2000). According to Duh et al. (2002: 14), Tailing to 
pay, using stolen credit cards, improper employee behaviour, and 
misrepresenting the quality or characteristics of goods are more common 
and occur in a wide variety of e-commerce websites'. 
A feedback forum and an escrow programme are the key mechanisms with 
which eBay deals with fraudulent behaviour. The feedback forum is a 
unique feature of eBay. When the successful transaction is completed, the 
buyer and seller are encouraged to record feedback about their counterparts. 
The character of feedback records makes them a powerful enforcement tool. 
It has also stimulated some competing participants to try to manipulate the 
feedback by getting their colleagues to post positiN, e feedback, or bN 
painting their competitors in unfavourable terms. Shill feedback, feedback 
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extortion and feedback solicitation are some obvious possibilities (Dennehy. 
2000). eBay deals with such behaviour by allowing buyers to file 
complaints and takes disciplinary action, but Ior legal reasons, the result of 
the investigation may not be disclosed or shared with eBay users' (Kaiser 
and Kaiser, 2000: 142). eBay does not have many direct disciplinary options 
other than to refer offensive behaviour to the police, or expel the offending 
party from their website. eBay also does not compensate the deceived 
buyers (Levy and Stone, 1998). Online auction sites are powerless once a 
crime has occurred. As a result, various user groups have made increasing 
calls for government regulation of the internet auction business (13ý wel I and 
Oppenheim, 200 1). 
Compared to other economic crimes, which pursue the private model of 
justice, online auction companies more often invite the public police 
investigation to deal with auction fraud in their virtual markets. Because 
online auction fraud involves many individual participants, including sellers 
and buyers, it is completely different from the typical style of Business-to- 
Business (B2B) commerce. Online auction fraud is difficult for authorities 
to investigate and victims rarely recover the money they have lost. Online 
auction companies with their private model of justice and security 
management cannot handle all fraud cases without public police 
intervention. Online auction fraud can be a good example of cybercrime that 
strongly demands cross sector partnership between public and private 
policing. 
As described in this section, constantly increasing numbers of online auction 
fraud incidents show that more attention is needed to protect online 
shoppers and vendors while e-commerce is taking place in our society. 
Cross-sector partnership policing between private and public poling models 
is essential to respond to it because victims of online auctions vary from 
individuals to businesses so that any single sector alone cannot effectively 
cover the reported incidents. 
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Short firm fraud 
This fraud directly relates to auction fraud and long-firm fraud that 
Iraudster sets up in business as wholesaler, and place orders with suppliers 
with the intention of evading payment' (Merseyside Police. 2008). For 
example, an internet shopping mall may sell good items at a lower price for 
a while and build customer trust, and then may advertise to sell more 
expensive items at lower price but the items will never be delivered. 13ý 
manipulating the reputation system poor quality items are sold at very 
expensive prices. Use of the reputation management system is very 
important since more people are using auction sites for selling and buying 
useful items. There is usually no better system for trusting the reputation of 
the vendor than from the perspective of online customers (Wall, 2007). It 
appears that short firm fraud is an auxiliary fraud for online auction fraud. 
Without online auction fraud, short firm fraud does not exist. In contrast to 
short firm fraud, long-firm fraud entails a fraudster setting up in business as 
a wholesaler and purchasing goods from suppliers for resale with the sole 
intention of evading payment. 
Advance fee fraud 
This section on advance fee fraud will illustrate how the internet can 
transform an existing crime to an upgraded form of crime. Previously, 
advance fee fraud was conducted by sending letters to their potential victims. 
These frauds annually result in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars 
internationally (Buchanan and Grant, 2001). 
Advance fee fraud is also known as the '419' scheme, named after a statute 
in the Nigerian criminal code that prohibits obtaining property by false 
pretences (Oriola, 2005). Hence the reason why it is often called 'Nigerian 
advanced fee fraud'. In the United States, the Secret Service, who estimate 
that one quarter of the major frauds under investigation involve Nigeria, has 
primary responsibility for dealing with advance fee fraud (Smith, Holmes 
and Kaufmann, 1999). Where the victim has suffered financial loss, the 
Secret Service initiates an investigation (US Secret Service, 2007). 
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The National Internet Fraud Information Center reported that '8 percent. or 
985 out of 12,315 fraud complaints were about Nigerian money offers' in 
2005 (Wall, 2007: 92). According to IC3, they received 207,492 complaints 
in 2006, a decrease of 10% from the 2005 figures of 231,493. The average 
loss per victim was $5,100. This fraud typically begins with an unsolicited 
letter or email. The confidential message purports to come from a 
government official or ex-official, a doctor or a tribal chief (Emery, 2002). 
The letters are addressed personally to a potential victim explaining that a 
'mutual business associate' has suggested that the writer contact the 
addressee confidentially. The letter requests the recipient's assistance in 
transferring large sums of money in exchange for a percentage (Buchanan 
and Grant, 2001). The letters usually contain the following similarities: 
9 there is a large sum of money, known only to the writer, waiting to 
be paid out of the government coffers as a result of accounting 
shenanigans or over invoicing; 
9 the writer is a member of the government or military trying to move 
the money out of the country but needs help from abroad: 
9 the writer is willing to share the money with the recipient who 
provides assistance; 
0 secrecy is an absolute must because other corrupt officials would 
seize the money for themselves if they knew of its existence. 
The amounts represented are usually in the area of $35 million but may be 
as much as $75 million. In return for the help of the addressee, the writer 
promises anywhere from 20% to 30% of the total. In other words, the 
addressee is offered $7-10 million for very little effort and virtually no risk. 
(Buchanan and Grant, 2001: 40): 
After a number of communications and an appropriate amount of time to 
establish trust, the fraudster will report that the money is finally available 
for transfer. However, an unpredicted problem occurs, and advance payment 
fees are needed to clear the final obstacle. If the victim sends money, some 
other problems will occur until the victim is out of cash or realizes he or she 
has been deceived (Buchanan and Grant, 2001). 
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There is a popular misconception that many of Nigeria's 120 million people 
were actively involved in the '419' frauds. However less than I percent of 
households have a personal computer, while internet connectivit-v and 
accessibility is one of the lowest in Africa (Oriola, 2005). most of the 
fraudulent emails are sent from public internet cafes and some of them come 
from outside Nigeria. For example, in 2002, a US law firm ýý as swindled of 
$2. I. million, by someone who claimed to be an official with the %Iinistrý of 
Mining in Pretoria, South Africa, who convinced their bookkeeper to assist 
in the transfer of $18 million from South Africa to the United States. She 
had been promised a commission of $4.5 million (Ashenfelter. 2002). 
Because of its seriousness, the United States House of Representatives 
proposed a Bill to tackle the problem. The Bill was to be known upon 
enactment as the 'Nigerian Advance Fee Fraud Prevention Act of 1998' 
(Emery, 2002). The proposed law emphasized the necessity of international 
cooperation and public enlightenment campaigns to combat the fraud. The 
Bill also indicated that the Nigerian Government had responsibility in the 
advance fee fraud and considered the possibility of imposing economic and 
other sanctions on the Government of Nigeria as a means of restricting the 
fraud. However., there are jurisdictional problems that prevent transnational 
cybercrime governance and explain the US Congress's preference for 
international cooperation, diplomacy and possible economic sanctions 
against Nigeria. The Money Laundering Act and Mail Fraud Act cover 
some parts of the violation, so the law was not passed (Oriola, 2005). 
In the United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office's West African Fraud 
Section took action; III individuals were prosecuted in 1997 (Smith, 
Holmes and Kaufmann, 1999) and approximately 25,000 complaints were 
received in 2001. This report indicates total losses of 10.5 million pounds, 
with an average loss per victim of 146,000 pounds. The City of London 
Police arrested over 500 advance fee fraudsters in 2004 (The Hindu, 2004). 
Smith, Holmes and Kaufi-nann (1999: 5) reported that 'the British Postal 
Service is also acquiring new powers to intercept and destroy advance f'ee 
letters'. 
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However, before postal service intervention, as part of public law 
enforcement, provision of the necessary poNNer to police by ISPs could 
provide more effective proactive policing against Nigerian advance fee 
letters. While some people believe that it is very useful that Internet Service 
Providers worldwide help by filtering out advance fee fraud e-mails, maný 
Intemet users oppose to the filtering of their e-mail by Internet Service 
Providers. It is against one of the basic principles of the internet, N\hich 
guarantees free flow of information. Civil liberty groups have opposed the 
cybercrime treaty because they believe that its activity dramatically restricts 
the free flow of information (BBC, 2006). From this perspective. self- 
regulation of the ISP is a very sensitive agenda for the private sector. It maN. 
result in the collapse of the ISP due to the infringement of cyber-rights. 
Oriola (2005: 246) suggested that countries with spam laws adapt them to 
avoid advance fee fraudsters because 'advance fee solicitations can be 
expressly designated as unsolicited non-commercial fraudulent e-mails, and 
outlawed'. It gives a significant impetus for strong international cooperation, 
since emails travel all around the world. There is no specific remedy for this 
violation, only international cooperation in intelligence gathering, sharing, 
and investigation and prosecution can be an effective counter measure to 
control advance fee fraud (Emery, 2002; Oriola, 2005). 
These days advance fee fraud has been found in eBay auction sites. The con 
artist personally approaches to victims to suggest that the direct trade 
between seller and buyer would save commission. When the victim is 
deceived and has sent money or products to the fraudster, the victim will 
never receive the money or products they expected. Therefore, online 
auction companies like eBay strongly recommend using secure methods for 
transactions, such as Paypal. 
Other advance fee frauds have also been adapted to the online environment. 
They are advance fee fraud in dating (looking for sex partner) and 
purchasing of goods (selling at a lower price). Advance fee fraud in dating 
usually occurs between an adult male victim and a young female offender. 
Particularly in Korea, a young female fraudster xN ill offer a date for moneN. 
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When the man remits money through the Internet, the girl never shows up at 
the meeting place. Because of protection laws of the youth, ý%hich prohibit 
any sexual relationship with minors (under 19 ý ears old in Korea). most 
victims tend not to report incidents to the police. Advance fee fraud in 
purchasing of goods is similar to eBay fraud in that the seller never sends 
purchased goods to the buyer after receiving money. 
As described above, credit card fraud, online auction fraud, and advanced 
fee fraud are the overwhelming fraud cases directly affecting the public 
interest. However, private interest is also engaged in that corporate entities 
respond to these fraud cases with their own private model of justice to 
protect them from the negative adverse publicity and to secure market 
confidence. 
Meanwhile, the victims of advanced fee fraud are often complicit and 
willing participants who have been driven by their own greed. Therefore, 
'victims are seen as deserving ridicule more that sympathy' (Peel, 2006). 
Their seeking for the abnormal fortune provides more opportunities for the 
fraudsters. Whether victims of advanced fee fraud are aware or not, they 
significantly facilitate this kind of fraud. This makes policing it much harder. 
Other types of internet fraud 
* Direct investment frauds are more harmful than work at home scams. 
Fraudsters 'purport to be legitimate investment brokers who sign up 
and produce free investment reports to customers that subsequently 
trick them into investing their funds in dubious stocks and shares. 
Another direct investment fraud is the 'pump and dump' fraud 
whereby investors playing the stock market are deceived bý, 
misinformation circulating on the internet about real stock. This 
information artificially drives up the price of the stock (the pump), 
which is them sold off at inflated price (the dump)' (Wall, 2007: 87). 
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0 Intemet Access Services is a fraud that offers a free trial period for 
the Internet Service to the customer, ýýhich eventuall) results in a 
contract with the ISP, with large penalties for cancellation 
(Balsmeier, Bergiel and Charles Viosca, 2004). According to 
Internet Fraud Watch statistics compiled for 2005, Internet Access 
Services fraud indicates I% with $1262 of the top 10 fraud (Internet 
Fraud Watch, 2005). 
0 Internet advertising fraud is a 'pay-per-click' advertising fraud. The 
aim of this fraud is to make people click. Every single click is to 
make money. However, each click is not made from an individual 
internet user but more likely done by a Third World loýN-wage 
factory worker. As technological advances occur, software is more 
commonly used by fraudsters. Link sparnming is a good example of 
this fraud, which connects the specific keyword to a ýýebsite such as 
'pornography' (Wall, 2007). 
9 The repair of credit rating is a famous financial scam to entice *many 
poor and financially excluded through the internet with promises to 
repair their credit ratings, provide credit options or credit facilities, 
credit cards with zero or very low interests, or instant and unlimited 
loans without credit checks or security' (Wall, 2007: 87). 
0 Drug sales scams aim to distribute counterfeit versions of drugs such 
as Viagra and Cialis (anti-impotence drugs) through internet sales. 
Sometimes spam mail and viruses to infect computers accompany 
the drug fraud. Particularly, this fraud also involves transnational 
criminality since it involves sending drugs across national borders to 
avoid local prescription restrictions or exploit beneficial tax 
circumstances (Wall, 2007). 
0 Travel and vacation scam is a fraud that offers a luxurious boat trip 
with lots of extra benefits such as a rental car, hotel and 
entertainment. However, the), deliver lower quality accommodation I 
and services than advertised or no trip at all. Usuallý a trip is 
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scheduled for the next year so that customers voluntarily abandon 
trips. Most of the time there is an additional or hidden charge in 
order to take an actual trip. According to the National Fraud 
Information Center, the average loss due to fraud in 2004 was S803 
per incident. Travel frauds are the second most reported fraud after 
online auctions (Glink, 2005). 
0 Advance fee loan frauds are run by deceitful individuals who target 
those individuals with a poor credit history and who have been 
turned down for loans from financial institutions. According to law, 
enforcement agencies in the US and Canada, 'ads and promotions 
for advance-fee loans suggest - or even -guarantee" - that there's 
a high likelihood that a loan will be approved, regardless of the 
applicant's credit history. But to take advantage of the offer, the 
consumer has to pay a fee'. Once they receive your money, they run 
off or their phone number will be changed (FTC, 2005). 
0 Prize/sweepstake fraud is a fraud whereby 'customers receive an e- 
mail from someone claiming to be from a law firm or a government 
agency. Victims are told that they have won a large sweepstakes 
prize but need to pay taxes up front. If they pay, they Nvill receive 
another email a few days later, telling them that another winner 
refused to pay taxes. As a result, the prize is larger and they need to 
pay additional taxes'. According to the Canadian Better Business 
Bureau (CCBBB, 2005), it is illegal in both Canada and the United 
States to ask for money upfront if you have legitimately won a 
prize/sweepstake. 
2.4 Social engineering and internet fraud 
Social engineering is used as a major method to deceive others. Social 
engineering is 'an outside hacker's use of psychological tricks on legitimate 
users of a computer system, in order to obtain information he needs to gain 
access to the system' (Palumbo, 2000). According to Granger (2001), 'the 
basic goals of social engineering are: to gain unauthorized access to systems 
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or information in order to commit fraud, network intrusion, industrial 
espionage, identity theft, or simply to disrupt the system or network. Tý pical 
targets include telephone companies and ansNýering services, big-name 
corporations and financial institutions, military and government agencies. 
and hospitals'. Hackers and fraudsters use social engineering to obtain *user 
names and passwords' to penetrate computer networks. They deceive people 
who can lead to them to system control programmes, database, financial or 
telecommunication systems. After they access the system, they erase, 
modify or copy the information to fit their needs (Broadhurst and Chantler, 
2007). 
Fraudsters develop a human relationship to obtain the necessary information. 
One of the most serious concerns is ID theft since true ID leads to the 
network or computer system (Smith, 2006). As the development of e- 
commerce increases, awareness of social engineering is necessary. However, 
study of social engineering and its defence is rarely provided in private or 
public sectors. Social engineering is classified into two categories: s\'ntactic 
and semantic. Syntactic social engineering refers to the second wave of 
network attacks and relates to the operation of network and vulnerabilities 
such as denial of service and difficulties with cryptographic algorithms 
(Schneier, 2001). Barrett (1997) argues that basic security faults make 
syntactic social engineering possible for attacking the network. Malware 
and smurfing are the most common forms of syntactic attacks. Malware is a 
malicious code that is responsible for the distribution of viruses and worms. 
Smurfing is a denial of service that uses 'ping' to test an internet host's 
response. 
Semantic social engineering refers to the third wave of network attacks 
(Schneier, 2001). This targets the people who operate the computer rather 
than the physical machine by using human-based or computer-based 
methods. Low awareness of personal intrusion and data collection, and 
ineffective security measures make semantic social engineering attacks 
possible (Barrett, 1997). 
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The most common methods of human and computer based semantic social 
engineering are introduced by Granger (2001): 
0 Phone: a social engineer calls up and imitates an emploý ee in order 
to pull information out. Help desks are vulnerable to this type of 
attack. Hackers usually pretend to call from inside the corporation by 
manipulating the caller's number, so caller-ID is not useful (Granger, 
2001). 
e Dumpster diving: another favoured method of social engineering. A 
huge amount of information can be collected through company 
dumpsters. 'The following items are potential security leaks in our 
trash: company phone books, organizational charts, memos, 
company policy manuals, calendars of meetings, events and 
vacations, system manuals, printouts of sensitive data or login names 
and passwords, printouts of source code, disks and tapes. company 
letterhead and memo forms, and outdated hardware' (The LAN 
Times, 1995). 
* On-line: the major weakness is that many users often use one simple 
password on every account. So once the hacker has one password, he 
or she can probably get into multiple accounts. One way to obtain 
this kind of password is through an on-line form: 'they can send out 
some sort of sweepstakes information and ask the user to put in a 
name (including e-mail address - that way, she might even get that 
person's corporate account password as well) and password' 
(Granger, 2001). Another way to obtain information on-line is by 
pretending to be the network administrator, sending e-mail through 
the network and asking for a user's password. Or a pop-up which 
requests that the user re-enter his username and password to fix 
some sort of problem. This information is re-directed to the hacker 
(Guenther, 2001). 
0 Persuasion: 'basic methods of persuasion include: impersonation, 
ingratiation, conformity, diffusion of responsibility, and plain old 
friendliness. Regardless of the method used, the main objective is to 
convince the person disclosing the information. The other important 
key is to never ask for too much information at a time, but to ask for 
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a little from each person in order to maintain the appearance of a 
comfortable relationship' (Granger. 2001). 
Reverse social engineering: this is more a&, anced method of gaining 
illicit information. A hacker pretends to be a person that appears in a 
higher position so that employees will ask him for information, 
rather than the other way around. The reverse social engineering 
attacks may offer the hacker an even better chance of obtaining 
valuable data from the employees. The reverse social engineering 
attack involves three parts: sabotage, advertising, and assisting. 
Sabotage the system that hackers want to break into; then Advertise 
for the service to fix it; and then Assist with the problem while 
obtaining the necessary information (Allen, 2006). 
In order to defend against social engineering, several layers of protection are 
more effective in stopping further penetration after passing the first level 
(Gragg, 2002). Security policy is considered to be one of the most effective 
methods to respond against social engineering. Security policy assures that 
end users resist the fraudster's request. It must address 'information access 
controls, setting up accounts, access approval, and password changes. 
Modems should never be permitted on the company intranet. Locks, IDs, 
and shredding should be required. 'Violations should be posted and 
enforced' (Granger, 2002: 2). Besides, security policy has to define the 
responsibility for information or access by users or employees. 
Training in the form of awareness programmes of social engineering attacks. 
is essential for all users, including private company's employees, 
government employees and individual users. They must be aware of social 
engineering techniques used to attack network systems (Stevens, 2001). 
Their confidential information should be protected. Management level 
should defend their employees when they refuse to provide confidential 
information to others. The refusal occurs when a caller asks 'to give contact 
information, rushing. name-dropping, intimidation, misspellings. odd 
questions, and requesting confidential information' (Granger, 2002: 2). 
They must know how to respond to suspicious requests by social engineers. 
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Finally, well defined security policy should enable employees to report aný 
incident if they suspect it. 
Social engineering traps are set in the system to stop attacks. Traps provide 
warnings for potential threats. They will prepare for the common social 
engineering techniques. Some recommendations for trapping the social 
engineer are made by Gragg (2003): First, all employees must understand 
the possibility of the physical presence of a social engineer in their 
legitimate area. They must be aware of unauthorised visitors. Second. 
centralised security logs must be examined on a regular basis by information 
security personnel. They have to monitor not only network access logs but 
also help desk services and customer requests. Help desks are particularly 
vulnerable since staff members of help desks are trained to be friendly and 
give out information. Third, a phone back policy will help to confirm the 
true identity. Employees should call back suspicious persons to check 
whether he or she provided a true identity. 
The following table lists some common intrusion tactics and strategies for 
prevention: 
Table 2-1: Common Intrusion tactics and strategies for prevention 
Ar ea of Risk Hacker Tactic 
Phone (Help ! Impersonation and 
, persuasion 
Desk) 
Building 
entrance 
Office 
Phone (Help 
Desk) 
'Unauthorized physical 
4ccess 
Combat Strategy 
Train employees/help desk 
to never give out passwords 
or other confidential info by 
phone 
Tight badge security, 
employee training, and 
security officers present 
Pon't type in passwords 
with anyone else present (or 'Shoulder surfing 
z if you must, do it quickly! ) 
All employees should be ! Impersonation on help desk ý 
calls 
assigned a PIN specific to 
help desk support 
ýWandering through halls Office ýlooking for open offices 
Mail room : 
Insertion of forged memos ...... ... .... . ........ .... 
Machine Attempting to gain access, 
'Require all guests to be 
escorted 
Lock & monitor mail room 
r Keep phone closets, server 
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room/Phone remove equipment, and/or 
closet attach a protocol analyzer to 
, grab confidential 
data 
Phone & PBX Stealing phone toll access 
Dumpsters 
Intranet- 
Internet 
Office 
, Dumpster diving 
Creation and insertion of 
mock software on intranet or 
internet to snarf passwords 
Stealing sensitive documents 
rooms. etc. locked at all 
times and keep updated 
inventory on equipment 
Control overseas and long- 
distance calls, trace calls, 
refuse transfers 
Keep all trash in secured. 
monitored areas. shred 
important data, erase 
magnetic media 
Continual awareness of 
system and network changes. 
training on password use 
Mark documents as 
confidential & require those 
documents to be locked 
Keep employees on their 
General- 
Impersonation & persuasion 
toes through continued 
Psychological awareness and training 
programs 
(Source: http: //www. securityfocus. com/infocus/1533) 
Security awareness of social engineering must thus be increased. More 
security organizations should make social engineering a priority for their 
programmes. Organizations should routinely conduct security audits so that 
security doesn't become out of date. 
Finally, Kevin Mitnick (2001) said that 'you could spend a fortune 
purchasing technology and services from every exhibitor, speaker and 
sponsor at the RSA Conference, and your network infrastructure could still 
remain vulnerable to old-fashioned manipulation. ' 
The next sections will provide an overview of cybercrime and internet fraud 
statistics in South Korea before discussing the loss and victimisation caused 
by internet fraud around the world, based on statistics provided from 
reliable agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
2.5 Internet fraud statistics (South Korea) 
More than 30 million people are using the internet in Korea. This number, 
equivalent to 68.2 percent of Korea's population. was recorded in June 2004 
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by the Ministry of Information and Communications. It was noticeable that 
the number of users over the age of 40 had dramatically increased, as had 
the level of use - internet users reported that they used the internet on 
average for II and half hours per week. In terms of reasons for use, in 2005 
86.6 percent of users used the e-mail function, 45.3 percent were using the 
internet for shopping purposes, 18.9 percent of users were using paid 
contents, 44 percent of users were using online chat services and 30 percent 
of users had their own personal blog (Ministry of Information and 
Communications, 2005). These statistical results indicate that many people 
will be naturally exposed to the risk of internet fraud. However, as yet there 
is not enough reliable data available to compare the progress of internet 
users and internet fraud in Korea. 
In order to understand the policing of internet fraud in Korea, it is helpful to 
see overall cybercrime data for Korea. The official cybercrime statistics are 
managed by the Korean National Police Agency since the Cý ber Terror 
Response Center (CTRC) is the major cyber-policing agency and deals xN ith 
most cybercrime. 
The NPA categorizes cybercrime into 'cyberterror' and 'general 
cybercrime'. According to their classification, cyberterror includes the 
hacking and distribution of viruses that attack a computer's information 
system and the network itself. General cybercrime includes internet fraud, 
defamation, copyright violation and stalking and intrusion of privacy 
(CTRC, 2005). 
Table 2-2 shows the number of cases occurring from 2001 (22,65 1) to 2006 
(62,000). There were more noticeable increases in the general cybercrime 
level than in the level of cyberterror. Since eyberterror requires more 
advanced skills and technology to commit crimes, the number of cases has 
slowly increased. However, general cybercrime cases have rapidly increased, 
this is largely because general cybercrimes do not need any special 
knowledge to commit crime; they depend more on 'social engineering' than 
technique and technology. 
Classification 
2006 
2005 
2004 
2003 
2002 
2001 
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Table 2-2: Statistics - cases occurring 
Total Cyberterror 
829186 20,186 
88,731 21,389 
77,099 
68,445 
60,068 
33,289 
(Source: www. ctrc. go. kr ) 
15,390 
145241 
14,159 
10,638 
General 
Cybercrime 
62,000 
67,342 
61,709 
54,204 
45,909 
22.651 
It is assumed that general cybercrime cases will continuously increase since 
more computers will be used by criminals as tools for committing crimes. In 
the past, the computer was considered an expensive tool for everyone but 
popularization of the computer has reduced its price so that it can noýk be 
purchased by a much wider range of people. If someone cannot afford to 
own a computer, they can still use a computer by paying a small fee at a 
public internet cafd. 
However, there was a statistical decrease in cybercrime from 2005 (21389: 
67342) to 2006 (20186: 62000). This could be explained by the use of 
higher technology and hiring of more cyber police officers by the National 
Police Agency. Coincidently, cybercrime related conferences and 
symposiums have been held since the year 2005. It seems that more public 
attention and effort has been able to decrease the number of cases of 
cybercrime since 2006. 
The Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO) has independently compiled 
separate internet fraud statistics, as follows: 
61 
Table 2-3: Statistics of internet fraud in total number of internet crimes - compiled by 
the SPO 
Internet fraud Result 
Year Number of cases Number of offenders 
arrested / (charged) 
2000 247 325(66) 
2001 428 588(146) 
2002 1,346 1,603 (680) 
2003 2,403 2,777(846) 
2004 1,634 2,040 (3)23)) 
2005 1,208 1,465(203) 
F Total 7,266 8,798 (2,264) 
Internet crimes 2000 802 1.074(122) 
2001 2,353 3,143 (331 
2002 5,722 7,198(990 
2003 12,501 15,575 (1,745) 
2004 11,685 15,814 (1,104) 
2005 12,672 19,234 (1,766) 
Total 45,735 62,038 (6,058) 
Intemet fraud 15.89 14.18 (37.37) 
The data from the SPO are based on the number of cases passed over from 
the police (see data below Table 2-4). However, SPO data does not fully 
reflect the actual numbers of incidents since these data were compiled based 
on prosecuted cases. Compared to the police data, SPO data show that 
relatively small numbers of offenders were legally charged. Probably, SPO 
did not find any concrete evidence for their offences. 
Table 2-4: Statistics of internet fraud compiled by the National Police Agency (NPA) 
Year Total Internet 
fraud 
Hacking/Virus Violence Illegal 
site 
Illegal 
software 
Others 
03 51,722 26,875 8,891 4,991 1,719 677 8,569 
04 63,384 30,288 10,993 5,816 2,410 1,244 12,633 
05 72,421 33,112 15,874 9,227 1,850 1,233 11,125 
06 70,545 26,711 15,979 9,436 7,322 2,284 8,813 
07 78,890 28,081 14,037 12,905 5,505 8,167 10,195 
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Figure 2-1: Progression of internet fraud compiled by the NPA 
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According to the Korea National Statistical Office (KNSO), a total of 15.8 
billion dollars worth of cyber-shopping mall transactions occurred in 2007; 
this has increased by around 50 percent from 10 billion dollars in 2005. This 
indicates that more people are moving from the offline market to the online 
market to purchase their goods (2007). Seoul Electronic Commerce Center 
(2008) reported that 14,223 fraud cases were received in 2007. This figure 
had increased 46.7 percent from 9,694 in 2006. With the development of e- 
commerce activities, more internet frauds have occurred in cyberspace. The 
National Police Agency data indicates that a total of 28,081 internet fraud 
cases were reported in 2007, which was an increase of 4.2 percent from the 
26,875 internet fraud cases reported in 2003. Introduction of the escrow 
system in April 2006 enhanced policing effort, although there was little 
reduction in the number of cases during 2006. However, the total amount of 
loss has not changed since fraudsters now appear to be targeting more 
expensive goods. The Cheat, a community response site for internet fraud, 
has received more than 17,900 internet fraud cases from victims since it was 
founded in 2006. Now it has become a very popular site among internet 
users for sharing internet fraud information (Baek and Lee, 2008). 
In contrast to other nations, there are no statistics available to show the 
overall financial loss from internet fraud in South Korea. Further data and 
thus further research are needed to enable the response to internet fraud. 
2.6 Internet fraud statistics (US AND UK) 
There is broad evidence to illustrate that internet fraud is increasing as a 
function of the increased numbers of users online and the increasing 
2 (-)u 3-200 7 
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numbers of facilities, in addition, the rate of internet fraud is increasing 
because of ID theft and other new types of fraud emerging. The av'erage loss 
per person due to internet fraud is $410 (Emling, 2001). The Gartner Group 
predicted that financial damage caused by cybercrime would increase by 
between 1,000 and 10,000 percent by 2004. The Internet Complaint Center 
(IC3) received 206,884 complaints about internet crimes in 2006. In 2007 
this was further increased by about 20 percent or $40 million, Nýhich marks 
approximately $240 million of financial loss (Leyden, 2008). 
In order to respond to internet fraud, the Federal Trade Commission created 
'Consumer Sentinel', which is the largest database of consumer fraud 
complaints in North America. US and Canadian law enforcement agencies 
have access to the data through a secure, searchable website, and can now 
easily coordinate policing efforts aimed at the most common fraud (FTC, 
1998). 
According to the British National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) 
(which has subsequently become absorbed into SOCA), *fraudsters typically 
exploit human misery so they invariably create human misery. They are 
without scruples because this is how they make money' (Matusic, 2001). 
Depending on the skill of the fraudster, websites can be made to look very 
attractive and legitimate. Phishing is a good example of this kind of 
fraudulent website. Litan (2004) reported that 57 million US adults have 
received a 'phishing' attack e-mail within the past year. More than 50% of 
those who responded were victims of identity theft such as credit card data, 
home addresses, and telephone numbers. Phishing attacks undermine 
consumers' confidence in the authenticity of e-mail originators, threatening 
consumer trust in the very foundation of internet based communications. 
Gartner believes that at least a million individuals may have fallen for such 
schemes without realizing it. Direct losses from identity theft fraud against 
phishing attack victims in the US were about $1.2 billion in 2003. It also 
reported that the failure of the implementation of anti-phishing measures, 
consumer distrust and annual US e-commerce growlh would drop to 10 
percent or less by 2007 (May 4,2004). In order to decrease the number of 
cases of phishing, the public has to be aware of the importance of protecting 
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personal information and safe business practices. Most recent statistics of 
APWG (Anti Phishing Working Group) reported that 25,683 phishing 
attacks were received during the month of December 2007. According to a 
Gartner (2007), phishing attacks resulted in 3.6 million adult victims and the 
loss of $3.2 billion in the United States. 
According to the US National Consumers League (NCL) data in 2007, the 
total loss of internet fraud was $17,508.480 this was significantly higher 
than the $13,863,003 reported loss in 2005. The graph (Figure 2.2) below 
shows that the top 10 scams were auction (13%). general merchandise 
(23%), Nigerian advance fee scam (11%), fake cheques (29%), lotteries 
(7%), phishing (3%), advance fee loans (3%), friendship and sweetheart 
swindles (I%), and Internet access services (M). 
Figure 2-2: Top 10 frauds in 2005 (National Consumers League) 
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It was found (NCL 2005) that most consumers' aged 60 or over were 
vulnerable to phishing (21%), lotteries (21%), adu It/in formation services 
(20%), and Nigerian advance fee (12%). These statistics show that most 
victims are seniors who are vulnerable to the fraudsters. In contrast to those 
frauds targeted at those in their senior years, work at home plans (44%) and 
advance fee loans (35%) mainly victimize those under the age of 30. 
Figure 2-3 shows that most fraud victims use the following payment 
methods: wire (31%), credit card (24%), money order (13 %), bank 
debit 
(10%), debit card (9%), check (7%), cashier's check (3%), and cash (3%). 
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Figure 2-3: Top methods of payment in 2005 (National Consumers League) 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
13 
. 1, ,f- 
6credit crad 
13money o, je, 
Obank debit 
@debit card 
Ocheck 
mcashiers check 
Ocash 
In addition, the existing survey indicates that most offenders of internet 
fraud are individuals and not businesses. They are predominantly males 
residing in large cities (NW3C, 2005). 
According to UK statistics, internet fraud comprises about 15 percent of 
total fraud in the United Kingdom. The State o the Nation paper reported 
that their average loss was f875 per person in 2006. This equates to a total 
loss of 20 billion pounds and is equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP, as 
recorded in 2006. Get online reported that about 3.5 million internet users 
have been deceived. This means that around 12 percent of the 29 million 
internet user population have been defrauded. About 6 percent of internet 
users were defrauded during online shopping sessions (Andrews, 2007). 
APACS (2006) indicated a loss of f428 million from card fraud although 
this decreased by f8O million due to the introduction of chip and pin 
payment systems. Major card fraud is still CNP (card-not-present) fraud 
causing a total loss of f212.6 million. This figure includes off-line fraud 
such as phone and mail. So, actual level of internet based CNP fraud is less 
than figure cited. However, most recent statistics of APACS data indicated 
that card fraud losses were up by 25 percent, driven by a 70 percent increase 
in fraud from abroad. APACS expects that the use of chip and pin payment 
systems will continuously reduce the level of card fraud (Knights, 2008). 
The above statistics for the United States, the United Kingdom and South 
Korea indicate that internet fraud is a global trend; findings show that it has 
risen across all jurisdictions. However, South Korean data sources do not 
include detailed information of financial loss. The data only indicate 
numbers of reported incidents to law enforcement agencies. In contrast to 
South Korean data, the US NCL data indicates the total loss of internet 
fraud ($17,508,480 in 2007) while UK APACS data indicate major loss 
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from card fraud (f428 million in 2006). Overall, each country compiled 
slightly different types of internet fraud figures or wide-ran(ging data so it is 
difficult to compare those three countries' statistics. Lack of consistent 
reporting systems among those three countries is considered a major factor 
hindering cross comparison of internet fraud. 
2.7 Major internet fraud cases in South Korea 
The most prominent internet fraud cases reported by the National Police 
Agency are online escrow, phishing, bogus internal revenue sites, internet 
phone services, pornographic websites, internet banking loans and internet 
shopping mail scams. Details of case information are described on the NPA 
website, as summarized below. 
The online escrow website is the latest scam, which has become a serious 
problem since there is growing tendency of using the internet payment 
method. Recent escrow fraud detected by CTRC indicates that fraudsters 
open a fake internet shopping broker site to entice buyers to sell electronic 
merchandise such as LCD TVs, notebook computers and other items at 
below market value, and ask to pay through the Most Popular escrow service 
site. However, they advertise the escrow site on the largest portal site and its 
popularity ranking is manipulated. Innocent buyers then send money to the 
escrow account but never receive any items from the fraudsters. Over 
10,000,00OWon (approximately 100,000 dollar USD) was made in less than 
two weeks from this scam. 
Phishing scams create an entire bank website in order to deceive the 
innocent customer. This scam is a personal identification theft, in which 
fraudsters open a fake portal site almost identical to the largest portal sites 
and collect personal information, such as KID number, age, sex, address, 
telephone number from the new members NNho recognize their site as a 
genuine portal site. Approximately 360,000 articles of personal information 
were collected and sold via internet transactions. Surprisingly, the hacker 
who won second place in the international hacking competition committed 
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this crime. He and his colleagues, ýýho ýýere also hackers. founded an 
internet security company. 4 
A bogus Internal Revenue Service site was run bý the local Korean and 
Korean Chinese gang (Triad). They sent SMS messages or made calls to 
small retail business owners claiming there ýýere tax returns for them to 
collect immediately. Many people vvere deceived as the female operator 
called them first and they then heard more detailed information from the 
supervisor who was a professional con artist. The fraudsters made the 
recipient go to the ATM and operate the machine incorrectly to send them 
money. In July 2006, the NPA found that they had duped 337 people in 50 
incidents, taking more than 140,000,000 Won (approximately 140,000 
USD). The police were astonished that Chinese gangs worked \ý ith Korean 
criminals to do their business. This case illustrates how international 
cooperation in policing cybercrime and internet fraud is important to strike 
out the criminals. 
Internet-based phone scams have a technical advantage of being able to 
change the number of the sender anytime so that victims do not suspect calls 
from phony places. For example, a fraudster can manipulate his or her 
telephone number to be the same number of banks or credit card companies 
so victims provide their personal information without any hesitation. The 
internet phone was invented by the Israeli company 'Vocaltec' in the 1990s 
and was introduced in Korea in August 2005. 
Pornography fraud attracts people who want to watch private adult films. 
According to NPA, fraudsters who set up business in Pusan, the second 
largest city in Korea, advertised their service, and were able to obtain 9000 
subscribers within a very short period (October 2004 to May 2006) despite 
the fact that no site existed. The pornography site ýNas good bait for those 
who wanted to enjoy special movies. and fraudsters made more 
12,000,00OWon (1.2 million dollars USD). 
4NPA did not disclose the nwne of the internet securit) cornpaný. 
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Internet banking loan scams attract people in financial difficulty. A recent 
case indicates that a fraudster made 76,000,000\\'on in less than 6 months 
(January- June, 2005) from 234 victims, most of which had loýN income and 
a bad credit history background. Fraudsters conN inced their victims to open 
an instalment saving account to improve their credit rate, in NNhich a 10% 
cash deposit was required to apply for the loan. Victims thought that this 
made sense so they deposited funds and provided their bank account number, 
password, and security card number. With this information, fraudsters 
cancelled their victims' instalment savings accounts and disappeared. 
Internet shopping mall scams are the most common fraud cases in Korea. 
Many firaudsters open internet shopping malls and advertise their items at 
below market value. However. customers do not receive anN of the items 
they order, and any phone calls they make to hasten orders result in the 
same answer or excuse. After a couple of months victims can no longer see 
the shopping mall site. In one recent incident it was reported that a fraudstcr 
earned more than 460,000,000 Won (4.6 million dollar USD) in 16 daýs 
from 1,900 victims. 
A popular online game, called 'Lineage', in Korea has game money called 
' aden'. It is known that 1000,000 aden can trade \\ ith a value of 12 000 won 
(approximately USD 10) in the online market. Annually. more than I billion 
won (USD 100 million) has been transacted for the cyber money. Fraudsters 
advertised to sell this aden at a lower price than the real value and many 
innocent gamers paid the price. However, they never received it. A similar 
case is the 'selling of a magic sword', which is also used in the online game 
to rescue various characters. Recently, the Korean National Police Agency 
busted a criminal ring that circulated in Korea online money generated in 
China and cashed it out of Korea. Criminals wired $38 million from Korea 
to China. Fraudsters produced game money in China using cheap labour and 
a virus programme. They took commission of 3 to 5 percent of the money 
trade to purchase game money. An anonymous police source said that 'the 
ring used a virtual private network for IP laundering. Using the nemork, the 
suspect hid their real location. The network made their China based IP look 
like that of an internet cafd in Korea' (Lee, 2008). 
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2.8 Major internet fraud cases in the UK and US 
In the UK, among many internet scams, 'Card Not Present (CNP)* crime is 
one of the most commonly occurring internet frauds. According to . -\PACS. 
CNP caused more than E290.5 million in 2007. The introduction of Chip 
and Pin has attracted fraudsters to move on CNP fraud because the shopper 
does not have to be physically present at the point of transaction (Leyden. 
2008). Internet shopping mall fraud only scares about 20 percent of internet 
users who avoid online shopping, although estimated revenues %\ere oNer 
f 13bn during the Christmas season in 2007 (Leý den, 2007). 
According to Garlik (2008), 90,000 incidents were categorized as online 
identity theft in 2006. However, approximately 90 percent of cý bercrimes is 
not reported by victims due to absence of consistent reporting systems. 
Phishing fraudsters are 'hacking into IT director's bank accounts and 
ordering new credit cards that are subsequently used to purchase jewellcry. 
electronic goods, or foreign currency' (Leyden, 2007). Onc victim 
discovered that f60,000 had been withdrawn from his account at Barclays. 
In the US, 'a Californian man was accused of using an automated script to 
open 58,800 online brokerage accounts that were linked to a handful of 
online bank accounts' (Goodin, 2008). Fie sent *huge nUmbers of deposits 
between two cents and $1 dollar to the accounts to verify that account 
details of new customers are correct'. It is similar to the PayPal verifýing 
method. He got his idea from the USA Patriot Act that requires financial 
institutions to verify the identity of their customers. Many fraudsters 
maliciously manipulate the legitimate methods to deceive others. 
A different kind of advertising fraud, *cookie stuffing' was found in auction 
businesses; eBay sued its business partners for it. eBay pays its partners for 
advertising based on the number of clicks by partner site users. Howe\er. 
some of those partner sites were pretending that users had clicked el3aý ads 
when they hadn't (Out-laNN, 2008). Their clicks are recorded b" small text 
files within NNeb browsers visited. Those partners secretlý redirected their 
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users' computers to eBay. It caused eBay cookies to be placed in the users' 
web browser. This fraud makes it looks as though users have clicked on ads 
and thus eBay paid for their advertising fees. 
2.9 Internet fraud Control 
Most governments have anti-fraud policies and departments dedicated to the 
development of electronic commerce (Sathye and et al., 2004), although the 
actual levels of implementation of such policies are different throughout 
different re ions. Many studies suggest that little attention has been given to 9 t! 
the regulation of confusing, unreliable, untruthful and fraudulent businesses 
in contrast to the regulation of harmful content, virus and phishing (Smith, 
2001). Although some countries have updated their laws to deal with 
cybercrime, there is still a need for a detailed assessment and revio\ of the 
current policies and regulations regarding cybercrime (Smith and Urbas. 
2001). 
Currently, there are three main ways of dealing with internet fraud: hard 
regulation involving the use of the law; soft regulation using codes of 
practice; and strategies based on fraud prevention (Clark, Dugdale and 
Sathye, 2004; Smith, 2000). Depending on the sector, agency and situation, 
these regulations are applicable for the control of internet fraud varying 
from the level of criminal prosecution to prevention strategy. 
Criminal action 
Criminal prosecution and punishment deters fraudsters from recidivism and 
deters other criminal activities. There are varieties of other consequences, 
which may follow the detection of internet fraud, although conventional 
judicial punishments are not imposed. For example, 'adverse publicity, 
professional disciplinary sanctions, civil action, injunctive orders and, 
various forms of community conferencing' are followed (Smith, 2000: 10). 
The seizure of offender's assets is considered as an effective means of 
deterrence. However, there are 'various forensic difficulties associated Nkith 
gathering evidence from computers in a number of different jurisdictions 
that often make proceedings both difficult and costly' (Smith, 2000: 11). 
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Civil action 
Civil action can recover the loss from internet fraud while criminal action 
can punish the offender (Clark, Dugdale and Sathye, 2004). Although the 
threat of civil action can be quite effective in that it exerts a chilling effect 
upon potential fraudsters, it may be impractical because to invoke formal 
procedure can consume excessive time and be prohibitively expensive. For 
the non-career fraudsters, this threat may stop or delay their activities for a 
while. However, serious fraudsters do not care about civil action and ignore 
the threat of criminal action. 
In order to pursue a civil action the victim must be able to prove the loss or 
forfeit that caused by fraudulent activities. For example, deceptive 
advertisements on the internet will be held liable if the offensive content 
forms part of the terms of the agreement. This may cause a right to cancel 
the contract or sue for damages. The use of the internet raises legal issues, 
which are substantively the same as those which arise out of paper based 
advertisements and contracts. However, it is difficult to establish what 
transpired between the parties to an electronic transaction due to difficulties 
of collecting evidence and forensic investigation (Smith, 2000). 
Providing concrete digital evidence is the most difficult part of any legal 
procedure due to lack of technology, knowledge and staff in pursuing civil 
action. Unlike criminal procedures, civil procedures do have less coercive 
legal authority to collect evidence from ISPs or private corporation data. For 
example, an individual auction fraud victim will have difficulty pursuing the 
case without hiring a lawyer, and often fails to take successful legal action 
(Snyder, 1999). Depending on the seriousness of the incident, corporate 
victims use their corporate legal service teams or hire outside law firms to 
carry out legal action. The majority of times, the threat of legal action NN iII 
stop or deter fraudulent activities and protect their reputation and brand 
image. Financial compensation through legal action is not their intention. 
Content regulation through filtering system 
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ISPs monitor the harmful material on their network ýý ith screening soffiN, are 
or through measures (Clark, Dugdale and Sathye, 2004). These measures 
prevent internet users searching words, usually criminal, sexual and terrorist 
act related words, which are not accessible or require the use of an 
identification number (Bertelsmann, 1999). Although the use of screening 
software has been widely used to control access to obscene and offensive 
materials, it is more difficult to control the misleading and deceptive content. 
According to Smith (2000: 11), the Internet Industry Association recognizes 
that 'the Internet should provide a means to enable control of access to 
content while acknowledging it is impractical to filter all Internet content'. 
The Association granted means by which content can be recognized and 
possibly disqualified by content filter technologies as the most practical 
means of empowering responsible adults to control access to the internet to 
verify appropriate controls to content (Smith, 2000). 
Certification and endorsement services 
These services provide users with information as to the reliability and 
acceptability of online material (Clark, Dugdale and Sathye, 2004). Users 
can decide whether they wish to make use of the material in question. For 
example, the Platform for Internet Content Selection (2000) is a voluntary 
content rating system, which helps users, categorizes materials that conform 
to specific standards. 
AICPA (The American Institute of Certified Professional Accountants) 
developed the WebTrust programme, which certifies Internet sites that 
indicate legitimate online business practices after extensive auditing 
procedure. The audit includes checking the site's security measures, privacy 
practices and transaction-processing systems. The service is available from 
any WebTrust-licensed CPA or accounting companies. WebTrust is already 
available in Hong Kong, Australia, Germany, England and Wales, Scotland 
and Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain, as well as in the 
United States and Canada. Internationally, 15 national accountancy 
institutes from Europe, North America, and Asia joined the rapidly groNN ing 
consortium of WebTrust providers around the world (AICPA. 2004). 
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Electronic security of financial service providers poses a risk to the e- 
commerce activities in open network infrastructure (Glaessner, Kellermann 
and McNevin, 2004). Certification and endorsement sen-ices proýide 
confidence and financial security to both customers and merchants that 
would establish safe e-commerce activity. However, there is a problem of 
proliferation of services and the determination of appropriate standards 
(Smith, 2000). The anonymous character of the internet has negatively 
affected e-commerce activities so that many global corporations, such as 
Microsoft, have been pushing for the use of digital identity management 
systems. However, it appears that more studies of the interplay of 
international law and standards is necessary (Rundle and Laurie, 2005). 
It appears that the use of hard regulation of legal actions and soft regulation 
of codes of practice have been dedicated to controlling internet fraud, 
although some questions have been raised with regard to each jurisdiction 
and nation's law and policy. In addition, the development of e-commerce 
and transformation of financial services has facilitated the demand for more 
effective internet fraud regulation. 
Many cybercrime experts have recommended that preventive strategies are 
more effective and efficient ways of controlling internet fraud than reactive 
methods. Preventive strategies have many advantages for business entities 
since the use of preventive strategies have enhanced overall corporate IT 
security functions and avoided tough government control. 
Preventative strategies 
Generally, it is better to prepare preventive strategies before resorting to 
hard or soft regulations, as discussed above. Since most fraudsters tend to 
attack the private sector, these strategies are designed to protect corporate IT 
systems and ISPs. The majority of corporate victims of internet fraud do not 
know how to respond to it while the vulnerabilities of the internet may 
inhibit the development of e-commerce. Therefore, it is important to 
establish appropriate policy for use of the internet in terms of prevention of 
internet fraud. 
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2.9.1.1 Corporate fraud control policies 
Establishment of fraud control policies appear to be the best ýNa)s of 
preventing fraud within organizations. Without appropriate internet fraud 
control policy, employees are embarrassed when they are unexpectedly 
exposed to fraudulent activities. The ethical use of information technologies 
and how to respond to instances of fraud are imperative to conduct a 
business. Particularly, it is important to develop specific policies on 
computer security along with appropriate guidelines on reporting computer 
misuse and abuse. According to Smith (2000: 13), 'policies need to deal 
with specific on-line behaviour of employees such as security of user 
authentication systems, access to and use of the computers for private 
purposes, personal use of electronic mail, downloading software. and the 
use of copyright material'. For example, Australian Standard No. AS3806- 
98 Compliance Programmes 'provides which organisations are able to use 
to identify and to remedy any deficiencies in compliances with laws, 
industry code and in-house company standards and to develop for 
continuous improvement in risk management' (Greycar and Smith, 2002: 8). 
2.9.1.2 IT security enhancement 
For protecting corporate information, use of the internet by employees needs 
to be monitored through appropriate logs of usage (Clark, Dugdale and 
Sathye, 2004). The use of computers for private purposes has to be 
prohibited from the main business operation in order to prevent fraudulent 
activity internally and externally. Therefore, many companies prohibit the 
use of MSN messenger and limit their employees outgoing e-mail size. 
Global corporations such as IBM monitor their employees' behaviour 
through video surveillance or checking e-mails and files transmitted through 
servers (White and Pearson, 2001). Surfwatch filtering software 
programmes are used to restrict employees from accessing specific content 
by requesting the user's ID (Smith, 2000). However, highly restrictive IT 
security policies block the free flow of information, infringe privacy and 
deprive the convenient digital life of the individual (Clarke, 1999). 
2.9.1.3 Self-reRulation of internet fraud 
Self-regulation is the most favoured form of governance accepted bY private 
industries such as online auction and other professional services since it is 
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beneficial for the organizations with natural information asymmetries 
(Jacobson, 2001). According to Leland (1979), self-regulation improves the 
quality of goods and services. The rules in cyberspace are imposed, not 
through sanctions, nor not by the state. but by the N'rerN architecture (design) 
of the particular space (Lessig, 1999). 
Current research by Chua and Wareham (2002) indicates that the internet 
industry displays a strong degree of progressive self-interest and as a result, 
is highly self-regulated. They have discovered that sophisticated anti-fraud 
institutions have been established and only new entrants in the market NN, ho 
are unfamiliar with this mechanism become victimized. In addition, their 
research found that informal institutions are more effective than government 
regulation because they target fraud at its source. 'Fraud primarily occurs 
because of information asymmetries' (the fraudster know something auction 
participants do not know) and 'regulation, on the other hand, constrains 
behaviour by making unwanted behaviour costly' (Chua and Wareham, 
2002: 10). It is not possible to constrain fraudulent behaviour without 
correspondingly constraining desirable behaviour because fraud occurs in 
numerous forms. Unless they deal specifically with information 
asymmetries, government regulations do not reduce fraud. 
However, some studies suggested that government regulation might reduce 
fraud without dealing with information asymmetries. They recommended 
that governments collect intelligence about deviant (including terrorist) 
networks to establish concrete evidence of wrongdoing (Walker and 
Akdeniz, 2003). This will ensure the successful prosecution with hard 
evidence. In order to prevent internet fraud due to the information 
asymmetries, the govemment has to implement the necessary regulation in 
order to fundamentally block the information flow to those who potentially 
manipulate the law and system, while also protecting personal information. 
The UK Data Protection Act 1998 is a good example that 'gives people 
improved rights regarding personal information which others hold about 
them and imposes greater control over individuals or organizations that 
process personal information by using both manual and automated means' 
(South Shropshire District Council, 2003: 1). Information asvinmetries can 
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occur not only in relation to auction fraud but also with other frauds such as 
telecommunications fraud, stock transfer or alteration of salesibillinas 
(Denning, 1999). Regulation designed to financially support trader risk or 
punish the con artist are likely to be unproductive. Sometimes such 
regulation interrupts existing formal anti-fraud mechanisms and aggravates 
the incidences of fraud. Regulation requires people to pay more money for 
the implementation of services and may cause the overnight collapse of the 
market due to the flexibility of the internet auction market (Chua and 
Wareham, 2002: 10). Government regulations may transfer the cost of fraud 
to taxpayers who are protected by government institutions and firequently 
engage in riskier behaviour (Calomiris, 1990). They concluded that the 
'individual must investigate the auction. the trader, and the community of 
practice' (Chua and Wareham, 2002: 10) in order to protect him or herself 
from fraud. 
Self-regulation can occur when the self-regulating body can enforce the 
policies, while the formal regulation of internet fraud can take place under 
the legal and political support by the state or by the international 
organization. According to Lessig (1999), cyber-law has new characteristics 
such as anonymity, competing jurisdiction, abundance of ambiguity, and 
minimalism of internet architecture (a political decision about disabling 
control and technological decision about the optimal network design 
difficulty enhanced) so that it is difficult to apply universally. 
Self-regulation of the internet is an alternative that has been strongly 
preferred, especially during the 1990s, for addressing the issue of 
pornography, race-hate speech and other internet derived material 
considered undesirable. 'A raft of techniques for self regulation was 
available, and includes software that will block material with more than a 
certain percentage of 'skin-tone' or filtering of material deemed to have 
ýsuspect' content' (OBrien, 2005: 153). However, there is the danger of 
private companies offering these filtering facilities restricting free speech by 
exercising a form of 'corporate censorship' via their filtering process. Self- 
regulation of internet fraud can use the same techniques and soffivare to 
prevent and control the fraudulent activities (O'Brien, 2005). 
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Overall, preventive strategies described above would be the considered the 
best intervention for internet fraud, although there are some sensitive issues 
about restriction of free flow of information, infringement of privacý and 
promotion of corporate censorship. For self-regulation of internet fraud. 
progressive studies need to discuss its advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of protection of e-commence. More attention must be paid to 
particular industries, such as online auction companies. since online auction 
fraud has marked the most frequently occurring fraud among various 
internet frauds. 
In summary, each tier has different target groups and sanctions for policing 
cyberspace. From the individual user to government- funded public police. 
although some of the population served are limited within their members, 
most internet users are policed by this order maintenance assemblage. 
Sanctions vary from the lightest level of moral censure to the hardest level 
of criminal prosecution. Most private sectors impose the removal of access 
rights or withdrawal of internet services. However, this assemblage does not 
perfectly respond to all cybercrime. Each tier has different capabilities of 
policing so some target populations are sometimes ignored due to lack of 
resources, knowledge and labour. In fact, there are many barriers 
interrupting the effective policing by both sectors. 
2.10 Criminological theory and policing internet fraud 
The convergence of technology, policing and white-collar crime (Nhan, 
2006) is necessary to explain the difference in policing internet fraud 
compared to traditional terrestrial policing. Policing internet fraud appears 
to be quite different from terrestrial policing in that it invokes strong 
partnership policing. It appears that internet fraud needs more intervention 
from the private sector. Private companies and ISPs are participating in 
policing not only for the protection of their corporate interest but also for the 
protection of their customer's interest. Since cyberspace is not split into two 
sectors, policing by the private sector also covers the public interest area of 
cyberspace. The private sector has complained that over expenditure is 
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unavoidable if the police only symbolically exist and promise 'to serve and 
protect'. It seems that the public sector has to answer the question: *wh"' 
does the private sector have to spend money without delegation of povVer to 
control? ' The division of policing labour has to be clearlý defined and 
financial support for the policing of internet fraud has to be enhanced bý the 
public sector. 
As explained earlier in this chapter, internet fraud does not fit into 
traditional criminological theory. Internet fraud is a part of cybercrime. so it 
borrows the general characteristics of cybercrime. According to Wall (2005), 
cybercrimes appear to be fundamentally instantaneous, transnational, trans- 
jurisdictional and global. The discussion of cybercrime is also offence based 
and tends to 'cover a broad range of legal issues, many of which are the 
subject of civil law in addition to, or instead of, criminal law, demonstrating 
a resonance with the study of white-collar crime' (Wall, 2005: 87). 
Theoretical concerns about criminological links between cybercrime and 
white-collar crime leads us to wonder whether 'cybercrime' is a part of 
'white-collar crime' or not. However, logical conditions do not perfectly 
satisfy the theory of a link. More studies are required to find out their 
relation and to create new typology for internet fraud as a new crime. 
2.11 Conclusion 
Internet fraud statistics, statistical trends and major cases are found in South 
Korea, the UK and the US to be moderately different from each other. For 
the statistics, it seems different ways of data collection, compilation and 
interpretation were applied. South Korean statistics compiled by both the 
Supreme Prosecutor's Office and the National Police Agency do not 
indicate detail typology of internet fraud so it is difficult to state which fraud 
needs more attention or impacts more on internet users and e-commerce 
activities. Only through other civil organisations' data such as *the 
Catchall' 
and 'the Cheat' are we informed Nvhich fraud is more prevalent and serious. 
Consistently, statistical trends in the three nations indicate that the total loss 
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from internet fraud has continuously increased. Although there was a little 
reduction in occurrence, total loss has never been reduced. 
As the earlier part of this chapter indicated. the statistics show internet fraud 
incidents are increasing across jurisdictions worldwide. This shows that 
internet fraud is a new criminal trend, and is a rapidly groýN ing area of 
online crime. The impact of internet fraud is to hinder the development of e- 
commerce, which is globally changing the traditional business mode. More 
people are purchasing goods from the online market and more businesses 
are looking for customers online. The use of the internet shopping mail 
saves customers' shopping time while it saves sellers' advertisements, 
logistics and store rent fees. Therefore, development of e-commerce activity 
will never stop as long as we use the internet. However, it is unavoidable 
that internet fraud is internationally dispersing and is becoming crime that is 
more serious. In order to respond to it more effectively and efficiently. it is 
necessary to analyse the characteristics and nature of various cyberspace 
policing methods. 
Since internet fraud has characteristics of global reach, it is helpful to 
compare to a non-Western nation's policing model such as South Korea in 
order to examine similarities and differences in policing strategies and laws. 
While the IT business of South Korea has successfully expanded in local 
and global markets, the policing of internet fraud or cyber policing activities 
have not been known to other parts of the world outside South Korea. 
Therefore, an examination of the Korean policing model of internet fraud 
will introduce another dimension of cyber policing strategies and laws while 
showing also that occurrence of internet fraud is not geographically limited 
within South Korea. 
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Chapter 3: Policing internet fraud in UK Research 
3.1 Introduction 
CYberspace is currently policed by multiple policing actors: 'Internet user 
and user groups, online virtual environment managers and security, ISPs, 
corporate organ izations/corporate security organizations, non- 
government/non-pol ice organizations, governmental non-police 
organizations and public police organizations' (Wall, 2007: 167-177). These 
entities constitute the nodes of networked internet governance because *new 
technologies have accelerated the growing tendency towards networking 
sources of security' (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Dupont, 2004: 76-91). 
Shearing (2004) stated that 'auspices' and 'providers' of governance are 
distinctive. Entities that authorize governance are 'auspices' and entities that 
shape behaviours are 'providers'. They are referred as an assemblage 
because they 'work as a functional entity across the network' (Wall, 2007: 
167). This term 'assemblage' is borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari (2004) 
and Haggerty and Ericson (2000: 605). 
3.2 Who polices internet fraud in the UK? 
As explained in the introduction, internet fraud is policed by multiple actors 
from the smallest unit, the internet user, to the large corporate security. 
Wall's (2007) 'the internet's order maintenance assemblage' (See Table 3-1) 
categorises seven levels taking part in policing cyberspace. Since internet 
fraud is a predominant cybercrime, this concept is borrowed and applied to 
the policing of internet fraud. Compared to other nations, the UK model has 
more policing actors in the private and public sectors. This may be 
attributed to the reputation of the financial hub in the world. Besides, the 
public sector has also launched a specialized agency to respond to internet 
fraud. This shows how much the UK government recognizes internet fraud 
as a significant harm to society. This chapter explores how 'the internet's 
order maintenance assemblage' fits into the UK model of policing internet 
fraud. 
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Table 3-1: The internet's order-maintenance assemblage 
Type (governance Population served Sanctions (auspices) 
providers) 
Internet users/users All internet users Moral censure. cold- 
groups-includes within interest group shouldering, lobbying, CyberAngels, reporting, hacktivism Association of Sites 
Advocating Child 
Protection (ASACP), 
Sparnbursters, eBay 
Online virtual Members of online Removal of access 
environment managers environment rights, exclusion from 
and security-for online the environment when 
role playing/game community norms or 
playing, chat rooms, laws are transgressed discussion lists, e- 
auction rooms, cyber 
worlds 
Network infrastructure Subscribing Withdrawal of internet 
(ISPs)-Internet Service users/clients service, introduction 
Providers, ISP orgs, of control software 
domain name registries such as spam filters or 
content management 
Private (corporate) Own private Withdrawal of 
security-banks, interests/private clients services, civil 
telecommunications, recovery 
corporate entities 
Non-government, non- All internet users Withdrawal of 
police hybrids/ internet participation, financial 
Watch Foundation, sanctions, reporting to 
CERT, CAUCE police 
Government- funded non- All internet users, Financial sanctions, 
police/ customs and business prosecution (civil or 
excise, security services, criminal) 
intelligence, trading 
standards 
Government- funded All internet users Criminal prosecution 
public police/ police 
forces, national special 
un its 
(Source: Wall, 2007: 168, table 8-1). 
Internet users and user groups 
As commonly practiced in other countries, internet users and user groups 
police their virtual community to protect their valuable digital assets from 
outsiders. They routinely exchange useful information through messenger 
services, e-mail and community bulletin boards. Although their policing 
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activity is minimal and less effective, their informal networks often perform 
much better policing activity than that of government or corporate le-Vel. 
This level of policing has an advantage of using the huge volume of 
information from individual users and user groups ývhich reflect the utmost 
priority social issues, such as bulk-victimization of internet fraud. Internet 
users and user groups impose sanctions of moral censure. cold-shouldering, 
lobbying, reporting and hacktivism. 
Online virtual environment managers 
As indicated in Wall (2007) online virtual environment managers mainly 
focus on the violation of norms or laws of their virtual community. When 
finding any violation, they remove access rights and exclude from the 
environment. Compared to South Korea, there are feNNer virtual 
communities in the UK. The most popular websites among young internet 
users are facebook. com and myspace. corn powered by Google, originally 
made by US companies. UK local online virtual environment managers 
monitor unusual activities on their sites. For the older internet user. 
seniority. co. uk provides over 50 websites that share useful information and 
gain knowledge from one another. This site is also policed by its monitoring 
staff for any illegal and harmful activities. In addition, online virtual 
managers are working at community chatting sites such as 'just chat' and 
'wocchat' to monitor any illegal act. The 'just chat' site famously does not 
allow putting any sexual graphics or contents online. These people are not 
monitoring a specific kind of cybercrime, but rather a wide range of 
cybercrime, including internet fraud. 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
The BT trial 'Webwise' promises both 'protection against online fraud and 
makes ads that appear on participating websites more relevant to your 
interests' (Sterling, 2008). In the past, London based Biblio Tech 
(Richardson, 1999) asked to stop spam mail to US companies and 
individuals. In some serious cases, they pursued legal action for any losses 
incurred. Pipex Internet Limited, a Tiscali UK company has a securit'\ team 
to monitor fraudulent activities on their website. They have exercised their 
power to control internet fraud b) NvithdraýNal of internet serNices, 
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introduction of control software such as spam filters or content management. 
ISPs are considered the best safe guard for preventing from internet fraud so 
the government wants to tightly control the ISPs. However. strong 
opposition by ISPs and internet users has discouraged government 
intervention. 
Corporate security 
The most popular private sector organization, APACS (2004) is a trade 
association for payments and operates a website for banking users, which 
assists in the protection of customers' money. The Independent Banking 
Advisory Service (IBAS), IBAS helps with banking related security 
problems. For financial fraud through internet banking, IBAS investigates 
any mistakes occurring with the bank. Similarly, the British Banker's 
Association provides information about the prevention of fraud and money 
laundering. There are also smaller private organizations such as Miller 
Smiles and Rip-off Tip Off. In general, private sector activity is in-house 
security service based so it is difficult to know how each company operates 
anti-fraud units or whether they hire private investigators. With the 
development of mobile technology, telecommunication companies have 
monitored fraudulent activities in their service network. BT mobile, Orange 
and Vodafone have alerted their customers through real time warning 
systems. When they detect any suspected event, they have the ability to 
withdraw the service for offenders and pursue civil recovery. 
Non-government, non-police hybrids 
Get Safe Online is a joint initiative between the government, Serious 
Organised Agency (SOCA) and private sector website operated by 
Endurance Limited that introduces facts on how to use the internet safely 
and provides information on how to protect computers from many possible 
threats (Get Safe, 2007). According to Barrett (2007), 25% of the 10.8 
million people in the UK registered with networking websites expose 
personal information. Its activity focuses more on public awareness than 
policing activity. Recent CIFAS (2008) is the UK's fraud prevention service 
that has more than 270 member companies varying from financial agencies 
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to retail credit agencies. CIFAS is the first international level of data sharing 
scheme. Members share information to prevent further fraud. 
State-funded non-police groups 
WARP (2008) protects internet users from online fraud through providing 
up-to-date advice on information security threats, incidents and solution. 
WARP also provides useful training on how to use the internet safely. 
Another state-funded non-police agency is NAFN (National Anti Fraud 
Network). It was created for the awareness of organized fraud in 1993 
(NAFN, 2008). The UK Treasury department is monitoring and reporting 
fraud activities. The fraud advisory panel detects and deters external fraud. 
However, theses agencies do not specify their activity on policing internet 
fraud. For them, internet fraud is a kind of fraudulent activity. In addition, 
the committee on standards in public life is also involved in preventing 
internet fraud through examining current concerns. The FSA (Financial 
Services Authority) regulates most financial organisations such as banks, 
credit unions and insurance companies. The FSA also works w-ith other 
regulators and authorities in order to tackle financial crimes. Consumer 
Direct provides advice on how to avoid scams through online consumer 
advice services. This agency is supported by the Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
State-funded police 
Policing internet fraud in the United Kingdom is carried out by various 
levels of public police agencies, which vary from local police forces to the 
national level criminal justice agencies such as SFO (Serious Fraud Office) 
and SOCA (Serious Organised Crime Agency). As their names betray the 
former focuses upon serious frauds and the latter upon organized crime. 
At the local level, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Computer Crime 
Unit was founded under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 to deal %% ith 
internet related crime such as hacking and virus writing. So far, MPS 
reported that about 1,000 police officers have been trained to handle cases 
of cybercrime (Stephens and InduruNva, 2007). However, the MPS 
Computer Crime Unit does not deal with fraud related crimes, which are 
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mainly handled by the Economic and Specialist Crime OCU. Lack of 
resources and jurisdictional issues mean that the police haN e not effectiN ely 
responded to fraud cases. Current reporting arrangements are insufficient to 
respond to fraud cases where those responsible are based overseas (INIPS. 
2008). Local police have limitations in investigating internet fraud so lack 
of continuity of response gives benefits to firaudsters. It has also been 
reported that fraud involving minor values within a different jurisdiction and 
trading standard is rarely investigated (Fraud Review, 2006). In order to 
upgrade the capabilities of the MPS Computer Crime Unit, the Metropolitan 
Police Service launched the PCeU (Police Central E-Crime Unit) in 2008. 
The PCeU has worked closely with the Home Office, City of London Police. 
and the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to respond to 
cybercrime (MPS, 2008). The major mission of PCeU is to support the new 
National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) since 80-90 percent of cyber 
crimes are internet fraud related. The UK government assigned V million 
for this new agency (Vassou, 2008). Meanwhile, some local police forces, 
such as South Yorkshire, have prepared methods for investigating internet 
auction fraud on their website so that any police officer can use it. Despite 
local efforts, the majority of victims and police officers still do not know 
how to deal with internet fraud. 
At the national level, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), part of the criminal 
justice system and headed by the Director who is appointed by the Attorney 
General, handles major fraud offences in the UK. Its jurisdiction includes 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It was founded in April 1988 and its 
powers were created by the Criminal Justice Act 1987. Since the SFO has a 
limited budget and about 240 staff members, it does not deal with all fraud, 
only with serious fraud that involves special knowledge, wide coverage, 
international impact, and huge amount of loss (at least one million pounds) 
(Kiernan, 2005). Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act is a special power 
requiring answers to questions, provision of information or production of 
documents for the purpose of an investigation (SFO, 2008). Recently. the 
SFO obtained a new computer system to deal xNith internet fraud 
investigation (Kiernan, 2005). 
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SOCA (Serious Organised Crime Agency) is a non-geographic police unit 
responsible for undertaking pro-active operation against serious and 
organized crime. The agency has been formed from the combination of the 
National Crime Squad (NCS), the National Criminal Intelligence Service 
(NCIS) and HM Customs and Excise. A substantial part of the staff 
comprises former police officers so that they have carried over the 
professional police quality. The agency is sponsored by, but operationally 
independent, from the Home Office (SOCA, 2008). Recently, SOCA has 
expanded their policing activity to internet crime while its major role is to 
tackle national and transnational organized crime (Segell, 2007). The 
existing National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) has become a part of 
SOCA. There is a little difference between MPS/SFO and SOCA in that the 
MPS Computer Crime Unit and Serious Fraud Office have the ultimate aim 
to prosecute fraudsters while SOCA seeks to intercept criminals. It is in 
'addition to the SIS (M16) and the Secret Service (M15), similar to the FBI' 
(Segell, 2007: 1). However, SOCA's activities give little attention to 
cybercrime, this is apparent since only five percent of the budget was 
assigned to fight e-crime (Leyden, 2008). 
The UK government will establish the National Fraud Reporting Centre 
(NFRC) by 2009, which collates reports of all type of fraud and investigates 
fraud through its law enforcement arm (Leyden, 2008). The establishment 
of NFRC would fill the gap between fraud reporting and investigation. 
Previous separated systems did not prove effective or efficient in policing 
internet fraud. 
As illustrated above, public policing agencies have systematically responded 
to internet fraud from the local to national level in the United Kingdom. 
Although they do not perfectly deal with internet fraud, it appears that their 
progressive effort for developing policing for internet fraud can provide 
positive signs for future policing. In addition, along with the public model 
of policing internet fraud, the private model of policing is very active in the 
United Kingdom. 
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Summary 
The Fraud Review Team compiled statistics in 2006 indicating that that the 
following groups of investigators focused on fraud (Button; Johnston; 
Frimpong and Smith, 2007: 194): 
Serious Fraud Office (270 employees); 
The police (524 police officers in fraud squads); 
9 Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) (288 employees during 
2005-6); 
* Other public sector bodies - Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs 
(HMRQ (7500 staff including drugs investigators), DWP (32-50): 
NHS (344); Financial Services Authority (FSA) (46); Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) (150) etc.; 
0 Private sector (in-house investigations departments - the six largest 
banks alone having 2500 investigators). 
According to the Attorney General's Office, internet fraud accounted for 
about 8 percent of all fraud while overall losses from fraud were about 20 
billion pounds in the United Kingdom. Lord Goldsmith said that *it is often 
confusing for victims to know who to report the fraud to, particularly if it 
crosses geographical or sectoral boundaries'. Traudsters benefit from this 
lack of continuity of response. Internet fraud is a particularly good example 
of how a fraud can become difficult to report' (the register, 26/07/2006). For 
this reason, it is necessary to establish a central reporting centre so that 
victims can easily report their incidents without confusion and hesitation. A 
central reporting system would improve overall policing activities because it 
would resolve the under reporting problem while recording reliable incident 
data. Without recognizing the exact number of incidents, it is difficult to 
implement an effective policing strategy for internet fraud. 
Compared to the US policing model for internet fraud related crime, the UK 
policing model appears more fragmented and well balanced between the 
public and private sectors. It shows how the Americans and the British 
respond differently to internet fraud and reveals how internet fraud has been 
bridged between and within the public and private sector agencies. 
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Overall, the model for UK policing of internet fraud appears to have 
improved its capabilities in both the public and private sectors. Although 
private industries' activities are not publically recognized, in-house securit"'. I 
and risk management teams of large banks and corporations have gained 
great reputations (Button; Johnston; Frimpong and Smith, 2007). 
3.3 Internet fraud law in the UK 
The new fraud bill attempted to simplify existing laws by creating a new 
fraud offence carrying a maximum 10-year jail sentence and easing the 
prosecution process; the main feature of the bill (Leyden, 27/05/2005). The 
new offence can be committed: by false representation, which would take 
account of the offence of phishing; by failure to disclose information or by 
abuse of position. The new bill introduces three new offences that could 
potentially be used to deal with internet fraudsters: obtaining services 
dishonestly, for example by using a stolen credit card over the internet; 
possessing articles for use in frauds, such as a computer programme that 
generates genuine credit card numbers; and participating in fraudulent 
business. 
The recent reform of the UK Fraud Act 2006 Section 2 subsections (2) (3) 
creates an offence covering the perpetrators of phishing attacks. The 
provision is designed to clarify existing laws within the new Fraud Act. A 
new offence of fraud, designed to reinforce the existing law and simplify the 
prosecution process highlights the fact that the act of sending such emails 
without any proof of deception or obtaining of any property will be 
prosecuted (Savirimuthu and Savirimuthu, 2007); this is the main feature of 
the 2006 Act. The offence can be committed in one of three ways: false 
representation (as seen in phishing attacks); abuse of position (e. g. person 
lifting money from the account of an elderly person under their care) and 
failing to disclose information (e. g. a lawyer who schemes to keep 
information from his client so he can make money on the side). According 
to this 2006 Act, fraudsters can be imprisoned for a maximum 10 years for 
their offences (The registers, 2006). In spite of the enhanced Fraud Act 2006, 
89 
cyber firaudsters are still able to get away with limited sentences or 
discharges. Lost revenue in the UK stood at around $1.2 billion a ýear in 
2007 (Leggart, 2007). According to APACS data in 2008. card fraud 
increased 14 percent for the first six months of 2008 with total losses of 
001.7 million; online banking fraud losses totalled L21.4 million 
(Crimestoppers, 2008). These increases were attributed to internet fraud. 
However, introduction of chip and pin has interrupted fraudulent activitý 
and reduced losses by 35 percent since 2005. This clearly shows that la\\ is 
not the perfect remedy for internet fraud but safe use of the internet and 
enhancement of organizational information security are better solutions for 
the prevention (Savirimuthu and Savirimuthu, 2007). Overall, the capabilitý 
of criminal law must compete with the scale of the governance challenges 
that the online environment poses. 
3.4 How do public and private sectors police internet fraud 
in the UK? 
Policing internet fraud is very important subject since internet fraud has 
become the most prosperous type of cybercrime and influences both 
individuals and companies. While internet fraud requires converging 
criminological theory in the areas of policing, white-collar crime, and 
technology (Nhan 2006), it is imperative to find out what kind of policing 
model for internet fraud is more effective between the private and public 
policing models. 
Policing internet fraud by the public sector 
Policing internet fraud has a unique characteristic that travels across 
jurisdictions since internet fraud is not a specific country's issue, but an 
international one. It is widely recognized that the use of the internet as a tool 
for fraud was beyond the control of public sector regulators (Drinkhall, 
1997). In the public sector, there are govemment-funded police and 
govern m ent-fu nded non-police agencies participating in policing of internet 
fraud (Wall, 2007). They comprise police forces, financial supervision 
services, and information and communication regulating agencies. Ho\\ eN er, 
internet fraud cannot be effectively regulated by the public sector due to 
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lack of resources, knowledge, labour, training and law. The bureaucratic and 
inter-agency conflicts within the public sector have hindered the response to 
internet fraud. 
As policing internet fraud is different from the traditional type of crime. 
public police need to use a different design and strategy to respond to it. 
Law enforcement agencies are naturally bureaucratic organizations (Roberg, 
Kuykendall and Novak, 2002; Swanson et al., 1998). Police officers do not 
perceive the internet as a potential for the democratization of know ledge and 
growth in active citizenship (Walker and Akdeniz, 1998). Some argue that 
the police culture has a natural aversion to bureaucracy and show the 
development of UK police recruitment, training, and discipline and the 
reform efforts for anti corruption. However, the police have not completely 
escaped from the image of a bureaucratic organization (Reiner, 2000). 
According to Burns et al. (2004), law enforcement agencies have adopted 
the sort of bureaucratic model described by Max Weber, which emphasizes 
'a division of labour within organizations characterized by specified areas of 
competence, official duties bounded by a system of rational rules while 
training current and new staff (Bums et al., 2004: 479). Law enforcement 
agencies are required to develop competency and rules while training 
current and new staff, in order to respond to internet fraud adequately 
(Burns et al., 2004). To accomplish these developmental goals, a significant 
change must occur within the bureaucratic systems of law enforcement 
agencies. It will also require complex and comprehensive cooperation 
between institutions in the public and private sectors. 
Grabosky and Smith (2001: 29) reported that ýsecurity in cyberspace 
depends on the efforts of a wide range of institutions, as well as on a degree 
of self-help by potential victims of digital crime" and it is more likely to 
depend on a 'mix of law enforcement, technological and market solutions'. 
As in conventional crime, prevention is much better than cure in cyberspace. 
Public awareness programmes on behalf of prospective victims are needed 
to provide the necessary education about what risks they may confront. 
Grabosky and Smith (2001: 39) stated that 'individuals or institutions 
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should be made aware of the potential consequences of an attack on their 
information assets and of the basic precautionar) measures ýNhich they I 
should take'. 
Technological intervention such as biometric authentication and filtering 
software can be good counter- measures to prevent and to control internet 
fraud (Grabosky and Smith, 2001; Green, 2001). By using these 
technologies, systems administrators can prevent insiders and outsiders 
gaining access to certain types of information. However, the use of 
technological intervention may only create more opportunities to fraudsters, 
since they also use advanced technology and expertise to break into the 
system (Centeno, 2002). For this reason, law enforcement agencies are 
required to upgrade their new investigative techniques and equipment on a 
regular basis in order to detect and intercept fraudulent activities in 
cyberspace. 
The collaboration and cooperation of law enforcement agencies is very 
important in responding to serious internet fraud, since offender and victim 
can be located in different jurisdictions or on the sides of the globe. 
Therefore, the US Congress passed the Financial Services Antifraud 
Network Act of 2001, in order to enhance 'the coordination of anti-fraud 
efforts and promote the sharing of information among state and federal 
financial regulators' (Burns, R. and et al, 2004). Recent research by Bums et 
al. (2004) show that 64.2 percent of participants reported that there was very 
effective cooperation among law enforcement agencies. More specifically, 
respondents are working with county (62.0 percent), state (54.5 percent). 
and federal (55.1 percent) law enforcement. It was also found that there was 
the least effectiveness in working with the SEC's Office of Enforcement 
(24.4 percent), the NCL's Internet Fraud Watch (26.8 percent), foreign law 
enforcement (29.1 percent), and private security (30.9 percent). Information 
dissemination between/among security agencies is also an important factor 
in preventing internet fraud. According to Bums et al. (2004), most IaNý 
enforcement agencies send internet fraud awareness information to other 
law enforcement agencies (36.2 percent), the public (34.6 percent), and 
private sector businesses (25.7 percent). However, it indicates that judges 
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(3-3 percent) and other officials (7 percent) seldom receive such information. 
Meanwhile, it is also necessary to develop an accessible database of cases of 
internet fraud for law enforcement agencies and other criminal justice 
experts. 
These findings indicate the need for a central clearinghouse of information 
available to all law enforcement agencies. Internet fraud is significantly 
problematic and increasing in frequency primarily in a gradual fashion. A 
clearinghouse of information in which agencies involved with Internet fraud 
enforcement efforts could share 'technical information, the names of expert 
witnesses, advice from experienced prosecutors, or the location of available 
labs which would greatly assist law enforcement effort' (Bums and 
Whitworth, 2002: 18). 
There are a number of information clearinghouses actively operating under 
the supervision of international criminal justice organizations but they are 
not available to non-membership countries. For example, Interpol, Europol 
and ENISA have established criminal information networks to share the 
necessary information in order to respond to cybercrimes. In Europe 
particularly, ENISA (The European Network and Information Security 
Agency, which was founded in January 2004, will have a pivotal role in 
contributing to the development of a culture of network and information 
security for the benefit of the citizens, consumers, enterprises and public 
sector organizations of the European Union (ENISA, 2005). In 2005, 
ENISA had a budget of C34.3 million for five years and were fully staffed 
for collecting and analyzing incident data (Euractiv, 2004). In Asia, APECs 
(Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) 14 membership countries have 
discussed how to develop comprehensive legal frameworks to combat 
cybercrime and to build law enforcement units capable of investigating 
cybercrime. However, only 50% of countries participated in the treaty 
revealing legal and political disparities. 
Overall, it appears that the public sector has recognized the importance of 
policing cybercrime, including internet fraud. Many people have argued that 
the bureaucratic police organization has to change in order to satisý, the 
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public demand for the transformation of policing (Reiner, 2000): police 
have to develop their competency and rules while providing necessary 
training for officers (Burns et al, 2004). Private and public sector 
partnerships are emphasized when policing intemet fraud. It N\as strongly 
recommended by Grabosky and Smith (2001) that public awareness 
programmes by relevant public agencies and financial institutes are needed. 
Counter measures and technological interventions such as biometric access 
and filtering software have been introduced. For better coordination and 
cooperation, the Financial Services Antifraud Network Act of . 001 x\as 
established in the US (Bums et al, 2004). However, it is less effective for 
the private sector. Recently it has been discussed that law enforcement 
agency oriented information sharing has to be expanded to the entire 
criminal justice agency (Bums et al, 2004). The need for a clearinghouse of 
information was highly recommended (Burns and Whitworth, 2002). 
International level of response by Europol and Interpol was observed 
however, more efforts on an international level of cooperation have been 
emphasized. Evidently, the international level of law enforcement agencies 
has shown their effort to adapt to the policing of cybercrime while the local 
level of response has still been below the appropriate level. The following 
section will examine the level of policing in the private sector. 
Policing internet fraud by the private sector 
Since the policing of internet fraud is not a typical or routine event for the 
police, there is limited knowledge and limited human resources available to 
respond to interriet fraud. This situation implies that the private sector is 
better able to deal with internet fraud since it is in their interests to do so. 
Wall's (2002) study found that credit card related fraud was not reported to 
the police, but it was reported to the banks because they were regarded as 
the victims. The banks then resolved the fraud in their own way and 
favourably to their own interests, which prevents a negative impact of 
adverse publicity and preserves market confidence. The private sector of 
policing arguably responds more effectively to fraud in cyberspace because 
it applies a private model of justice. 
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Internet fraud has become more threatening for the private sector since e- 
commerce is developing rapidly and more people use online transactions for 
purchasing goods or services. Private organizations. corporations, banks and 
ISPs all make efforts to protect their customers' assets from any possible 
risks from internet fraud. Meanwhile, some organizations such as CAPA 
(Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants) have actively responded 
to internet fraud through regular base meetings that exchange information. 
They have acknowledged that there is a need for uniform guidelines and 
information clearinghouse to be established that set out desirable online 
practices with a view to minimizing the risks of fraud relating to electronic 
commerce (Smith and Urbas, 2001). 
The Anti Phishing Working Group is another large international level 
organization against fraud and identity theft resulting from phishing, 
pharming and e-mail spoofing. It has established global networks to respond 
to internet fraud and has more than 1700 members in the public and private 
sectors (APWG, 2008). It has a major aim to help e-commerce activities 
through eliminating those fraudulent threats. APWG encourages people to 
report their victimisation and provides public awareness programmes to 
enlighten internet users to avoid phishing attacks. However, it does not have 
any authority to use judicial sanctions on phishers, therefore serious cases 
have to be passed to a law enforcement agency. 
APACS is 'the UK trade association for payments and for those institutions 
that deliver payment services to customers' (2008). APACS represents 31 
industry members and works for their benefit through lobbying activities. 
Forecasting payment trends and collecting statistical data for developing 
industry standards and best practices are their main responsibilities. In 
addition, one of their key responsibilities is to coordinate activities to tackle 
payment related fraud. Usually, their policing activities are conducted 
through their own membership network. Thus, 31 industry members have 
participated in policing activities by collecting available information from 
each member's business domain. Eventually. the collated information NN ill 
become important data for making tactical counter measures to respond to 
payment fraud (APACS, 2008). 
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In fact, the majority of economic crimes are handled informallý through 
private models of justice, rather than reported to the police or other 
regulatory bodies (Clarke 1990; Levi 1992; Punch 1996; Schlegel and 
Weisburd, 1992). These responses are limited to 'internal systems of 
corporate justice' (Henry, 1983; Selznick, 1969) and 'securing desired 
forms of financial security on behalf of their clients' (Williams, 2005: 3- 
Recent trends indicate that many allegations of financial wrongdoing are 
handled not by the police but by private sector agencies. They are not low 
level and rather unsophisticated private security agencies, but professional 
service firms, which consist of CPAs, lawyers, former police officers 
(FPOs), private investigators and computer analysts. 
These are internationally famous firms in terms of sizes, assets, and large 
number of employees, namely: KPMG, Kroll Associates, Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte and Touche, Price-Waterhouse and Control Risks Group. They put 
a different name on their banner, such as 'forensic accounting', 'risk 
management consultancy' and 'security consulting'. According to Williams 
(2005: 317), 'these firms have positioned themselves as suppliers of a 
unique and highly specialized form of investigative and quasi-juridical 
labour geared to the resolution of 'business troubles' ranging from the theft 
of intellectual property, to the misappropriation of corporate assets, to 
breaches of financial security'. Williams coined the term 'Forensic 
Accounting and Corporate Investigation (FACI) industry' (2005: 317), for 
those businesses. 
In spite of a primary response to economic crime, their work has been 
limited to specialized accounting and legal publications. The FACI industry 
and its functions have been largely ignored within the sociological literature 
(Williams, 2005) although there are some references in discussions of risk, 
trust and security (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). This industry has 
contributed exclusively to the investigation of economic crime as a provider 
of policing services in the financial field. The majority of internet fraud 
occurred in the financial field since fraudsters penetrate credit card facilities 
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and use victims' credit cards. Therefore, many financial institutes have 
online and offline security service contracts with the FACI industry. 
According to Jones and Newburn (1999), a *policing division of labour' has 
long been employed as a focus point through which the mandate, interests 
and logics of private versus public forms of policing have been defined and 
framed. In the field of security, private and hybrid organizations govern a 
growing share of what has become a market and continuously search for 
new opportunities. Brodeur and Kempa (1995; 1999) argued that the public- 
private dichotomy fails to account for the diversity and heterogeneity of 
actors participating in the governance of security or policing. The 
prevalence and multidimensional implications of risk and its mentalitý' 
refute the idea that any single policing entity can prevent crime alone. The 
distinction between public and private forms of policing are increasingly 
difficult to maintain and have been proven somewhat outdated, given the 
emergence of complex and multi-dimensional 'security-networks' (Johnston, 
1996; Shearing, 1996; Loader, 2000; Newburn, 2001) or forms of 'nodal 
governance' (Johnston and Shearing, 2003: 18). 
Studies have indicated that private policing activities are very beneficial for 
preventing and protecting from internet fraud. However, private entities do 
have limited authority to enforce rules or laws against fraudsters. As 
indicated in Table 3.1 (internet order maintenance assemblage), their 
sanctions include removal from access rights, withdrawal of internet 
services and financial sanctions. These are relatively limited ways to 
effectively control the level of internet fraud. For this reason, their 
assistance to individual victims is limited and is often considered 
disappointing. In the meantime, corporations and banks have hired 
professional security services through the FACI industry, which will 
provide much more reliable services than non-profit organization services 
with substantial costs. However, FACI industry activities are not well 
known to the public (William, 2005). This reflects the fact that their 
activities are still restricted by some jurisdictions. As indicated in the 
internet order maintenance assemblage (see Table 3.1), multiple actors in 
the private sector participate in policing cybercrime. Therefore, some 
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experts report that public-private dichotomy fails to account for multiple 
actors participating in the governance of security or policing. The 
emergence of 'security networks' and 'nodal governance' is a substitute for 
the traditional public-private distinction (Wall, 2007). 
3.5 Relationship between the public and private sectors 
There are many criminal justice literatures describing the appropriate 
relationship between the private and public police (Marx, 1987; Gill and 
Hart, 1997; Golsby, 1998; Jones and Newburn, 1998: Johnston, 1999; Sarre 
and Prenzler, 2000; Bayley and Shearing, 2001) although this literature is 
not based on policing cyberspace. 
According to Marx (1987), the delegation of police poNNer to the private 
sector is useful to investigate cases where the police cannot reach due to 
legal constraints. He also argued that organizational forms distort public, 
private and the exchange of personnel between the policing sectors. 
However, Gill and Hart (1997: 564) have argued that the police 
investigation work, such as guarding and patrolling service, should not be 
contracted out. It seems that only simple police work should be delegated to 
the private police. Loader (1997: 385) argued that 'the most stringently 
controlled private security industry might still serve to cement and 
exacerbate social inequalities'. Meanwhile, Golsby (1998) suggested the 
establishment of equal partnership and private security federation, which 
has a complaints system and liaison committee, would provide effective 
policing. 
Sarre and Prenzier (2000) introduced the regulated intersections model to 
show an appropriate relationship between public and private police. Their 
model shows normative models for relationships between those sources. 
They argued that partnership is necessary but cooperation should limited 
and regulated in order to maximize the public interest. The model contains 
seven descriptive models that they suggest to consider for observed 
interrelation. They are the property model, the division of labour model. the 
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competing force model, the supplementary service model, the Ad Hoc 
partnership model, the combined model and the unholy alliance model. 
Table 3-2: The regulated intersections model 
Model Characteristics 
Property Similar means of patrol and investigation but differ 
ent 
location and boundaries 
Division of labour Police focus deterrence, private focus on crime 
prevention 
Competing forces Compete for the market share 
Supplementary servic 
e 
The police regulate private security industry 
Ad Hoc partnership Work together whenever it is necessary 
Combined forces Two sectors combine permanently at all levels 
Unholy Alliance Corrupt relationship between two sectors 
Source: Sarre and Prenzler (2000). 
Among the seven models, the division of labour model reflects the tension 
between the private and public models of policing internet fraud because it 
focuses on how each sector approaches internet fraud differently. While the 
police focus on deterrence through investigation, private security focuses on 
crime prevention. The things that make them so different are their 
contrasting policing goals. The goal of private policing mainly seeks for the 
recovery of loss, prevention of future risk (George and Button, 2000) while 
the goal of public policing mainly seeks actual punishment (Reiner, 1994). 
In the private justice model, sanction might involve dismissal, demotion or 
civil penalties. Some cases can be litigious while some cannot be litigious 
(Stucki, 2002). 
In response to internet fraud, investigative tendencies also reflect their 
different goals of policing activity. For example, the police would like to 
eradicate all connection in cases of phishing while the private security 
would like to reinstate normal internet services without delay or being 
noticed by their customers. The degree of difference in the response b) each 
sector shows how it is difficult to mix two sectors. 
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The relationship between private and public sector in terms of policing 
internet fraud does not exist in the current law in many nations and there is 
no specific law to define their relationship and policing activity. Although 
they have pursued different goals of policing. close partnership and 
cooperation of the two sectors is imperative to improve the level of policing 
of internet fraud. 
It is evident that governments and law enforcement agencies need a strong 
partnership with the private sector for policing internet fraud because 
governments cannot handle the complex problems of internet fraud without 
the assistance of private organizations. Neither governments nor the private 
sector can solve the problems alone. Lack of knowledge about internet fraud 
on the part of the public police and lack of legal authority for private 
security makes them dependent upon each other. The nature of internet 
fraud requires close cooperation between the public and private sectors. 
Although cooperation between the public and private sector is imperative, it 
is also important to improve the role of public police in relation to the 
policing of cyberspace because traditional forms of policing cannot treat the 
complicated nature of cyberspace and cybercrimes required by networked 
security. 
3.6 The development of the public police role in policing 
cyberspace 
Policing cyberspace is characterized by 'a sense of order that results from 
the complex order-maintenance 'assemblage' of networked nodes of 
security' (Wall, 2007: 177). These networks go beyond the 'state/non -state 
binary' (Dupont, 2004: 76) and state sovereignty (Shearing, 2004: 6). Wall 
(2007) stated that networked security takes advantage of the 'natural 
surveillance' and has social control functions, both primary and secondary. 
Internationally, jurisdictional legal disparity is mediated by networked 
security. 
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Although overall the public police role is small compared to other networks, 
police still culturally, symbolically and politically tend to claim an 
ownership of policing cyberspace. Particularly, public police is being 
supported by 'the traditional consensual relationship with the state and the 
citizen' (Wall, 2007: 178). With regard to the debate over policing 
cyberspace, a replication was made by the terrestrial reassurance of policing 
debate in that the 'increasing recognition that the police alone cannot NN in 
the fight against crime and disorder and cannot meet the public's seemingly 
insatiable demand for a visible policing presence' (Crawford and Lister, 
2004: 413). Wall (2007) argued that policing cyberspace never demands a 
more visible policing presence while terrestrial policing demands a more 
visible policing presence on the street. 
According to Crawford and Lister (2004: 414), 'public police are becoming 
part of more varied and complex assortment of organizations and agencies 
with different policing functions together with a more varied and complex 
assortment of organizations and agencies with different policing functions 
together with a more diffuse array of processes of control and regulation'. 
This reflects the claims that 'not all policing lies in the police' (Reiner, 2000) 
and 'player in the broader network of security constitutes the policing 
cyberspace' (Wall, 2007: 178). As claimed by Crawford and Lister (2004: 
426), 'much policing is now taking place beyond the auspices' of the public 
police and plural policing, facilitating a form of 'networked governance', 
that has taken placed in the networked and nodal architecture of cyberspace 
(Wall, 2007: 179). 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997) stated that the emerging role of police is as 
'information brokers' since they do not necessarily use physical force to 
deal with the crime but use intelligence thorough the internet. For example, 
'insurance companies and their investigative units are routinely given access 
to police records and insurance adjusters take the lead in investigating 
fraudulent claims, they depend on the police for routine disclosure of 
relevant knowledge' (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997: 227.23 1). 
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There is clearly a need for international cooperation to the response of 
internet fraud between advanced countries to make such expertise available 
to less developed nations and share strategic information and training 
throughout the world. To some extent this is already occurring. indeed some 
IT advanced nations' police agencies have hosted workshop and training 
programmes for other nations' police officers. For example. the Korean 
National Police Agency hosted 13 foreign police forces and provided three 
nations' cyber-policing training in 2006 (Kim, 2008). HoýNever. it appears 
that the provided training did not focus on internet fraud investigation but 
focused more on hacking and other types of cybercrime. It seems that 
internet fraud investigation is not a priority for the Korean National Police 
Agency. This may reflect the fact that the private model of policing internet 
fraud is better than the public model. Because of this reason, it is necessary 
to find a solution from the cross sector partnership between the public and 
private sectors. 
3.7 Multi-agency cross sector partnerships 
The purpose of 'a multi-agency cross-sector partnership is to build up 
networked trust relationships that engender a willingness to share 
information'. It should not be exclusively dominated by the state law 
enforcement although 'these partnerships tend to be driven by Internet 
security and law enforcement initiatives' (Wall, 2007: 180). For example, 
POLCYB (the Society for the Policing of Cyberspace) is both multi-agency 
and cross-sector, existing to share information across micro-networks of 
trusted individuals and agencies to promote cooperation between sectors 
which actively invite international involvement from law enforcement, 
corporate entities and interest groups' (Wall, 2007: 180). POLCYB (2008) 
is a good international forum for the policy issues while HTCC (the High 
Tech Crime Consortium) focuses more on discussing routine problems of 
cybercrime. HTCC is also more of a multi-agency than cross-sector 
organization (2008). 
According to Hynds (2003), the private sector has spent a huge amount ot 
money on business intelligence in order to make successful investments, 
new products and expand while less money is spent on the IT security that 
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has to be synchronized with company efforts. He suggested that a cross 
sector partnership would reduce the cost that private sector previousk had W 
to foot alone. Risk assessment by the public sector would provide real value 
to private industry. Since all information supplied comes from across the 
various business sectors and other intelligence sources, the private sector 
would obtain real value added service from the public sector. 
The AGORA security group tends to discuss 'at a policy or procedure leý el 
rather than specifically sharing sensitive intelligent data; for example, 
developing ideas about security issues and good practice, but also 
identifying, even agreeing possible acceptable limits for data storage and/or 
provide data' (Wall, 2007: 181). It promotes more informal cross sector 
meetings. Sharing of commercial victimization and criminal intelligence 
within the forum based on networked trust relationships enhances the 
partnership policing. Multiple crossover memberships are common for the 
members who seek more information. 
Charney (2005) also reported the five elements of a public and private 
cross-sector partnership strategy that Microsoft experienced N\hich 
illustrates the role of industry and government. The five elements are: 
the existence of strong laws and adequate resources for enforcement; 
proper training of law enforcement; 
9 coordination among domestic and international law enforcement 
agencies and improved information sharing that is closely related to 
such coordination; 
0 heightened public awareness of the risks of cyberspace and proper 
user practices; 
0 improved technology (Charney, 2002: 4). 
Similar to CIPAC (Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council), 
NISCC (National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre) coordinates 
principle agencies in the UK. NISCC is an interdepartmental centre. N\hich 
consists of Home Office, CESG (Communications-Electronics Secunt% 
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Group), Security Service, MoD, DSTL (ex DERA), DTL Cabinet Office, 
CCS (Civil Contingencies Secretariat), e-Envoy (CSIA), and NHTCU 
(National Hi-Tech Crime Unit). It was launched in February 2000 and its 
major aim is to minimize the risk of the Critical National Infrastructure 
(CNI) from electronic attack (Overill, 2001). Later, CPNI was formed in 
February 2007 from the merger of the National Infrastructure Security Co- 
ordination Centre (NISCQ and the National Security Advice Centre (NSAC 
- part of M15) (CPNI, 2008). Its business philosophy focuses on information 
sharing. Davis (2005) emphasized that information sharing among 
government departments, operators, owners of CNI and system vendors 
would help to deal with the vulnerability. In Europe, ENISA contributes to 
coordinating member states in combating cybercrime associated with the 
private sector by developing of investigative technology (Mitrakas and 
Zaitch, 2006). 
There is an also specific growing concern encouraging the demand for 
establishing specialist coalitions such as The European Contact Network of 
Spam Authorities (CNSA) that coordinates anti-sparn enforcement 
internationally through building relations with the OECD and the 
International Telecommunication Union (Wall, 2007). Shaw (2004) reported 
that spam is a bothersome cross sector problem that requires international 
cooperation in terms of legal and technical support. Broadhurst (2006) 
argued a need for mutual legal assistance in the international level of 
response for the cross-national nature of cybercrime. Transnational policing 
capability for cybercrime is necessary since malicious codes penetrate into 
the global computer network that eventually threatens e-commerce activities. 
According to Wall (2007), it is evident that there are not many multi-agency 
cross sector partnership organizations available at the international level. 
Furthermore, existing multi-agency cross sector partnership organizations 
such as POLCYB, AGORA, and HTCC have been launched in English 
culture based nations. There is no single agency or organization existing in 
Asia. Since cybercrime has a transnational nature, it is necessary to establish 
a multi-agency cross sector partnership forum or organization in order to 
cover the international level of the order maintenance assemblage. 
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In order to establish an effective international cross sector agency. it is 
important first to examine current policing practices in IT a&anced nations. 
The following section illustrates how the policing of internet fraud operates 
in the US. This information will be used to compare other nations' policing 
models for internet fraud. 
3.8 Barriers to the effective policing of eybercrime 
The most common complaint made by police officers or law enforcement 
agencies is that they are not technologically equipped for the response of the 
high tech crimes while criminals are getting smarter and crimes are getting 
more complicated (Chung, 1999). Conservative police cultures and 
traditions have hindered the rapid change of police capability in relation to 
high technology (Wall, 2007). 
In order to satisfy the public concern regarding emerging cybercrimes, 
police forces form specialist units to deal with the cybercrimes. The success 
of the organizational response to cybercrime depends on special knowledge 
and expertise within a police force. According to Wall (2007: 160), 
'cybercrimes introduce a new global dimension to the relationship between 
police, technology and the public because they clearly fall outside the 
traditional localized and even national operational purview of police'. 
Although the Council of Europe (COE) and international police 
organizations (Europol, Interpol) work at the procedural and organizational 
levels, there are various barriers to developing good policing of cybercrimes. 
There are de-minimism, nullum-crimen disparities, jurisdictional disparities, 
non-routine activity and police culture and under-reporting (Wall, 2007). 
De-minimism is a common characteristic of cybercrimes that leads to low- 
impact, bulk-victimizations that cause large aggregated losses 
intemationally because police do not investigate trivial matters. Vullum- 
crimen disparity (nullum crimen sine lege-no crime without law) is another 
characteristic of cybercrime that causes inter-jurisdictional problems, which 
arise due to cultural differences in defining crime. Some offences fall Linder 
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civil law in one jurisdiction and criminal law in another. Jurisdictional 
disparities are also found in many nations, hence the use of, forum shopping' 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) is favoured by the police and prosecutors in 
order to maximize the potential of conviction (Wall, 2002: 2007). 
Jurisdictional venue changes have been seen in many cases since 
cybercrimes have involved different locations of servers, offenders and 
victims. Inter-jurisdictional cooperation is a key factor for a successful 
response to cybercrimes. 
According to Reiner (2000) and Wall (1997: 2000), response to cybercrime 
is not a routine activity of the police, which include cross-border 
investigation. Wall (2007: 163) stated that 'police occupational culture is the 
accumulation of the collective "routine" experience of police officers and it 
is an important component of police work'. Since cybercrimes are non- 
typical events for the police officers, police culture does not appropriately 
support them to respond to unusual events. 
Under reporting of cybercrimes to the police is becoming a serious concern. 
Comparison of several reliable data sets indicates that relatively small 
numbers of cybercrimes are reported to the police. They are mainly minor- 
credit card related frauds but no further investigation was taken. It appears 
that there is a relationship between de-minimism and under-reporting. The 
public also does not expect any successful investigation by the police due to 
lack of knowledge and resources. However, 'the public still regards the 
police as a primary emergency service' (Wall, 2007: 165). Generally, 
victims and other groups or organizations involved in the regulation of 
behaviour in cyberspace deal with the cybercrimes since most cybercrimes 
are actually not necessarily classified as crime, rather they are considered 
more harmful activities (Wall, 2007). 
Police accountability, de-minimism and under-reporting are jointly 
facilitating the development of cybercrime. In addition, ambiguous 
classification of cybercrimes that may fall into the category of harmful 
activities has also provided a blind spot for the policing of c"'bercrime and I 
harmful activities. Apparent classification of cybercrime is imperative to 
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define the role of the public police so that the public police knoýý how to 
respond to it and what they have to do to prepare for it. It is veD,, important 
to rethink the role of the public police with regard to the policing of 
cybercrime. 
3.9 Tensions between private and public sectors in policing 
internet fraud 
Nature of problem 
Tensions evident while policing internet fraud have characteristics that are 
different from tensions in terrestrial level policing in that they are mainly 
occur due to lack of a legal system, lack of technological resources and lack 
of IT knowledge between the private and public sectors. Since the police 
have limited knowledge and resources for policing cyberspace they can 
neither satisfactorily protect the victims of internet fraud nor prevent the 
occurrence of crime in the first place (Parliament of Victoria, 2002). thus 
the responsibility of the private models of policing fraudulent activities in 
cyberspace has become more pronounced than ever. At the same time, the 
private model of policing has shifted its focus from the protection of 
physical assets to the protection of information (Solms, 2001). so policing 
by the private sector of security now plays a more significant role in the 
response to internet fraud than it does to conventional crime. This 
superiority of the private model of policing internet fraud creates serious 
tensions between the public and private policing bodies. 
Previously many scholars have studied the tensions between private security 
and public police (South, 1988; Johnston, 1992; Shearing, 1992; Swanton, 
1993; Greene, Seamon and Levy, 1995; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader 
and Walker, 2001; Mandel, 2002). They argued that policing involves 
various tensions that negatively affect the efficiency and effectiveness, 
public reassurance, and authority of the state. However, their studies ý\ ere 
limited within conventional terrestrial level policing and the tensions 
between private and public models of policing internet fraud does not 
appear to have ever been chosen as a main research topic. 
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Despite many academic articles reporting the importance of public and 
private cooperation and partnership in policing cybercrime (Adamski, 2003: 
EURIM, 2006; IACP, 2004; Kozlovski, 2005). tensions in the policing of 
internet fraud have rarely been discussed in the existing literature. Lack of 
criminological research about tensions between private and public models of 
policing internet fraud suggest that criminologists may be discouraged to 
conduct it since it contains many sensitive issues. The only available 
literature regarding this topic is to be found in Wall's (2005: 87) recent 
work, where he comments that 'low levels of prosecutions for breaches of 
computer security and low levels of recorded Internet related fraud are 
poignant examples of this tension'. 
Notwithstanding the fact that many Western countries' governments have 
encouraged the use of private policing, there are still tensions arising 
between private and public policing sectors (Shearing, 1992). Traditional 
public sector policing does not trust private sector policing in terms of 
accountability, integrity, professionalism, and public interest. According to 
Crawford, Lister, Blackburn and Burnett (2005), lack of coordination, 
duplication and poor relationships between the two sectors discourage their 
effectiveness. 
Production of tension 
According to Swanton (1993: 1), 'police and private security occupy a 
largely common functional domain, both are finding it difficult to prepare 
for the future and a degree of tension exists between them. That tension can 
be expected to exacerbate in an era in which charging for services hitherto 
considered public responsibilities finds widespread acceptance'. If the 
police can effectively patrol our neighbours, each individual does not need 
to hire private security services with the extra expenditure. However, 
'tension in cyberspace arises from the power struggle for control over 
cyberspace in order to obtain market control and protection' (Wall, 2007: 
23). 
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Cyberspace is a virtual world where ideas create more economic value than 
physical property (Barlow, 1994). According to Jordan (1999: 3). 'virtual 
societies have become increasingly important, taking over the existing 
societies and inventing their own'. More people meet, discuss and share 
information in cyberspace than terrestrial space. With the emergence of the 
internet, economic, social and political values have been reshaped and 
reappraised. It is not an exaggeration to say that the internet has become a 
most important tool for humans. 'The Internet is causing us to reformulate 
the ways in which we understand societal changes' (Wall 1997: A '109). 
Neither sector wants to compete for ownership of policing internet fraud if 
no interest exists between the two sectors. For the private sector, it is 
directly related to corporate governance and management (Von Solms, 
2001). For the public sector, it is directly related to a symbol of state 
sovereignty (Shearing, 2004). It appears to be difficult to gke up their 
policing authority for cyberspace since they have to pursue the different 
goals ofjustice and interests. 
Types of tensions 
As McKenzie (2006) reported, many more serious tensions exist between 
the private and public sector than between public police forces and public 
agencies. Their different goals and reasons for policing internet fraud create 
those tensions and hinder their effective partnership. 
3.9.1.1 Tensions between the private and public sectors 
Tensions between the private and public sector of policing bodies deter and 
impede the building of positive relationships. Security experts believe that 
lack of trust and sharing of information, different investigative philosophies, 
negative publicity, and adverse impact on stock are the most common 
tensions between the two sectors. These tensions have been noticed by 
criminal justice and policing related literatures (Shearing, 1992; Greene, 
Seamon and Levy, 1995; Connors, Cunningham and Ohlhausen, 1999: 
Rigakos, 2002, Crawford, Lister and Wall, 2003: Delint, 2005: Joh, 2004: 
Bhanu and Stone, 2004; Ferret, 2004). However, there are some gaps in this 
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research since tensions between private and public sectors for policing 
internet fraud have not been studied by many scholars. 
Traditionally, the study of tension between the private and pub] ic sector NN as 
concerned with the development of private policing and the promotion of 
partnership policing. According to Swanton (1993), different perspectives in 
the way each view the world and differing interests create tensions between 
the two sectors. Only former police officers who join the private sector tend 
to have a friendly sympathy for the private sector. Usually. police see the 
private sector as an inferior security group. Therefore, it is difficult to unite 
with the police in this respect. 
Later, Greene, Seamon and Levy (1995) confirmed that tension was also 
generated even though private and public police joined for the collective 
benefit of policing in Philadelphia. It seems that the generation of tension is 
an unavoidable phenomenon as long as two different policing models 
coexist. Like terrestrial policing, tension continues to be generated in the 
policing of internet fraud, as the only differing condition is the use of the 
internet as a criminal tool, the policing bodies remain the same. And. like 
many issues, tensions are produced when two different models of policing 
compete for the same target of crime. 
Among the many tensions, lack of trust appears to be the most critical one 
highlighted in the extant literature (Loader, 1997; Johnston, 1999; Nalla and 
Hummer, 1999). Basically, lack of trust between the two sectors ruins 
efforts made toward partnership policing from the onset. Johnston (1999) 
reported that risk minimization in policing is attached to the element of 
removing lack of trust. Matthews and Cotes (2004) argued that trust is a key 
aspect of social capital formation at the interpersonal, community level and 
further institutional level. Abrahamsen (2005) argued that if institutional 
legal reforms proceed and obstacles such as lack of trust, corruption and 
cultural differences are tackled, effective partnership policing can be 
achieved, even in developing nations such as Kenya. 
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At the be inning of this chapter, lack of resources ýk as mentioned as another 9 
tension between private and public models of policing. Previously it was 
thought of as an individual tension and not linked N\ith other tensions. 
However, Fleming (2006) reported that lack of resources prevents trust from 
building in any potential partnership. Simpl%. insufficient technological. 
financial and human resources hinder the promotion of partnership policing. 
It is important to note that lack of trust is not only caused b\ political, 
cultural and social factors but also caused through a lack of technological, 
financial and human resources. 
With regard to different investigative philosophies of policing, the private 
sector does not like to use the public police (Shearing, 1992) since interests 
of private security are generally client-driven and contractual, while the 
police are held to standards of public interest (Swanton, 1993). However, 
the public police, due to the consensual relationship between state and its 
citizens, are expected to police cybercrime. It may be more practical to 
establish an appropriate law and policy to define the role and scope of each 
sector. In particular, not only general cybercrime but also the policing of 
internet fraud should be clearly included. With regard to the public police, 
they should maintain and extend this symbolic duty to protect the public 
interest (Prenzler and Sarre, 1998) and so apply this to internet fraud. 
As mentioned above, negative publicity is another factor significantly 
affecting partnership policing. Usually, private companies are concerned 
with negative publicity and the subsequent adverse impact on stock value 
(Braithwaite and Fisse, 1983). Many believe that incident reports to the 
police have often been disclosed to the public. Therefore, they are reluctant 
to report incidents despite the fact that immediate reporting makes it easier 
to police internet fraud. This under-reporting could deter cooperation 
between private and public policing bodies in the response to internet fraud 
(Wall, 2006). 
According to Sarre and Prenzler (2000: 107), 'law enforcement and 
corporations that use private security often have incompatible goals and 
guiding principles. especially when it comes to the issues of reporting crime 
and prosecuting offenders'. Private security prefers to deal ýN ith Internet 
fraud through informal justice such as blocking services and warnings of 
frozen membership, while public police prefer to use the criminal justice 
system and procedures such as fines and imprisonment. 
Clearly, largely dissimilar interests motivate them to claim ownership of 
policing so that tension is unavoidable between the private and public sector. 
For the private sector, it is important to protect company assets and 
customers from any fraudulent activity. For the public sector, it is important 
to protect taxpayers' assets and citizens from any harmful online activity. 
However, too many things overlap between these interests. Most private 
interest is for the public good so that it is difficult to distinguish betýýeen the 
two interests (Swanton, 1993). 
Other factors, such as insufficient information sharing between the tNNo 
sectors have also demoted effective policing activity for internet fraud. Each 
sector has a different purpose of policing thus some information cannot be 
shared between the sectors. Sometimes, legal restraints, such as the Data 
Protection Act in the UK and Personal Information Protection Act in Korea, 
hinder their sharing of information. Besides, an asymmetric information 
flow is another problem promoting the ineffective policing of internet fraud. 
It has been suggested that there should be a balanced two-way 
communication between the two sectors. 
Contrary to general belief, the public police play a small part in policing 
cybercrime (Sommer, 2004) since they have insufficient resources and 
knowledge to respond to criminals. Internet fraud is different from other 
cybercrimes so in many ways it is more appropriate to use a private model 
of policing. While public police cannot deal with incidents that involve the 
loss of small values, such as auction fraud (Chua and Wareham, 2004), 
private security can deal with any case if it is necessary or beneficial. 
In terrns of loss control and prevention, many private companies such as the 
telecommunication and financial services industry. employ large number of 
IT security experts to protect themselves and their customers (EURIN1, 
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2006). They spend more money on policing cyberspace, including internet 
fraud, than a small nation's annual budget because they have recognized 
that the potential risk may significantly harm their business activitN,. 
It also appears that the tension between criminal justice and intelligence is 
not the consequence of a power struggle for the ownership of policing rather 
different interests and aims carry the tension within the intelligence network 
(De lint; O'Connor and Cotter, 2007). 
3.9.1.2 Tensions within the public sector 
Tensions within the public model of policing hinder the development of 
inter sector cooperation in response to internet fraud. Actually, a study of 
tensions within the public model of policing internet fraud is a difficult topic 
to deal with. Without working inside an agency or having special 
connections to access agency data, it is hard to obtain reliable data. 
Congressional audit and media reports have often addressed tensions that 
negatively influence the cooperation of public policing bodies. However, 
these tensions are only discussed by those within the public sector. Due to 
the political sensitivity of the issue and potential denial of agencies, third 
parties tend not to be involved in research on this topic. 
As a result, it is even more difficult to reveal tensions concerning the 
policing of internet fraud within the public sector. Instead, we can 'borrow' 
some tensions within the terrestrial level of policing that are likely to also 
affect the policing of internet fraud. Among the tensions within the public 
sector, the most common are overlapping jurisdictions, lack of information 
sharing and competency. 
In cyberspace, there are no clear borders so it is difficult to claim the scope 
of jurisdiction. Local, state and federal law enforcement agencies have often 
separately policed and investigated the same crime without recognizing 
others' involvement. Particularly, internet fraud has been targeted by many 
public agencies including state funded police and state funded non-police 
agencies. Extraordinary characteristics of internet fraud haNe required 
various policing bodies to respond to it. Unless there is a special laN% to 
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assign different jurisdictions and the role of each agency. overlapping 
jurisdictions problems will continue. It seems that cyberspace is a place with 
no traffic lights. When every agency wants to claim its cyber jurisdiction, a 
chaotic situation occurs. 
Lack of information sharing has been found among public agencies whether 
they are state funded police or non-police agencies. Each agencýl is reluctant 
to share any merit for the successful policing or investigation ýNhile equallý'. 
no agency wants to take entire liability. Effective partnership policing 
cannot be expected if there is no sharing of information ýN ithin the public 
sector. Since cybercrime travels over jurisdictions and national borders, the 
sharing of information is vital to remove internet fraud. As c)-bercrime has 
become a transnational problem, establishment of an international 
information sharing system is imperative. 
Lack of competency is 'where cases are passed on from lower to higher 
levels if it is felt the lower level is not competent to resolve the issue' (Wall, 
2002: 202). As long as the transfer case from a lower level to higher-level 
agency occurs based on mutual trust and respect, it could be considered a 
good sign of inter-sector cooperation. However, a lower level agencý, would 
be discontented if a higher-level agency took over the case without consent, 
using agency power. This has happened to many centralized national police 
system nations. 
As illustrated above, it appears that different interests and aims of the 
private and public sectors create tensions and these hinder the development 
of effective partnership policing between and within sectors. Fundamentally, 
major tensions are created due to lack of trust, sharing of information and 
lack of competency. Other tensions also discourage the positive partnership 
effort between and within two sectors. However, it is assumed that some 
tensions may become useful motivations for making an effective policing 
partnership for the prevention of internet fraud. 
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Positive and negative perspective of tension 
Tensions between private and public sectors and tensions within the public 
sector appear to be quite different from each other. Tensions between 
private and public sectors are produced mainly due to different interests 
while tensions within the public sector are produced mainly due to inter- 
sector competition. Tensions are not always seen as negative factors 
hindering the development of effective partnership policing. Some tensions 
are necessary to promote partnership policing between private and public 
sectors. For example, lack of resources and knowledge of IT ýýithin the 
public sector can be a good reason to invoke the cooperation of the private 
sector. In particular, investigation of financial fraud cannot be handled bý 
the public sector alone. Cooperation in the investigation by credit card 
companies and banks is imperative given the complicated nature of the 
fraud. Therefore, these tensions appear to be very useful factors to invoke 
partnership policing for internet fraud. 
In contrast, some tensions, such as negative publicity and adverse impact on 
stock value, are good examples of negative tension that can promote 
partnership policing for internet fraud. These tensions tend to discourage 
fraud incident reporting by the private sector because these tensions are 
directly related to the success of their business. Many companies have been 
disappointed when news of police investigations have exposed their 
weaknesses to the market and eventually ruined their brand image and 
company reputation. Actually, negative publicity and adverse impact on 
stock value are closely related to the downgrading of business reputation. 
The impact of media sensitization is far beyond our imagination. 
Paradoxically, some tensions are useful stimuli to invoke the promotion of 
partnership policing while others deter their optimistic efforts. it seems that 
tension contains more negative characteristics than positive. Only some 
positive tensions described above are considered good stimuli for 
partnership policing of internet fraud. Thus, both tensions work as a 'check 
and balance' function in policing internet fraud. However, it appears that 
there is little evidence to support this assumption. Broadly speaking, 
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tensions are products of negative relationships. In order to develop a more 
logical connection between two tensions, the cause and effect of each 
tension has to be studied in relation to the development of partnership 
policing for intemet fraud. 
To summarize, tensions tend to contain more negative than positive 
characteristics that prevent both sectors from building a positive partnership 
police for internet fraud. Now, it is necessary to examine hoNý 
criminological theory and the policing of internet fraud are academically 
related in order to explain the creation of the new phenomenon of internet 
fraud as a cybercrime. 
3.10 Conclusion 
There are three critical reasons why the policing of internet fraud by the 
public police has been challenged and questioned. Firstly, intemet fraud is 
not an easy problem for the public police to tackle because they lack the 
requisite knowledge and resources. However, in many countries, the general 
public tend to think of the public police as the emergency service to deal 
with all problems. Secondly, the cultural claim by the public police to a 
greater ownership of policing cyberspace does not square Nvith the fact that 
the public police only do a small part of that work compared to other 
networks (Wall 2006: 9). This claim to ownership stems from the traditional 
Peelian paradigm of the police, which has not only defined the local-police- 
public mandate but also shaped the organizational and professional priorities 
of the police whilst framing their 'constitutional' position in the broader 
framework of policing society (Wall 2006: 11). Thirdly, the primary 
function of the public police is to police for the public interest, but internet 
fraud largely takes place in a private domain covered by private interest so 
corporations tend to want to pursue a private model of justice in order to 
secure their strength and maintain confidence in the market. This incentive 
to self-police as determined by 'private interest' is viewed as being in the 
best interests of the public, despite creating a tension bemeen public and 
private policing (Wall, 2006). 
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Tensions between private and public sectors in policing cyberspace are 
raised due to the different interests each sector has to pursue. Tensions 
between the private and public sector of policing bodies deter and impede 
the building of positive relationships. Security experts believe that lack of 
trust; information sharing, different investigative philosophies, negative 
publicity, and adverse impact on stock are the most common tensions 
between two sectors. In addition, Wall (2005: 87) argued that the most 
affecting examples of tension are 'low levels of prosecution and low levels 
of recorded Internet fraud'. 
Tensions within the public model of policing hinder the development of 
inter-sector responses to internet fraud. The most common tensions are 
overlapping jurisdictions, lack of information sharing and competency. 
Since cybercrimes travel across national borders and jurisdictions, it is 
imperative to establish close partnerships among agencies international ly. 
Lack of competency underline the importance of inter-sector cooperation 
through mutual trust and respect. These tensions illustrated within the sector 
are the same as tensions between sectors in that cooperation or partnership 
policing is imperative to respond to rapidly growing rates of cybercrime. 
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Chapter 4: Policing internet fraud in US Research 
4.1 Introduction 
Internet fraud is not a major concern for the local and state police agencies 
since lack of resources and the borderless nature of internet fraud deter them 
from participating in effective policing. However, federal level agencies are 
well prepared for the response of internet fraud under full congressional 
financial support. The toughening up of national security after the 9/11 
terrorist incidents make it easier to develop responses to internet fraud on 
behalf of integrated security systems. 
4.2 Who polices internet fraud in the US? 
Compared to South Korea and the UK, the policing of internet fraud in the 
US appears more advanced and well organized. However, the US model of 
policing depends too much on the public sector. It may be influenced by the 
law enforcement focused crime prevention programme and anti-terrorism 
focused national security policy. For the response to internet fraud, IC3 and 
NW3C are enthusiastically performing their best efforts. Particularly, the 
US government and Congress provide sufficient budgets to achieve their 
aims for the prevention and control of internet fraud. It is also important to 
see how other policing actors in the US practice policing activities for 
internet fraud. Like other nations, Wall's (2007) 'the internet's order 
maintenance assemblage' model is also seen in the US. 
Internet users and user groups 
Internet user and user groups perform similar actions in any jurisdiction 
against internet fraud because they do not have legal authority and 
mechanism to respond to it. Like other nations' internet users, most internet 
users take individual action to report their victimizations to appropriate 
agencies such as NCL's fraud centre, the Internet Crime Complaint Center 
(IC3) and National White Collar Crime Complaint Center (NW3Q. The), 
directly report serious case to the police. Most cases were found to be online 
auction and shopping related frauds. 
118 
Online virtual environment managers 
Online virtual environment managers are 'emerging as a neNN, stratum of 
behavior governors' (Wall, 2007) and hired to police the behaviour of their 
virtual environment. My Space, Facebook and Chat Friendz are good 
examples that show how people monitor the unusual behaviour of their 
online community. Like other nations' moderators, they use the sanction of 
'time out' and 'removal of access' in order to maintain the community norm 
and rule (Wall, 2007). While more people are using the internet and joining 
the virtual community, their community has to be policed by these 
moderators in order to maintain their community value. 
Non-government, non-police hybrids 
NGOs (non-government organizations) and non-police hybrids are not 
publically known to us for participation in the policing of internet fraud. It 
seems that an NGO is in too difficult a position between corporate and 
government sectors. Generally, private and public sector security systems 
in the United States respond well to cybercrimes so there is less space for 
NGOs to take part in policing internet fraud. 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
Microsoft, Yahoo and AOL are major Internet Service Providers in the US. 
They have their own security teams to monitor unethical behaviour on their 
websites. They control online behaviour through 'contractual governance' 
(Crawford, 2003; Vincent-Jones, 2000). ISP's terms and conditions control 
behaviour of internet users to represent ISP's interests. Compared to other 
policing actors, ISPs prefer to excise self-regulation without any 
governmental intervention. Since ISPs are profit-oriented companies, their 
policing activities toward customers seem negligible to government 
agencies. 
State-funded non-police groups 
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is an independent, 
non-partisan and quasi-judicial regulatory agencY with responsibilit,., ' for 
administering federal security laws. The mission of the SEC is *to protect 
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investors, maintain fair, orderly and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
information' (SEC, 2008). The SEC has many divisions for the commission 
including 'Division of Enforcement'. It is a law enforcement function. This 
division conducts investigations into violations of securities law. This 
division recommends the commission to take civil action to the federal court 
or administrative judge. Criminal cases are often referred to other laN% 
enforcement agencies by this division. These days, this division closely 
monitors fraudulent activity online because investors use the internet as a 
primary too] for transactions. 
The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was established 
in 1990 by the US Treasury Department to fight against financial crime 
under the BSA (Bank Secret Act), especially drug money laundering. 
Actually, FinCEN does not directly relate to internet fraud. However, BSA's 
requires recordkeeping and 'to establish financial trail for investigators to 
follow as they track criminals, their activities and their assets' (FinCEN. 
2008). Though its database, FinCEN supports all kinds of financial 
investigation. Recently, its scope has been expanded to internet fraud 
because financial related frauds are committed over the internet. 
The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection ýwrks for 
the prevention of fraud, deception and unfair business practice in the market 
place, it takes online complaints from victims of internet fraud, provides 
useful information to avoid internet fraud, and enforces federal laws to 
protect consumers (FTC, 2008). 
The Internet Crime Complaint Center (10) provides a central referral 
service to the law enforcement and regulatory agencies at local, state, 
federal and international levels. IC3 has a partnership with the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National White Collar Crime Center 
(NW3C) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). 
For the response to internet fraud, IC3 has provided an easy to use reporting 
system for victims (IC3,2008). IC3 is a hub of internet crime response. 
Below Figure 4-1 shows how to file a complaint with IC3. 
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Figure 4-1: IC3 complaint manual 
Filing a Complaint with IC3 
IC3 accepts online Internet crime complaints from either the 
person who believes they were defrauded or from a third party 
to the complainant, We can best process your complaint if v; e 
receive accurate and complete information from you. Therefore., 
we request that you provide the following information when 
filing a complaint: 
9 Your name 
" Your mailing address 
" Your telephone number 
" The name, address, telephone number, and Vý'eb address, 
if available, of the individual or organization you believe 
defrauded you. 
Specific details on how, why, and when you believe you 
,, ýiere defrauded. 
Any other relevant information you believe is necessary to 
support your complaint. 
File a Complaint 
(Source: http: //. ic3. gov/default. aspx\) 
NW3C is a congressional funded, non profit corporation that supports the 
law enforcement agencies and prosecution off-ices at local, state and federal 
levels. It does not have any investigative authority but its main role is to 
help other law enforcement agencies to fight against economic and high tech 
crimes. For the response to internet fraud, NW3C provides analytical 
services to other agencies such as the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) 
and White Collar Crime Research Consortium (WCCRC) in order to 
increase public awareness (NW3C, 2008). Thus, the policing of internet 
fraud by the NW3C cannot be seen by internet users. It is only recognized 
by the law enforcement agencies and regulatory bodies. 
State-funded police 
The United States Department of Justice website introduces appropriate law 
enforcement agencies that will respond to internet fraud: FBI local off-ice. 
The US Secret Service (Financial Crimes Division). The FBI has locýd 
121 
stations in major cities. Those local stations receive complaints directly I 
from victims or local police departments. Since internet fraud is a borderless 
crime, local offices report to the headquarters for a nationxvide response. 
The US Secret Service's financial division is well known for counterfeit and 
other economic crime investigation. Along with the groNNih of e-commerce 
and internet fraud, Secret Service has expanded its policing activity to 
internet fraud. With the financial division, the Electronic Crimes Task Force 
(ECTF) prioritizes to conduct investigations about e-crimes that 
significantly affect the community (US Secret Service, 2008). 
Corporate security 
US corporate organizations have advanced security systems in domestic and 
international offices to protect their assets and interests. Internationally 
renowned telecommunications firms, banks and credit card companies 
police their websites to prevent any possible threats from fraudsters or other 
criminals. They are: IBM, Yahoo, Apple, Oracle, Bank of America, Wells 
Fargo, VISA and Master Card Company. Their policing activities involve 
risk management software and other technological methods. HoxNever. their 
detailed activities are not publically introduced because corporate 
organizations tend not to disclose their special know-how to others. Large 
corporations have practiced two different ways to police their virtual spaces: 
in-house security and contract-out security. For internal security, they tend 
not to hire outsiders to police their intranet. 
4.3 Internet fraud law in the US 
Internet fraud is covered by the Fraud law in the US, which is the area of 
state and federal law that defines fraudulent acts, provides a means to 
prosecute fraudsters, and describes the type of punishment that guilty fraud 
criminals may confront. Fraud is defined generally as a deceptive illegal act 
committed in order to secure unfair or unlaw, ful financial gain at the expense 
of others. Fraud law is also commonly referred to as \ýhite collar crime laý\ 
(Freidrichs, 1996). Sub-categories of fraud law outline and enforce statutes 
based on specific types of fraudulent activity. Fraud law covers fraudulent 
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acts carried out through the internet such as phishing. pharming and voice 
phishing. 
Originally, fraud law was enacted in order to protect consumers and other 
victims from the serious damages that can be caused by fraudulent actions. 
Both federal and state governments have enacted fraud IaNN and have 
assigned various agencies to help enforce fraud law. Either a civil or 
criminal law can be applied, depending on the circumstances and the 
severity of the crime. Punishment for fraud law violation can range from 
fines to imprisonment. Punishments for fraud law violation are often much 
harsher for corporations than for individuals. For example, the Enron 
scandal in 2002 resulted in the demise of Arthur Anderson, which was 
internationally the largest accounting firm. However, shredding of Enron 
working papers and communications led to a conviction on the grounds of 
obstruction of justice (Cornwell, 2002). 
Fraud law also provides consumers and victims of fraudulent acts with legal 
remedies so that they may be able to seek compensation for their losses. 
Although fraud law specifics vary by state and circumstance, most fraud law 
has a statute of limitations which provides for the amount of time in which a 
fraud lawsuit can be filed. Many government and regulatory agencies have 
complaint departments, such as IC3 and NW3C, where you are able to file a 
fraud law violation. 
The US CODE: Title 18,1030 
For internet fraud, the US CODE: Title 18,1030 describes fraud and related 
activity in connection with computers. 
(a) Whoever- 
(1) having knowingly accessed a computer without authorization or 
exceeding authorized access, and by means of such conduct 
having 
obtained information that has been determined by the United 
States 
Government pursuant to an Executive order or statute to require protection 
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or 
foreign 
relations, or any restricted data, as defined in paragraph y. of section 
II of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, with reason to believe that such 
information so obtained could be used to the injury of the United States, or 
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to the advantage of any foreign nation wilfully communicates, delkers. 
transmits, or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted, or 
attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, 
delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, 
or wilfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee 
of the United States entitled to receive it; 
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains- 
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or 
of a card issuer as defined in section 1602 (n) of title 15, or contained in a 
file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer, as such terms are 
defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U. S. C. 1681 et seq. ); 
(B) information from any department or agency of the United States; or 
(C) information from any protected computer if the conduct involved an 
interstate or foreign communication; 
(3) intentionally, without authorization to access any non-public computer 
of a department or agency of the United States, accesses such a computer 
of that department or agency that is exclusively for the use of the 
Government of the United States or, in the case of a computer not 
exclusively for such use, is used by or for the Government of the United 
States and such conduct affects that use by or for the Government of the 
United States; 
(4) knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer 
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such 
conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless 
the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the 
computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any I -year 
period; 
(5) (A) 
(i) knowingly causes the transmission of a program, infon-nation, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage 
without authorization, to a protected computer; 
(h) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and 
as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or 
(W) intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and 
as a result of such conduct, causes damage; and 
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(B) by conduct described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (. -\), 
caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, if completed, have 
caused)-- 
(i) loss to I or more persons during any 1 -year period (and, for purposes of 
an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United 
States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting I or 
more other protected computers) aggregating at least S5,000 in value; 
(H) the modification or impairment, or potential modification or 
impairment, of the medical examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of I 
or more individuals; 
(W) physical injury to any person; 
(iv) a threat to public health or safety; or 
(v) damage affecting a computer system used by or for a government entity 
in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national 
security; 
(6) knowingly and with intent to defraud traffics (as defined in section 
1029) in any password or similar information through which a computer 
may be accessed without authorization, if- 
(A) such trafficking affects interstate or foreign commerce; or 
(B) such computer is used by or for the Government of the United States; 
(7) with intent to extort from any person any money or other thing of value, 
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing 
any threat to cause damage to a protected computer; 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
(b) Whoever attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this 
section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section. 
(c) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) or (b) of this 
section is- 
(1) 
(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or 
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section which 
does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or 
an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; and 
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, 
or both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1) of this section 
which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this section, or an 
attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; 
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(2) 
except as provided in subparagraph (B), a fine under this title or 
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in the case of an offense 
under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5)(A)(iii), or (a)(6) of this section which 
does not occur after a conviction for another offense under this section, or 
an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph; 
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or 
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), or an attempt to 
commit an offense punishable under this subparagraph, if- 
(i) the offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain; 
(H) the offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State; 
or 
(iii) the value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000; and 
(C) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or 
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(6) of 
this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense under this 
section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this 
subparagraph; 
(3) 
(A) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than five years, or 
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4) or (a)(7) of this 
section which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under 
this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under this 
subparagraph; and 
(B) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or 
both, in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(4), (a)(5)(A)(iii), or 
(a)(7) of this section which occurs after a conviction for another offense 
under this section, or an attempt to commit an offense punishable under 
this subparagraph; 
(4) 
(A) except as provided in paragraph (5), a fine under this title, 
imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
under subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), or an attempt to commit an offense 
punishable under that subsection; 
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(B) a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or both, 
in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(5)(A)(ii), or an attempt to 
commit an offense punishable under that subsection; 
(C) except as provided in paragraph (5), a fine under this title, 
imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both, in the case of an offense 
under subsection (a)(5)(A)(i) or (a)(5)(A)(ii), or an attempt to commit an 
offense punishable under either subsection, that occurs after a conviction 
for another offense under this section; and 
(5) 
(A) if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause 
serious bodily injury from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i). a 
fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both; 
and 
(B) if the offender knowingly or recklessly causes or attempts to cause 
death from conduct in violation of subsection (a)(5)(A)(i), a fine under this 
title or imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or both. 
Hardening of cyber security/ Patriot Act 
After 9/11, the US government enacted the PATRIOT Act that allows 
federal law enforcement agencies to look up any e-mail and electronic 
message for the protection of the national security purposes (Golden. 2004). 
Private companies and ISPs must comply with their requests to provide all 
necessary information. It is not an exaggeration to say that all American 
internet users are under surveillance. The American Civil Liberty Group 
argued that the Patriot Act violates rights to free speech and due process 
(Golden, 2004). The partnership between private and public has never been 
better than now. This hardening of national security due to terrorist activity 
has brought a chain effect to all areas of security in the United States 
(Conrades, 2004). In this case, under the special circumstances caused by 
breach of national security, internet users' rights have been significantly 
limited. It seems that there has been a potential conflict between cyber- 
rights and anti-terrorism initiative (Cameron and Vaile, 2006). 
In the light of cyber-rights. the US Patriot Act has had a significant impact 
on internet users regardless of the national security matter. This sho\\ s that 
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internet users and governments have to choose the correct balance between 
cyber-rights and cybersecurity for the national interest. The American case 
could be used as reference for making other nations' cybersecurity laws and 
policies since the American's 'war on terrorism' policy and practice has 
rapidly affected many other nations in many aspects. for example. 
enhancement of international airport security reflects how other nations 
have been affected by the American 'war on terror' (Enders, 2002). In this 
sense, there is a possibility that hardening of cybersecurity law may extend 
to other nations that do not have serious terrorist threats. Amoore and Goede 
(2005) reported importance of risk management in *war on terror' because 
terrorism has given a chilling effect to every business, from border control 
to international financial transactions that are directly related to internet 
fraud. 
To illustrate how the policing of internet fraud works, Kozlovski's 
cyberpolicing model will be used to explain the transformation of policing 
from law enforcement to cyberpolicing. This model will help us to 
understand the transformation of policing as it occurs through the 
emergence of the internet. 
4.4 How do public and private sectors police internet fraud 
in the US? 
Policing internet fraud by the public sector 
In response to internet fraud, NW3C and the FBI created the Internet Fraud 
Complaint Center (IFCC) (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2003). Later, the IFCC 
changed its name to the IC3 
5 
and it has become a leading anti-fraud 
response centre that has strong partnerships with NW3C and the FBI. 
Another large federal agency, the National White Collar Crime Center 
(NW3C) is a congressionally funded organization that provides a 
5 The Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) was established by the Department of Justice 
in 2000. For the law enforcement agencies, IFCC provides the Information referral service. 
Later, the IFCC was later renamed the Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) in October 
2003 in order to respond to rapidly expanding area of cybercrime and it has a partnership 
with the FBI and NW3C (http: //www. ic3. gov). 
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nationwide support system to law enforcement agencies for preventing. 
investigating, and prosecuting economic and high tech crimes (NW3C, 
2008). 
Other federal agencies that are not directly related to the response of internet 
crime such as the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) have proactively participated in policing internet 
pharmacies related fraud. They have focused on drug and healthcare related 
fraud. For example, they warned a website operator who had a misleading 
and deceptive website about SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) to 
remove the false information. Fraudulent information gathered through the 
FTC surfing the internet is coordinated with the help of the FDA and the 
Ontario Ministry of Consumer and Business Services. These kinds of 
fraudulent activities have resulted in large numbers of victims and monetary 
damage (FTC, 2003). It is said that 'firms or individuals who violate the 
FTC Act could be subject to a federal district court injunction, enforceable 
through civil or criminal contempt proceedings, or an administrative cease 
and desist order, enforceable through civil penalties of up to $11,000 per 
violation' (FTC, 2003). As approximately 100 million Americans use the 
internet to find health information, the need for enforcement is greater than 
ever since the fraudster can create a bogus website whenever necessary. 
The Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) is a main investigative authority in 
the federal case although it does not stand at the frontline of fighting internet 
fraud. The FBI has a partnership with the Internet Crime Complaint Center 
(IC3) and National White Collar Crime Complaint Center (NW3C) and 
receives serious cases from them for further investigation. The FBI usually 
intervenes when IC3 or NW3C refer cases that involve criminal matters. 
Due to the restriction of human rights and privacy, its proactive cyber 
policing is limited to the hacking of national infrastructure and 
communication systems (FBI, 2008). 
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Policing internet fraud by the private sector 
For the private sector, many companies have their oýý n security measures 
for dealing with internet fraud. There is no unified model of policing 
internet fraud known to the public. Each company and sector has different 
concerns and vulnerable points for the fraudster and other criminals because 
of different products and services they provide to their customers. Usually. 
private companies have hired in-house IT security teams or contracted-out 
IT security services to protect their valuable assets and customer 
information from possible threats (Bartley, 2001). 
Internet Service Providers have their own security measures and reporting 
systems to deal with internet fraud. However, their activities are limited to 
their networks. They usually involve preventive modes of security measures 
such as filtering systems, firewalls and anti-virus software. Customer 
reporting is particularly important to help the ISP respond to internet fraud. 
Without support from individual users, the ISP does not properly respond to 
it as a non-police entity. Like a terrestrial level of policing, community 
support through reporting crime is a key factor for successful and effective 
control and prevention of internet fraud. 
4.5 Relationship between law enforcement agencies and 
private security 
The current partnership for internet fraud is seen as the 'Ad-Hoc partnership 
model' which was introduced by Sarre and Prenzler (2000). This model 
entails private and public sectors working together whenever necessary. 
There is no regular basis for joint work, but for the response to internet 
fraud good working partnerships have been emphasized. However. the 
private sector tends not to report to law enforcement due to lack of trust, 
negative publicity and fall of stock value. In order to resolve these issues, 
IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint Center) and NW3C (National White Collar 
Crime Center) were established with the support of the FBI (Federal 
Investigation Agency) and the congressional fund. These agencies have 
become buffers between private and public sectors in order to reduce their 
concerns. Private security firms usually do not \\ant to contact law 
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enforcement agencies unless there is an imminent threat. In this sense. IC3 
and NW3C are very useful channels through which private companies can 
report internet fraud. These agencies are likely to solve problems by 
themselves and report to the law enforcement agency depending on the 
seriousness of the incident (IC3,2008). 
4.6 Transformation of policing cybercrime 
Kozlovski's (2005) 'paradigm shift in policing from law enforcement to 
cyberpolicing' introduces the appropriate policing model for the response of 
internet fraud. Kozlovski (2005) argued that the law enforcement strategy 
does not appropriately respond to the quickly developing cybercrime. 
According to Kozlovski, existing assumptions about law enforcement are 
out of date in terms of deterrence effect, jurisdiction and successful 
investigation and prosecution. More precisely, lack of investigative 
knowledge, low levels of prosecution, geocentric policing and punishment 
expectancy within the public model of policing were criticized. In the 
meantime, a social preference for private policing was also emphasized. 
Cost of crime prevention, protection of privacy and prevention of lawful 
activity were considered. In addition, private interest was also an important 
factor to consider the paradigm shift from law enforcement to cyberpolicing. 
Kozlovski (2005) summarized the characteristics of the policing strategy 
(see Table 4-1). The cyberpolicing strategy reveals a very different approach 
for dealing with cybercrime. Overall, it tends to depend more on preventive 
measures based on proactive tactics and is intelligence focused. while the 
law enforcement model depends on reactive and evidence-based 
investigation. The cyberpolicing strategy is more appropriate for internet 
fraud because most cybercrimes are not crime but harms. Therefore, 
regulation through code, non-discretionary and non-judicial sanctions fit 
them better. Besides, active victimization is different from the terrestrial 
level of crime. 
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Table 4-1: Policing strategy 
Law Enforcement Cyberpolicing 
Reactive Proactive tactics 
Evidence based investigation Intelligence focused 
Law as primary regulator Regulation through Code 
Discretionary enforcement Automated, non discretionarý' 
Deferred judicial sanction Present non-judicial sanctions 
Passive victim Active victim 
Criminal focused Intermediaries focused 
Source: http: //crypto. stanford. edu/portia/talks/online_policing_model. ppt 
As presented in Table 4-1, law enforcement structures indicate a totally 
different structure from that of the cyberpolicing model. It appears that the 
law enforcement structure is similar to a military structure. Compared to 
cyberpolicing, the overall structure of law enforcement is quite simple and 
centralized. Its policing activity is limited to the geocentric and terrestrial 
level. It tends to limit delegation of policing power and individual use of 
force. 
However, the organizational structure chart by Kozlovski indicates (see 
Table 4-2) that cyberpolicing has a more complicated, decentralized and 
internationalized structure than that of law enforcement. In contrast to the 
law enforcement structure, delegation of policing function and 
empowerment of the individual are more widely admitted. These 
characteristics are similar to the multi-tiered governance structure suggested 
by Wall (2001). 
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Table 4-2: Organizational structure 
Law Enforcement CYberpollicing 
Public officials Multiplex organizational structures 
Central command Decentralized 
Territorial Non territorial. internationalized 
Limits on delegation of policing 
power 
Delegation of policing function 
Limits on individual's use of force Empowerment of the individual (self 
help) 
Source: http: //crypto. stanford. edu/portia/talks/onIine_poIicing_mode1. ppt 
The significance of Kozlovski's model is in explaining why law 
enforcement structures do not appropriately respond to cybercrime. \Vhile 
American law enforcement enhanced its federal law enforcement power 
after 9/11, the shift from law enforcement to cyberpolicing structure could 
generate the misconception of diffusion of policing power. However. 
Kozlovski's model innovatively demonstrates how the policing of 
cyberspace has to be changed. In particular, participation of the individual 
user is emphasized. This is the most important aspect of cyberpol icing. Wall 
(1998: 205-206) stated that 'the Internet is renowned for "voluntary policing" 
of the activity of users'. 
Kozlovski's model (see figure 4-2) proposed three main research questions 
that are relevant to this thesis concerning reduction of tensions. The 
configuration of figure 4-2 is based on comparison contents in Tables 4-1 
and 4-2. Figure 4-2 indicates the three main concerns that the current 
criminal justice system has to deal with. The first concern is 'the failure of 
the current legal system to control cyberpolicing'; this is public official and 
reactive model focused. The second concern is *unaccountable policing' 
which considers the lack of set rules, policing policies and actual 
enforcement. The third concern is 'designing for accountability' and refers 
to the fact that 'legal, institutional, and technological settings of 
conventional law enforcement are based on the conditions of physical crime 
scenes and fail to transfer smoothly to the online [environment]' (Kozlovski, 
2007: 108). 
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Figure 4-2: Kozlovski's major concerns in the current criminal justice system 
Kozlovski's model 
Failure of 
legal system 
Unaccountable Designing 
policing 
for 
accountability) 
The emerging cyberpolicing is different from offline policing: 'it is maini) 
preventive, highly decentralized, a hybrid of public and private enforcement, 
and highly automated'. It 'calls for the ubiquitous policing of online 
activities to monitor, control, deter, deflect, detect, prevent, or pre-empt 
risky and potentially malicious activities' (Kozlovski, 2007: 107). It requires 
the establishment of new laws to embrace this cyberpolicing model. For 
example, the Fraud Act 2006 in the UK supports the policing of cybercrime 
by including 'phishing' as a crime. 
In order to enhance a safe online environment, 'it is imperative to design an 
accountable policing model' (Kozlovski, 2007: 108). This model could be a 
'multi-tiered policing model' and relate to *The Internet's order- 
maintenance assemblage' suggested by Wall (2007). 
Kozlovski (2007) stated that new technology requires neNv institutions to 
supervise policing, and value-driven design now demands legal procedures 
that are better shaped to support policing to be accountable. Policing 
internet fraud may require the establishment of neNv institutions to supervise 
its policing activity, such as SOCA in the UK. 
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Kozlovski's (2007) 'designing accountable online policing' emphasized the 
transformation of policing for cybercrimes. A shift from laýý enforcement to 
a cyberpolicing model is imperative to provide an effective policing service 
to the public. Cyberpolicing aims to prevent and pre-empt crime rather than 
to prosecute. This policing model relies on non-legal restraints such as 
technology, network, and social construction of particular users of 
computers. The new policing is a hybrid form and tends to rely more on the 
private sector. The hybrid architecture of cyberpolicing takes advantage 
from optimizing the allocation of responsibilities between the centre 
(centralized) and the edge (decentralized). The regulation of victims and 
third parties becomes important. The notion of open intelligence establishes 
a new information sharing architecture. While a self-help sanction is widely 
adopted by the individual user. For example, use of upfront exclusion and 
virtual imprisonment. Online identification processes have become 
important to cyberpolicing since the internet is the anonymous users' 
heaven. Cyberpolicing relies heavily on non-content data such as traffic data 
and automated system logs for the investigation of cybercrime. Overall, it 
appears to be very similar to David Wall's 'transformation thesis' (Wall, 
2007: 4). 
Fundamental to this analysis, the policing of internet fraud is a newly 
emergent form of policing cybercrimes. Whether Kozlovski's cyberpolicing 
model is satisfactorily adopted for policing internet fraud or not, this model 
introduces a different approach to policing strategy that is more appropriate 
for the response to internet fraud. 
4.7 Development of multi-sector agency partnership 
After the 9/11 terrorist incident, the US government enhanced the national 
security by establishing the DHS (Department of Homeland Securitý). The 
DHS uses resources within federal, state, and local governments to 
coordinate 'the transition of multiple agencies and programmes into a single, 
integrated agency focused on protecting the American people and their 
homeland. More than 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions at the 
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federal, state, and local level have homeland security responsibilities. ' The 
DHS believes that 'partnership between the public and private sectors is 
essential, in part because the private sector owns and operates 
approximately 85% of the nation's critical infrastructure' (DHS, 2008). 
For the protection of critical infrastructure, CIPAC (Critical Infrastructure 
Partnership Advisory Council) 'provides the operational mechanism for 
carrying out the sector partnership structure. The CIPAC provides the 
framework for owner and operator members of Sector Coordinating 
Councils (SCC) and members of Government Coordinating Councils (GCC) 
to engage in intra-government and public-private cooperation, information 
sharing, and engagement across the entire range of critical infrastructure 
protection activities'(DHS, 2008). Although CIPAC shows an effective 
operational mechanism for the partnership structure, it does not aim to 
respond to internet fraud. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a separate 
partnership model for the multi-sector agency. 
In order to promote the partnership, an understanding of the 4Cs 
(Communication, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration) is essential: 
communication emphasizes the sharing of information; cooperation 
emphasizes the joint operation and sharing of personnel; coordination 
emphasizes the common goal of crime prevention; collaboration emphasizes 
the understanding of partner's 'mission overlap and adopt policies and 
projects designed to share resources, achieve common goals, and strengthen 
the partners' (BJA, 2005: 5). 
The Bureau of Justice Assistance (2005: 5) reported that there are 12 
components to promoting successful law enforcement and private security 
partnership. 
Common goals 
Common tasks 
Knowledge of participating agencies' capabilities and missions 
Well-defined projected outcomes 
A timetable 
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" Education for all involved 
"A tangible purpose 
" Clearly identified leaders 
" Operational planning 
Agreement by all partners as to how the partnership will proceed 
Mutual commitment to providing necessary resources 
Assessment and reporting. 
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recommended nine 
guidelines for law enforcement agencies that seek to improve collaboration 
with their private partners (BJA, 2005: 6). These nine guidelines can be 
applied to law enforcement agencies and government regulatory bodies 
participating in policing internet fraud. 
9 Recognize the need for prevention. 
0 Establish a system, centre, or task force to serve as a clearinghouse 
for all potentially relevant domestically generated terrorism 
information. 
0 Ensure timely interpretation and assessment of information. 
0 Prepare Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) and formal 
coordination agreements between public and private agencies. 
MOUs should describe mechanisms for exchanging information 
about vulnerabilities and risks, coordination of responses and 
processes to facilitate information sharing and multijurisdictional 
pre-emption of terrorist acts. 
0 Use community policing initiatives, strategies, and tactics to identify 
suspicious activities related to terrorism. 
9 Explicitly develop 'social capital' through collaboration among the 
private sector, law enforcement, and other partners so that data, 
information, assistance, and 'best practices' may be shared and 
collaborative processes developed. 
0 Coordinate federal, state, and local information, plans, and actions 
for assessments, prevention procedures, infrastructure protection, 
and funding priorities to address prevention. 
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* Establish a regional prevention information command centre and 
coordinate the flow of information regarding infrastructure. 
0 Include prevention and collaboration measures in exercises. 
These nine guidelines are also evoked with a complex net-work for policing 
internet fraud to promote partnership policing from the perspectlýe of the 
private sector. In contrast to the public sector, the diversitý of profit 
organizations makes it difficult to create guidelines for the private sector. 
Fortunately, relationships between private and public sectors in the US have 
been developed to achieve common goals for crime prevention and 
avoidance of terrorism, meanwhile the policing of internet fraud resides 
within them. 
4.8 Barriers to policing internet fraud 
There appears to be no academic data or literature showing the kind of 
factors which negatively impact upon the policing of internet fraud. 
However, it is believed that in many ways it retains great similarity ývith the 
policing of cybercrime, because internet fraud shares many points NN ith the 
characteristics of cybercrime: lack of trust, negative publicity and adverse 
impact on stock value (Wall, 2007). Compared with other cybercrime, 
internet fraud is more pertinent to economic crime. Therefore. the private 
sector tends not to report to the police unless they cannot directly handle the 
case. 
At the operational level, the two sectors do not cooperate with each other. 
Too many different interests create conflict between the two sectors, while 
victims want to recover their loss as soon as possible. The absence of 
mandatory reporting law is accredited for discouraging the partnership 
policing of internet fraud (Smith, 2005). Although there are a few non- 
police channels to report incidents, private companies tend to solve 
problems within their organizations. eBay and other auction companies 
directly receive complaints from their customers and hold victims until the), 
find a solution. Fraudsters are aware of the complaint procedure and thus 
take advantage of delayed investigation due to lack of cooperation. This 
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suggests that the best way to deal with this is to establish partnership for 
policing internet fraud. 
4.9 Tensions between private and public sectors in policing 
internet fraud in the United States 
Only a few academic literatures have introduced tensions that are produced 
between private and public sectors in policing. It is believed that tensions 
are generally created due to lack of trust and sharing of information, 
different investigative philosophies, negative publicity, and adverse impact 
on stock (Shearing, 1992; Greene, Seamon and Levy, 1995; Connors, 
Cunningham and Ohlhausen, 1999; Rigakos, 2002; Crawford, Lister and 
Wall, 2003; Delint, 2005; Joh, 2004; Bhanu and Stone, 2004: Ferret, 2004). 
It is assumed that tensions between private and public sectors in policing 
internet fraud in the US are somewhat different from that of the United 
Kingdom. As introduced in the earlier section, NW3C and IC3 have become 
hubs for reporting internet fraud. They have created buffers to reduce 
tensions between the two sectors, although large corporations tend to solve 
problems internally. Tensions are created where private and public interests 
are too different. Large global corporations would like to avoid any potential 
threat that may cause negative publicity and adverse impact on stock value. 
Since they are profit organizations, protection of their assets is the highest 
priority. In order to protect their assets and personnel allocated worldwide. 
they have well equipped security systems. Some global corporations, such 
as IBM, HP and Microsoft, spend huge amounts on security, costs which are 
in excess of a small nation's annual security cost. 
Global corporations would like to handle security breaches themselves in 
order to protect their brand image. During the initial stage of investigation, 
the public police are temporary excluded. Unless public intervention is 
obligatory, global corporations tend not to ask for help from the public 
sector. Since they often hire former federal law enforcement agents and 
national intelligence experts, their policing and investigative capabilities are 
way ahead of local or regional law enforcement agencies. As indicated 
earlier in Chapter 3, the FACI (Forensic Accounting and Corporate 
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Investigation) industry has enabled great advances in the capabilities of 
financial crime investigation. 
As illustrated above, lack of trust between the two sectors has created 
hostile working environments when responding to internet fraud. Lack of 
trust has also created other tensions. If the two sectors trusted each other, 
other tensions would disappear. However, the fact that the two sectors 
pursue different interests means they cannot completely resolve this 
problem: the private sector's interest focuses on maximizing its profit while 
the public sector focuses on maintaining law and order. Their reasons for 
policing and investigation are totally different, while the mutual goal of 
crime prevention has to be maintained. Thus, it is felt that building trust is 
the most important factor for working together. 
Lack of sharing information is considered another serious tension between 
the two sectors. Information is a very valuable asset in the digital era so no 
one provides it without reward. It is more seriously considered in the 
business and political environment. Sharing of information usually occurs to 
obtain mutual benefit for all parties involved. Through exchanging useful 
information, both sectors are enabled to perform effectively in policing 
internet fraud. When a law enforcement agency provides warning signs for 
possible threats, such as phishing and pharming, private companies prepare 
for the threat and educate their customers for prevention. This kind of 
information can be provided to achieve the goal of public interest. It shows 
that information flows from the public to private sector appear to be routine 
activities in terms of public service. When information flows from the 
private sector to the public sector, it shows a slightly different trend. It 
seems that the private sector is more concerned about their information 
going to the public sector. Particularly since some information contains very 
sensitive company secrets or business know-how, this could provide 
knowledge to the public through which it might be possible to attack the 
company, financially or with a business scandal. Private companies believe 
that the police do not properly protect their information and often leak to the 
media or outsiders. For these reasons, private companies tend not to report 
incidents to the police or other law enforcement agencies. 
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Different investigative philosophy is another tension between the private 
and public sector security. As explained in Chapter 3. each aim of policing is 
different since each sector has a different interest. Private companies police 
internet fraud for crime prevention and loss control. while public police and 
regulatory bodies police internet fraud for the maintaining of IaNN and order 
and for public safety. Accordingly, private companies want to retrieve their 
loss in case of internet fraud investigation. At the same time. they would like 
to conduct investigations confidentially. They worry about any negative 
publicity occurring if news of incidents is released to the public. On the 
contrary, public police and other law enforcement agencies have to achieve 
the goal of public safety and the maintaining of IaNN and order. Since their 
policing activity and investigation is funded by public taxes, theý work for 
the public's interest. Therefore, public police would not provide any favour 
while conducting an investigation. 
Negative publicity is another reason why private companies tend not to 
report incidents to the police. When news of an incident is publicized, a 
private company may suffer a knock to its good reputation and brand image. 
Although a law enforcement agency may promise to keep confidentiality in 
the investigation, it is difficult to keep the promise. The private sector 
recognizes the potential threat due to negative publicity. Unless there is a 
law to promise a confidential investigation, many companies hesitate before 
reporting an incident to a law enforcement agency. Realistically, it is 
difficult to enact the law while promising confidentiality in the investigation. 
Some private interests are also public interests. Imagine that personal 
information stored in Facebook or My Space is hacked by someone. This 
kind of incident not only damages the private interest but also public interest. 
It has become more difficult to distinguish between private and public 
interest. The information society and digital technology have integrated 
these interests into one. Since virtual space can not belong to one sector, an 
overlap of interest always exists between the two sectors. Besides, it is 
difficult to find any justification for protecting confidential ity and private 
interest while spending public taxes doing the investigation. Therefore, 
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negative publicity cannot be removed unless there is a law which NNHI 
promise the protection of private interest 
Finally, adverse impact on stock value is another tension existing bemeen 
the private and public sectors. This tension is closely related to negative 
publicity since it could adversely affect stock value. Private companies have 
always attempted to maximize their profit and protect their assets through 
in-house security or contract-out security services. Private companies are 
afraid of adverse impacts on stock value which can occur upon disclosure of 
an incident. Sometimes, massive amounts of negative publicity surrounding 
a company may result in the collapse of a company. A similar incident 
occurred in the 'Enrol Scandal' of 200 16 . Enron shares dropped from over 
US $90 to less than 50cent. Also, e-commerce is facing more risky 
situations than other business types. In order to remove this tension, special 
law needs to evolve to secure stock prices while law enforcement conducts 
investigation into internet fraud incidents (WIKIPEDIA, 2008). 
4.10 Conclusion 
The policing of internet fraud in the United States is mainly carried out by 
federal law enforcement agencies, government regulatory bodies and the 
corporate sector security. Compared with the United Kingdom, the US 
internet fraud policing model does not really assign much importance to 
non-government, non-police hybrids. This may be attributed to the 
' The Enron scandal was a financial scandal involving the Enron Corporation (former 
NYSE ticker symbol: ENE) and its accounting firm Arthur Andersen, that was revealed in 
late 2001. After a series of revelations involving irregular accounting procedures conducted 
throughout the 1990s, Enron was on the verge of bankruptcy by November of 200 1. A 
white knight rescue attempt by a similar, smaller energy company, Dynegy, was not viable. 
Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2,2001. 
As the scandal was revealed, Enron shares dropped from over US$90.00 to less than 50C. 
As Enron had been considered a blue chip stock, this was an unprecedented and disastrous 
event in the financial world. Enron's plunge occurred after it was revealed that much of its 
profits and revenue were the result of deals with special purpose entities (limited 
partnerships which it controlled). The result was that many of Enron's debts and the losses 
that it suffered were not reported in its financial statements. 
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dichotomy of policing internet fraud still taking place in the United States. 
There is no coverage for NGOs actively taking part in policing internet 
fraud. From the optimistic point of view, US law enforcement agencies and 
government regulatory bodies are well prepared to respond to internet fraud. 
As Kozlovski (2007) suggested, the traditional law enforcement model for 
cybercrime has been transformed to the cyberpolicing model. It emphasizes 
ubiquitous policing and individual participation of cyberpolicing. 'With the 
transformation of the policing of cybercrime, multi-sector agencý 
partnership has been enhanced through government policy and forums such 
as CIPAC (Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council). Sector 
Coordinating Councils (SCC) and members of Government Coordinating 
Councils (GCC) promote intra-government and public-private sectors 
cooperation. However, CIPAC does not exist for the development of multi- 
sector agency partnership policing of internet fraud. Thus, it is imperative to 
establish an independent council or organization for coordinating a multi- 
sector agency for responding to internet fraud. 
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Chapter 5: policing internet fraud in South Korea 
5.1 Introduction 
'Policing internet fraud' is becoming a very important task for both the 
public and private sectors since rapidly growing levels of cybercrime are 
costing individuals and businesses billions of dollars across the international 
jurisdictions. For effective policing, a cooperative effort between the public 
and private sector is essential. However, inherited structural barriers of the 
public sector and legal and political barriers of the private sector tend to 
hinder the development of policing cybercrime. 
As briefly introduced in Chapter 3, David Wall (2007) has clearly classified 
seven different groups who currently police cyberspace. His internet order 
maintenance assemblage table is well defined in relation to each entity's 
role and sanction. Among the seven tiers the 'online virtual environment 
and security' tier (see Table 3.1) is the most recent addition. This updated 
assemblage emphasizes the importance of self-regulation of ISPs, is to be 
discussed later in this section. 
The internet user and user groups are the smallest policing actors in the 
networks and nodes of security within cyberspace, but are the most 
numerous. They exercise significant power to control the online behaviour 
through criticism of some events or crimes (Wall. 2007). Individual users 
employ a wide range of software solutions such as firewalls, spam-filters 
and anti-virus vaccines to prevent themselves from victimization of 
cybercrime. 'Working on a self-appointed mandate, the Internet users are 
simultaneously auspices and providers of governance' (Wall, 2007: 167). 
Diverse and self-appointed memberships often lack formal mechanisms of 
accountability for their action. Sometimes, internet users commit illicit and 
illegal acts before they realize it. Fortunately, there are many socially 
beneficial user groups working for the public interest such as anti-spam, 
anti-phishing and anti -pornography groups. For the individual user's level 
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of policing, eBay's online auction trading partner profile rating system is a 
good example of peer-policing (Haywood, 2006, Wall. 2007). 
Online virtual environment managers and security managers are people who 
'police the behaviour of their online community' (Wall, 2007: 169). They 
have to ensure that norms and rules are maintained in their N, irtual 
community. If any breaches occur, sanctions might be imposed to the 
violators. Sanctions vary from temporarily freezing accessibilitý to 
permanent exclusion from the community. depending on the seriousness of 
violation. 
ISPs (Internet Service Providers) are important policing groups since they 
work as 'gatekeepers' of cyberspace through 'contractual governance' 
(Crawford, 2003; Vincent-Jones, 2000). They use *terms and conditions of 
contract' as a tool to control the behaviour of their client, the internet users. 
According to Wall (2007), market, law and the interest of the ISP form 
those terms and conditions. In terms of service providers, ISPs are also 
subject to contractual governance through the terms and conditions laid 
down in individual contracts between each telecommunications provider. 
ISPs also have to provide necessary online security services for their 
customers. Recently, ISPs have suffered from much litigation, which has 
exerted a 'chilling effect'. ISPs have to respond to numerous demands, 
ranging from individuals to the police, to remove offensive material whether 
obscene or not. According to Wall (2007: 171), *ISPs tend to organize 
themselves both within specific jurisdictions and across them with a further 
level of transnational organizations, for example the Commercial Internet 
exchange, the Pan-European Internet Service Provider's Association: 
EuroISPA and Internet Providers' Consortium (mainly US)'. In addition, 
under the oversight of ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers), ISPs are domain name registries (EuroISPA, 2008) 
Corporate organizations exercise their contractual governance over both 
employees and clients and any other outsiders in order to protect their 
corporate interest (Wall, 2007). Contractual terms and conditions warn of 
cancellation of services or civil and criminal litigation in case of serious 
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violation. As e-commerce developed, corporate security organizations 
became major players of policing cyberspace. However, their policing 
activity is not exposed to the public since they have to protect the 
confidentiality of their private interest. They also tend to pursue the *private 
model of justice' since the criminal justice model does not reflect what 
private companies want to do (Wall, 2001). Corporate securitý organizations 
tend to work independently in order to achieve their corporate interest 
although there is less support from the public sector. 
Non -governmental, non-police organizations *contribute to the order 
maintenance assemblage by acting as gatekeepers to the other level of 
governance, but also contributing towards cybercrime prevention' (Nk'all, 
2007: 172). Internationally, many NGO groups provide governance of 
cyberspace under the auspices of mandates from governments. The Internet 
Watch Foundation (lVv'F) in the United Kingdom and Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CERT) in the United States are good examples of non- 
governmental/non-po I ice organizations. However, according to Wall (2007: 
173-174), 'they tend to lack the formal structure of accountability normally 
associated with public organizations and sometimes find themselves the 
subject of public concern'. 
Governmental non-police organizations 'provide governance under the 
auspices of regulations, rules and law through charges, fines and the threat 
of prosecution' (Wall, 2007: 174). For example, KISA (Korea Information 
Security Agency) indirectly controls internet users through government- 
controlled ISPs. By law, all Korean ISPs have to report any significant 
incident to the KISA. 
In the United Kingdom, CPNI (Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure) was formed in February 2007 out of the merger of the 
National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) with the 
National Security Advice Centre (NSAC - part of M15). CPNI provides 
integrated (combining information, personnel and physical) security advice 
to the businesses and organisations which make up the national 
infrastructure' (CPNI. 2008). Like KISA, UNIRAS (The Unified Incident 
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Reporting and Alert Scheme) receives IT security incidents in government 
departments and agencies in the UK. Similar to KISA and UNIRAS. the 
National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPQ in the US is responsible 
for the protection of the national critical infrastructures (Wall, 2007). 
Public police organizations are known to provide a small portion of policing 
of cyberspace in Western countries. However, policing capabilities N'ary 
from simple investigation to the international cooperation of cybercrime 
prevention. In contrast to local police, federal and national police 
organizations provide more effective policing. In the US, the FBI and US 
Secret Service are the main bodies of policing cybercrime. They are 
responsible for investigating crimes related to multi-jurisdiction crime and 
federal law violation. In the UK. SOCA (Serious Organized Crime Agencý) 
took over the National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) as a SOCA's e- 
crime unit in 2006. SOCA is a UK version of FBI or US Secret Service. 
Compared to other Western countries, Korea's National Police Agency has 
unique capabilities to respond to cybercrimes. More than 230 local police 
departments have almost the same capacity as the headquarters (Cý'ber 
Terrorism Response Center) in terms of investigation competence. CTRC is 
linked with the all-local police forces so that there is no technological gap 
between headquarter and branches. 
5.2 Who polices internet fraud in South Korea? 
Both the private and public models of policing have dealt with policing 
internet fraud in South Korea since the negative impact of internet crime 
significantly affects both groups' interests. However, the importance of the 
private sector policing internet fraud has not been discussed in Korea. This 
is due to the perceptions of 'policing' as related to the police and other law 
enforcement agencies. Therefore, it is unthinkable for the private sector to 
use the word 'policing'. The private sector uses the terminology 'private 
security' to replace the negatively stigmatized term 'private policing', 
although they in fact participate in the same 'policing' activities. Thus, the 
concept of policing internet fraud by the private sector in Korea is inertlý 
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limited to preventive IT security activities by financial institutions, such as 
banks, credi t-card-com pan ies and stock companies. 
Only a few criminal justice academics and security experts are aware of the 
terminology 'policing' and there is an even greater lack of general public 
awareness regarding the concepts of 'plural policing' (Loader. 2000; 
Crawford and Lister, 2004; Newburn, 2006), , multi -lateral ization of 
policing' (Bayley and Shearing, 2001), and 'multi-tiered policing' (Wall, 
2001). These concepts are very important to illustrate how cyberspace is 
policed by various levels of policing actors. The policing of internet fraud in 
South Korea is thus seen as very similar to 'the internet's order maintenance 
assemblage' model. The following sections introduce hoýN the system 
resembles it. 
Internet users and user groups 
Internet users and user groups police cyberspace voluntarily. Whether they 
are aware or not, they are the most powerful police force in cyberspace. 
They are motivated by various personal reasons or factors that stimulate 
their participation of policing cyberspace, such as higher moral standards, 
community service minds and unpleasant past experiences. It is difficult to 
define or to clarify internet user activity into a certain category since this 
tiered system consists of too many people who have different socio- 
economic and political backgrounds. Like a terrestrial level of policing, 
some internet users want to implement tough or strict counter-measures 
while others want to implement softer counter- measures against cybercrime. 
Nevertheless, user groups are different from the individual user level due to 
the fact that they represent their group interest in order to accomplish the 
goals of the group they represent through their collective activities. Recently, 
the emergence of the personal blog "naver. com", *daum. net" and mini 
homepages "cyworld. com" has encouraged more users and user groups to 
participate in policing cyberspace. Recently, victims of internet fraud have 
created their own community websites *'thec heat. c o. kr" and catchall. or. kr" 
to track down fraudsters and warn the innocent public about fraudulent 
activities. The Cheat and Catchall were founded in 2006, as not-for-profit 
community websites to act as response agents to internet ftaud. Both sites 
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are sponsored by the internet user for their operation, ýýith their major 
activities involving the sharing of fraud information and the introduction of 
anti-fraud measures. Although they only demonstrate a basic level of fraud 
prevention measures, these models are still beneficial for the policing of 
internet fraud in the private sector. The reporting of fraud incidents collated 
and analyzed by the private sector is not an easy task and has yet to be 
attempted by any public agency. 
Online virtual environment managers 
'Online virtual environment managers and security-for online role 
playing/game playing, chat rooms, discussion lists, e-auction rooms, cyber 
worlds' are using 'removal of access rights, exclusion from the environment 
to regulate their virtual space when community norms or laws are 
transgressed' (Wall, 2007: 168). This category has wider range of interest 
groups because there is countless number of online communities existing, 
for example, "social reform" and "cyworld". As government requires more 
strict self regulation of the internet community, security staff members that 
monitor their service sites pay more attention to unusual activity. Naver is a 
largest portal site that increased its monitoring staff from 270 in 2007 to 430 
in 2008 in order to respond to any illegal and unethical activities. Daum, 
second largest portal site, also increased its monitoring staff from 200 in 
2007 to 300 in 2008 (Sports Seoul, 2008). Recent news reported that 
fraudsters hacked messenger IDs and passwords to deceive friends online. 
By using messenger, they asked friends for money for an emergency. 
Non-government, non-police hybrids 
Non-government, non-police hybrids are motivated by socio-political 
influences and they have insisted that there is only one pure way to prevent 
cybercrimes. Recently, NGOs (non -governmental organizations) 
represented general internet users in Korean society who, individually, did 
not believe themselves to be opinion leaders. But. collectivek, their 
activities eventually created public consensus, which pressed government to 
establish laws that reflected their demands. The implementation of an 'Opt - 
In System' is a good example of their achievement. Peoplepower2l, 
Jinbonet, Citizen Action, LaN\yers for a Democratic SocietN and Intellectual 
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Property Left are the most powerful NGOs that advocate the safety and 
freedom of the internet in Korea. There is a very unique group called 
'CONCERT' which is positioned between the NGO and corporate securitý. 
Consortium of CERT was founded in June 2005 as an organization of 
security power, merging public and private security for collective benefit, 
consisting predominantly of private companies related to internet securitý 
that are involved in IT businesses. These companies include Samsung SDS, 
SK Telecom, LG CNS, KT, Naver, Daum, KTF, Shinhan Bank, SIEMENS. 
SK C&C, LG Telecom, Posco, Korea Amway, Dacom, Koscom, 7 and 
other private companies. CONCERT's major objective is to share 
information and to respond to any threatening attempts to penetrate the 
Korean telecommunication infrastructure. 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are motivated by both governmental 
intervention and management interests. Firstly, governmental intervention 
has been made by recommending the establishment of the self-regulation of 
ISPs in order to prevent harmful contents or pornography. However, self- 
regulation cannot punish those who create harmful content or pornography. 
Public awareness programmes, education programmes and hotlines to 
respond against immediate threats should support it. If ISPs do not impose 
any action against risky activities, they will result in inviting legal 
intervention by the government that could damage ISPs' reputations. 
Secondarily, management interests are motivated to involve vigorous cyber 
policing activities in order to protect corporate assets, to avoid any liability 
and to provide hassle-free internet service to their clients. KT, SK Networks, 
KFT, Samsung Networks, Onse Telecom and Hanaro Telecom are the most 
popular ISPs in Korea and are acting members of the Korea Internet 
Infrastructure Promotion Association. 
' These company names are original, not abbreviations. 
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State-funded non-police groups 
State-funded non-police groups consist of several governmental agencies 
that each have formal authority over the supervision of internet actiN! ities. 
Thus, each agency has different motivations for their participation in the 
governance of cyberspace. Depending on the agency. jurisdictions are 
varied from pure IT related issues to financial issues. For example. the 
Korea Spam Response Center focuses on overflowed spam mail problems 
by receiving complaints from internet users and by developing anti-sparn 
software to protect inboxes from the overwhelming amount of spam mail 
and mail that may contain scams (KSRC, 2003). KrCERT monitors unusual 
activity on the internet (KISC, 2004). The Korea Consumer Protection 
Board is also making an effort to protect consumers' rights through 
monitoring commercial internet transactions. 
The FSA (Financial Security Agency) was founded by the FSS (Financial 
Supervisory Service. The major functions of the FSS include the supervision, 
examination, investigation of and enforcement over financial institutions, 
along with other matters delegated by the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSQ and the Securities and Futures Commission (SFQ in 
May 2005, which is a special research institution that works to produce 
preventive measures for financial transactions. The FSA is major public 
policing body for internet fraud. The FSA established a KFCERT and 
Phishing Incident Report Center in Jan 29,2007 (Lee, 2007). The FSA 
primarily runs the One Time Password (OTP) centre to protect internet 
banking transactions. The FSA not only does research work but it also does 
quasi-policing activity. The FSA is seeking to implement more proactive 
policing activities (Lee, 2007), yet at this time there could be a possible 
conflict of interest with the Korea Financial Telecommunications and 
Clearing Institute (KFTC) that is under the control of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy (NIFE). Both the FSS and the NIFE have operated 
quasi-policing bodies under the title of 'research institute' (the Korean 
equivalent of the FSA name includes 'research institute'). It seems that the 
FSS and the MFE have had concerns about the possible opposition for the 
establishment of those subsidiary agencies since they said theý \Nere going 
to involve more policing activity. 
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The Korea Financial Telecommunications and Clearing Institute (KFTC) is 
another public policing body for internet fraud under the control of the 
Ministry of Finance and Economy (NIFE). Its primary activity is to secure 
and to maintain safe financial transactions for membership banks and 
customers (Digital Certification Center, 2006). 
KISA (the Korea Information Security Agency) is another public-funded 
cyber policing agency, which is an affiliated agency of the Ministry of 
Information and Communication, established by The hifOrmation 
Facilitation Act No. 14 in April 1996 (KISA, 2003). KISA was founded to 
respond to emerging problems in the digital era such as the leaking of 
personal information, misuse of IT systems, and to handle NNorldwide 
computer hacking at a national level. KISA's main role is to oversee the 
overall activity of membership organizations, which are defined under the 
Acts on Promotion of Telecommunications Net-work Utili,: ation. 
Membership organizations number between 300 and 400 and are limited to 
ISPs (Internet Service Providers), internet security service companies and 
vaccine production companies. Membership organizations must report all 
accidents to KISA; this is not a voluntarily provision, it is a legal 
requirement. This also differs from the presidential direction, which is being 
used by the NCSC (National Cyber Security Center). KISA also has a 
liability to keep the secrecy of incident information that KISA receives from 
membership organizations. 
The Korea Spam Response Center is a subsidiary unit within KISA that 
provides services to prevent illegal, unwanted mail. The KRSC ensures a 
clean and dependable cyber world through performing a variety of 
campaigns to prevent sparn-related damage: by generating technical 
measures such as the creation and distribution of free anti-sparn software, 
and by implementing policies and studies to improve laws and systems 
restricting spam activities. Another important measure is the participation in 
anti-sparn activities by moving forward towards international cooperation 
with foreign countries, anti-spam organizations and international 
organizations (KSRC. 2003). 
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PRIVACYNET is a subsidiary unit within KISA that has endeavoured to 
prevent personal information infringements and their expansion. Too much 
personal information has been given away from ISPs and ýveb-based 
business companies to small venture businesses and even individuals for 
various purposes. Its Secretariat monitors whether businesses comply ýNith 
the personal information protection laws on a regular basis. If businesses 
violate the laws, the Secretariat recommends them to correct themsek, es 
voluntarily or to refer the facts to the related agencies. Its primarý/ function 
is to represent the internet user (KISA, 2004). 
KrCERT/CC (The Korea Information Security Center) is a subsidiary unit 
within KISA that prevents infringement cases and minimizes damage from 
the internet in Korea. It plays an important role in improving the technical 
capability for the protection of the Critical Network Infrastructure Internet 
communication network and for the reinforcement of prediction and alarm 
systems. Sometimes fraudsters illegally penetrate the internet 
communication network to search for or disguise potential victims, and it is 
therefore important to block such attempts. KrCERT has established 
international cooperation with many nations' CERT and IT security related 
offices to share necessary information and to be able to respond at an 
international level (KISC, 2004). 
State-funded police 
State-funded police are motivated mainly by their duty to protect and to 
serve their communities. Their motivations are based on the public interest 
to contrast with private security services, ývhich are based on profit, market- 
oriented services and private interest. Their policing services widely range 
from small districts to large metropolitan areas of jurisdiction. Sometimes, 
the national police system mandates them to take a responsibility to police 
the whole country. The Korea National Police Agency operates the CTRC 
(Cyber Terror Response Center). which is the headquarters for all 
cybercrime units. The CTRC coordinates nationally deployed cybercrime 
units in the police force (CTRC, 2005). 
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Compared to other nations' public policing models for internet fraud. South 
Korean law enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies have given little 
attention to internet fraud. Since public sector agencies do not see it as a 
serious threat to the majority of internet users and the national information 
infrastructure system, occurrence of internet fraud has silentIN increased. In 
spite of continuous growth, policing of internet fraud in the public sector 
needs to establish specialized response units in law enforcement agencies 
and regulatory agencies. Korean public sector agencies (see Table 3-2) do 
not have any specialized response units for internet fraud such as those 
found in the US and the UK. Although Korean agencies do not specialize in 
responding to internet fraud, their routine activities do involve the 
prevention of internet fraud. 
The Korean National Police (NPA) established the Cyber Terror Response 
Center (CTRC), originally named the'Hacker Investigation Squad', in 1995. 
It has developed alongside the growth of Korean IT businesses and an 
increasing population of internet users. The CTRC's policing work mainly 
focuses on copyright violations, illegal websites, defamation and sexual 
assaults, hacking, internet fraud and the distribution of viruses. These crimes 
are described in the Korean Criminal Law Article 41, in Nýhich internet 
fraud is the subject of Article 347. The NPA is the pioneer of policing 
cyberspace and handling internet crime investigations in Korea. It is not an 
exaggeration to state that CTRC is the one of the best cyber police forces in 
the world, and many Western police agencies have signed up for the MOU 
(Memorandum of Understanding) with the KNPA (CTRC, 2005). 
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Figure 5-1: The National Police Agency 
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The Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO) operates the Computer 
Investigation division, while the Seoul District Central Prosecutors' Office 
(DPO) operates its Computer Investigation department, which is the only 
actual computer investigation office in the SPO. However, prosecutors who 
work at the Computer Investigation department are not in permanent 
positions because they regularly transfer to other departments or to different 
district offices (at least every two years) in order to prevent corruption 
issues. As a result of transfers, new prosecutors and staff members have to 
be constantly trained and organized to effectively perform law enforcement 
activity (SPO, 2005). 
The National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) is the central point of 
government for identifying, preventing and responding to cyberattacks and 
threats in Korea. It was founded in 2003 in order to protect the critical 
national infrastructure in Korea. The National Cyber Security Center 
(NCSC) is under the command of the National Intelligence Service (NIS is 
the Korean equivalent of M16). Its major cybersecurity activities are defined 
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and enacted by The Presidential Direction Number 14 1 -National Cyber 
Security Management Regulation (January, 2005). According to its 
instruction, central and local government organizations must report to the 
NCSC any unusual activity that might damage their information system. For 
this purpose, the government has established the National Cyber Security 
Strategy Council and the NIS director leads all its meetings. This council 
consists of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Deputy 
Minister of Justice, the Deputy Minister of National Defense, the Deputy 
Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs, the Deputy 
Minister of Information and Communication, and the Deputy Secretary 
General of Executive Office/ National Security Council (NSC). The 
officials of deputy ministerial rank are nominated by the chairperson of the 
Strategy Council from those who belong to relevant central administrative 
agencies. Despite its legal standing of the presidential calibre, it is 
nevertheless less powerful than the law, and any single person or agency 
will argue that the NCSC has a superior power over cybersecurity. The 
NCSC also works with the private sector and the military to improve 
warning and response time (NCSC, 2005). 
Figure 5-2: The National Cyber Security Strategy Council 
<Ccomprehensive System for Cyber Security Managemerit> 
(Source: www. ncsc. go. kr) 
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In 2006, the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) launched the Korean 
National CERT council with nine government agencies 0'ational 
Intelligence Service, National Police Agency, The Supreme Prosecutors' 
Offt c e, Korea Information Security Agency, Korea Financial 
Telecommunications and Clearings Institute, Defense Security Command, 
Ministry of Information and Communications, Ministry of Science and 
Technology, and Ministry of Government Administration and HomeAffairs) 
as a functional group that shares intelligence services within the public 
sector concerning current vulnerabilities, threats and the status of counter- 
measures regarding cyber threat and terrorism. 
Corporate security 
Corporate security is motivated thoroughly by the profit and market- 
oriented philosophy of each firm. Their motivations vary depending on 
products, local culture, and laws that frame the status of the corporation. 
This part of security or policing of cyberspace is not well known to outside 
societies. However, through globalization and transnational functions of 
businesses security, agencies now require the most sophisticated technology 
and strategies to be used in order to protect their valuable assets deployed 
worldwide. Corporate security is divided by *in-house security' and 
4contract-out security' services. Large corporations have their own 'in-house 
IT security team' to police their networks, while mid-sized companies 
outsource the 'contract-out IT security' service or adopt the combination of 
'in-house IT security' and 'contract-out IT security' services. Many small 
companies are vulnerably exposed to cyber threats and risks, but are only 
equipped with feeble anti-virus software and firewalls. 
Ahnlab Coconut was founded by AhnLab, Dacom, Enterprise Networks and 
Hansol Telecom with their joint investment, technology, know-how and 
capital. AhnLab Coconut is Korea's first company specializing in 
comprehensive internet security services. AhnLab Coconut introduced the 
concept of internet security service in the Korean market, offering 'ongoing 
security consulting' in oriented, comprehensive security services that folloNN, 
the steps of diagnosis-design-building-management in their monitorin, (,,, and 
operations (Ahnlab, 2007). For IT security people, policing internet fraud is 
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not their primary role and is often a voluntary by-product of their ordinan, 
occupations when their assistance is requested by the police. 
KOSCOM, a private company, operates the Financial ISAC (Information 
Sharing and Analysis Center), which is approved by the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy in order to protect financial trading information. 
KOSCOM/ISAC is a security centre for collecting and analyzing cyber 
terrorism and hacking threats, and is also used for formulating hacking 
countermeasures. KOSCONI/ISAC provides real-time detection of 
cyberterror, such as hacking and viruses, in cooperation \N ith the computer 
systems of member institutions and other financial and public institutions. 
Their system provides immediate warnings for clients if an intrusion is 
detected; it then finds the security vulnerabilities and quickly devises 
measures to protect the system. KOSCOM/ISAC also provides a cyber 
incident database, vulnerabilities database, patch information database and 
online security information. KOSCOM/ISAC has operated an ESM 
(Enterprise Security Management) system, a CERT team, a real-time 
analysis and a process of response for when cyberattack occurs 
(KOSCOM/ISAC, 2005). 
The BC Card Company has independently operated fraud prevention 
measures, installing special monitoring software into their server to detect 
any unusual events occurring to the accounts or credit cards of their 
customers. These companies use Experian's risk management programme to 
monitor customer's behaviour, such as excessive withdrawals of cash or 
excessive use of credit cards. They have enhanced their risk management 
capabilities in order to satisfy the Basel 11 requirements; financial institutes 
must have their own risk management systems, which are to be supervised 
by the National Financial Agency (BC Card, 2005). 
Auction. co. kr is an affiliation of eBay international. It has maintained 
almost the same system as that of eBay. Through operating a safety centre, 
customers can obtain necessary information about buyers and sellers. In 
case of default of transaction, the safety centre becomes activelý' in\ olved to 
solve the problem. If serious fraud occurs, the safety centre reports it to the 
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police so they can investigate the case. In addition, it has many useful safety 
tips to customers for preventing fraud. 
The NHN has a security team that consists of a security analysis team, a 
security service team and a customer information protection team. 
Naver. com is one of the largest and most popular Internet searching portal 
service companies operated by the NI4N Corporation. As a popular 
searching portal company, there are continuous problems existing between 
companies and customers in terms of internet fraud. Although most 
incidents should be reported for civil and regulatory action rather than 
criminal investigation, there is still a need for intervention by the police. 
Therefore, the NHN security team has maintained a strong relationship with 
the police through hiring former police high rank officer (Choi, 2006). 
Overall, the reactive and auxiliary role of the private sector has facilitated 
more fraudulent activities in cyberspace. Although most fraudulent activities 
have occurred in the private domain, private industry has looked on without 
doing anything until the public policing bodies have become officially 
involved, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. Most fraudulent incidents 
have not been reported to the public police due to lack of trust, different 
investigation philosophies, negative publicity, and adverse impacts on 
stocks. Simply put, the private sector does not believe that the public police 
appropriately protect their private interests. This predisposition of public 
policing has been noticed by many previous incidents. The public police 
tend to be involved when criminal activities occur that considerably harm 
public interests, which must be protected by the law. Recently, private and 
public sectors of policing have realized that they have to cooperate Mth 
each other in response to increasing fraud incidents in cyberspace. 
Before examining the reform of public policing in South Korea, it is 
important to take a look at current internet fraud law in the country, 
therefore this will be reviewed in the following section. 
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5.3 Internet fraud law in South Korea 
Korean criminal law was amended in 1995 in order to cope with ne\N crimes 
in the age of information. It regulates computer- involved crimes such as 
fraud, forgery, interference of business, embezzlement and privacy 
interruption through computers and destruction of electronic records and 
documents. Internet fraud is a subject of criminal laNN. \Nhich includes the 
Acts on Promotion of Telecommunications Network Utilization and the 
Telecommunication Business Law (Lee, 2000). 
Under Korean criminal law: 
0 Article 347-1: a person, if convicted for fraud, could face a 
maximum of 10 years in prison or a fine of up to 20 million Won. 
0 Article 347-2: Illegal use of a computer to process false information 
or incorrectly attempt to make money could face a maximum of 10 
years in prison or a fine of up to 20 million Won. 
For example, a total of 274,638 people were booked for the charge of fraud 
(Article 347-1.2) by the police and they were reported to the Prosecutors' 
Office. Among them, 55,618 were finally prosecuted in 2005. The 
percentage of prosecution is relatively low for fraud cases because it is 
difficult to prove without concrete evidence (CTRC 2005). 
Under the Acts on Promotion of Telecommunications Network Utilization: 
e Article 48-3, Article 62-5: a person who sends excessive signals or 
processes illegal commands in order to interrupt the stability of a 
telecommunications network could face a maximum of 5 years in 
prison or a fine of up to 50 million Won. 
For example, a total of 4,019 people were booked to face charges for the 
violation of this act (Article 48-3.62-5) by the police and they were 
reported to the Prosecutors' Office. Among them, 2,032 people were finallý, 
prosecuted in 2005 (CTRC, 2005). 
Under the Telecommunication Business Law., 
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0 Article 53: Fraudulent activity can be prohibited and punished by 
this law although many people and parties ignore this administrati\ e 
order administered by the Minister of Information and 
Communications and by the Korea Internet Safety Commission. 
Violation of this law could face a maximum of 2 years in prison or a 
fine of up to 100 million Won. 
For example, a total of 156 people were booked to face charges for the 
violation of this act (Article 53) by the police and they were reported to the 
Prosecutors' Office. Among them, 88 people were finally prosecuted in 
2005 (CTRC, 2005). 
The conviction rate for the above examples is not available, but it is alleged 
that the prosecution rate and the conviction rate are almost the same in 
Korea. The Korean criminal court rarely overturns prosecuted cases because 
the court often accepts offenders' guilty statements presented to prosecutors 
as evidence of non- involvement. 
However, many expert respondents in this research criticized the fact that 
these laws are not able to catch up with the speed of technology and culture. 
Criminals are always a step ahead of the law enforcement agency, resulting 
in growing demands upon public policing bodies. As a result of numerous 
professional meetings, the government has decided to revise current laws 
governing the internet and cyberspace. Revision of the Act was 
implemented in 2007 after passing the community hearing and the 
legislation procedure. 
The revision of the Act on Promotion of Telecommunications Network 
Utilization and Information Protection in 2007 mandates (MGL, 2007): 
ISPs (Internet Service Providers) and Media with more than 300.000 
and 200,000 visitors per day must implement the limited 'Real Name' 
system. 
The ISP and Media must confirm the name and contact number of 
their bulletin board and keep that information for at least 6 months. 
If the ISP does not implement 'Real Name' confirmation, the %1IC 
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(Ministry of Information and Communications) can order for their 
correction, and a 30,000,000 Won fine will be imposed if they do not 
comply. 
When personal information transfers abroad, the ISP must notifý' the 
name of the country and recipient, method of transfer, aim of use of 
the user and finally they must obtain permission from the user to 
transfer their information. 
9 In cases of infringement of privacy and defamation, victims can 
submit the offender's name, address and contact number to the 
Office of Mediation of Defamation in order to initiate a lawsuit 
against the person who committed the crime. Five laý'ers are then 
appointed by the Information and Communication Ethics Committee 
to handle the case. 
0 In cases of transfers of personal information due to the mergence and 
acquisition of a company, it must be notified wholly via e-mail, 
letter and by telephone to the user. If there is no contact information 
for the user, this information must be informed on the company's 
website for 30 days. 
The revision of this Act focuses more on the responsibilities of ISPs in 
terms of protection of personal information. This Act has been modified in 
2008 in order to enhance the responsibility of ISPs so that number of portal 
site and news site visitors changed from 300,000 (portal site) and 200,000 
(news site) to 100,000 visitors (Kim, 2008). It will become more difficult to 
trade personal information between or within commercial markets 
internationally. Meanwhile, ISPs will have to perform more policing 
activities in cyberspace in order to fulfil the revision of the Act. It is quite 
contradictory that self-regulation has been considered the more preferred 
form of internet control worldwide. Korean laws could be more realistic 
than other countries' laws since Korea has more than 70% internet user 
population and has become one of the strongest IT nations. Events in Korea 
suggest that the international community are verly likely to confront similar 
occurrences. Korean laNNs could thus be used as international guidelines in 
the future. 
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However, the government faces many challenges from liberal cyber 
community groups to abolish the revision of these acts. They are concerned 
that this revision of law will violate human rights and infringe on the 
privacy of internet user, arguing that the 'big brother' is online to oversee 
them. The Korean government has argued that the balance between safe and 
risky cyberspace must be considered a very serious matter. 
The National Internet Development Agency of Korea reported that about 75 
percent (32,570,000) of Koreans use the internet, %vith about 35 percent of 
the population using internet banking (June, 2006). Therefore. it is 
fundamental to have greater internet security, despite strong opposition from 
internet user groups, such as the Korea Information Security Agency 
(KISA). 
5.4 How do public and private sectors police internet fraud 
in Korea? 
In the public sector, there is no public agency solely focusing on internet 
fraud. Since internet fraud is considered a cybercrime, it is embedded xvith 
general cybercrime. The police do not police internet fraud separately. 
Therefore, most internet frauds are reported by victims. When internet fraud 
occurs, the victim has to go to the police department to make an official 
report. Initially, police were taking reports through an internet site but too 
many false reports were received. As a result of abundant false reports, the 
police changed their policy and now take reports directly from victims. This 
direct reporting policy has reduced false reports by victims dissatisfied with 
internet shopping. After changing the reporting policy, only serious internet 
frauds have been reported and prosecuted by law enforcement agencies. 
In the private sector, a few organizations, such as 'Catchall' and 'The 
Cheaters' respond to internet fraud. Groups are voluntarily organized bN, 
victims and managed with a small amount of support from them. Through 
their websites, they receive internet fraud reports from victims. As the 
media has introduced their activities and websites, more victims have joined 
in order to catch fraudsters by exchanging useful information, such as tricks 
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and methods that were used by them. However, their policing activities are 
causing concern for law enforcement agencies. The police ask victims to 
report it when they locate fraudsters rather than taking action themselves. 
Corporate victims are likely to recover their losses through their security 
measures. They are concerned with the impact of negative publicity and 
negative impact on stock value so they sometimes absorb their loss as *cost* 
rather than officially respond to it. If their loss is considerably large, the% 
tend to report to the police. Compared to foreign companies, fraud 
investigation and prevention methods are rarely used. Although it maý cause 
significant loss, Korean companies are unlikely to spend money on 
preventing possible threats or risks. 
Internet Service Providers police internet fraud through their security staff, 
but they have a lack of staff available to monitor complicated fraudulent 
activities. Their security staff members spend most of their time watching 
for defamation comments and replies in membership cafes. Recently, the 
subject of defamation comments and replies has become a very serious 
social issue in South Korea. In particular, politicians and entertainment 
celebrities are the main targets. Some entertainment celebrities have 
committed suicide because of malicious words. This situation needs a 
greater response. 
5.5 Relationship between the public and private sectors 
In contrast to other Western countries, the relationship between private and 
public sectors is not receptive. Historically, authoritarian governments have 
ruled Korean society for more than five decades. The government used to 
treat private companies as subordinates although not in their chain of 
command. Through regulation and policy, the government has tightly 
controlled the private sector. This hostile relationship has gradually 
disappeared with the process of democracy. However, lack of trust between 
the two sectors has remained. This relationship has acerbated the need for 
cooperative behaviour for information and knowledge exchange. 
164 
Government agencies used to obtain the necessary infon-nation from the 
private sector without formal request. However. this kind of practice is not 
acceptable these days. The vertical relationship has slowly changed to a 
horizontal relationship. Each sector has realized that partnership policing is 
important in responding to internet fraud. In order to establish an effectiN e 
partnership, more precise law has to define the necessarý! relationships. 
Lack of appropriate law has meant their relationship has remained 
indifferent. They do not exactly know how to improve their relationship in 
terms of policing internet fraud. 
5.6 Development of policing cybercrime in South Korea 
History of Cyber Terror Response Center 
The Korean National Police Agency established the first computer crime 
investigation team within the International Criminal Affairs Division in 
1992 in order to respond to computer related crime. Later, this team became 
a Hacker Investigation Unit in October 1995; it consists of four staff: two 
investigators and two analysts. Since the breakdown of the Noýýcom 
network in May 1997, this team has belonged to the Investigation Bureau 
and has more staff members and equipment; it was renamed the Computer 
Crime Investigation Team in August 1997. As cybercrime has increased 
throughout the nation, the Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) 
established the Cyber Crime Investigation Team in 16 provincial police 
agencies in January 2000. At the national level, KNPA's Cyber Terror 
Counteraction Plan was submitted in February 2000. This plan emphasized 
the national level of response to cybercrime. The Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security approved the establishment of the Cyber Terror 
Response Center (CTRC) with 80 staff members and an annual budget of 10 
billion won in April 2000. Eventually, CTRC opened in July 2000 (CTRC, 
2005). 
Reform of the criminal justice system 
The Korean criminal justice system is different from other \Vestern 
countries' systems in that there are two law enforcement agencies 
165 
competing for investigation authority; The Supreme Prosecutors, Office and 
the National Police Agency. In the Korean Criminal Prosecutors' La\ý. only 
the prosecutor can conduct a criminal investigation and has the right to close 
the case. The public police are defined as assistants to the Prosecutors' 
Office. However, the police agency has attempted to attain an *independent 
investigation right', by freeing itself from the control of the prosecution, as 
part of democratic reforms in the early 1990s. This effort gained impetus 
when the incumbent administration started an extensive judicial reform 
programme covering all areas of law enforcement, ranging from the training 
of lawyers to the operation of criminal trials. 
When the Presidential Commission on Judicial Reform released a draft 
proposal in April 2005 for the revision of the Criminal Procedures Law with 
a provision granting independent investigative power to police, the 
Prosecutors' Office was notably embarrassed. Moreover, the commission 
would not allow prosecutors to use defendants' statements in their 
interrogation as evidence in criminal trials. Prosecutors, in alliance with 
other legal professionals, went on a counterattack, primarily inquiring about 
police awareness for the protection of human rights (Korea Herald. 2006). 
There is currently a political environment whereby the public police are 
struggling to obtain independent investigation power whilst the Prosecutors' 
Office is strongly defending its ownership of investigation authority. 
According to Bhanu and Stone (2004), it needs external as well as internal 
support for police reform to succeed. Without leadership committed to 
improvement within a police organization, external calls for reform will 
rarely penetrate the daily delivery of police services on the front lines. But 
without external support for reform, even the most committed police 
leadership will lose the political backing and resources necessar'\, to sustain 
a successful reform process. However, it seems that this reform of policing 
is not easily implemented as the Korean National Police have barriers both 
inside and outside of the agency. 
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Most Korean police officers believe that the Commissioner General is not 
willing to stand on the front line of a war to achieve independent 
investigation power, and that the position of the Commissioner General is 
not the final career position. After one office term, the Commissioner 
General could be promoted to the Deputy Director of the NIS, Director of 
Presidential Secret Service, or the Minister of Government administration 
and Home affairs. Sometimes, they could directly join as a member of 
National Congress with support by the ruling party. Because of these 
reasons, it is believed that the Commissioner General ýý ill not sacrifice his 
career for such a difficult political challenge. 
Furthermore, the congressional legal committee consists of a former judge 
and prosecutor, making it impossible to pass the revised criminal procedure 
without support from public citizens. Fortunately, there is a groýý ing 
consensus about the revision of the criminal procedure and legal sý stem, 
which is comparable to the US legal system. However, this faces powerful 
opposition from legal professionals who do not want to give up their vested 
rights. 
The only hope lies in public awareness in that they are customers of police 
services, and the public's consideration of what kind of policing system 
serves to benefit them in providing improved public accountabilitý'. Policing 
reformations must consider the public interest, not only the agency's 
interests. 
However, the public still regards the competition between the police and 
prosecutor as a fight to obtain their own investigation power, not as a battle 
for the promotion of human rights. As a result of their negative public image. 
policing reforms have come to a lull. 
For the public police, this reform is a challenge to their independent 
investigation power to perform at full capacity to police cybercrime without 
any intervention by the Supreme Prosecutors' Office. The CTRC is a 
pioneer of cybercrime policing, but its investigation is still subject to 
prosecutorial supervision by the law. 
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5.7 Partnership policing for the response to internet fraud 
in South Korea 
In view of the growing tendency toward internet fraud. it is imperative to 
establish more specialized internet fraud policing units in the private and 
public sectors in South Korea. Through establishing specialized policing 
units for internet fraud, both sectors could achieve mutual goals for crime 
prevention while pursuing their different interests. Whether those units Nvork 
together or separately, more specialized policing units in both sectors would 
discourage the development of internet fraud and would promote safe e- 
commerce activities. 
In spite of various preventive strategies being adopted by the private sector, 
partnership with the public sector is crucial to prevent and to respond 
appropriately to internet fraud. However, it is argued that discussion of 
partnership policing should take place after establishing specialized internet 
fraud policing units in both sectors. Although there are a few volunteer 
groups' websites such as The Cheaters and Catchall, it is difficult to say that 
they work together with the police. These groups report to the police when 
they locate firaudsters who defrauded their members. Online auction and 
internet shopping mall companies have monitored fraudulent activities, but 
their policing capabilities show minimum results. They mainly deal with 
complaints received from their customers. 
For the development of partnership policing, it is suggested that more 
attention must be given to internet fraud by both sectors. In order to perform 
in full partnership, the establishment of an information clearing house has to 
be prioritized. This information clearing house would store useful data such 
as victim, offender and method. Without an information clearing house. 
neither sector has a platform through which to share information. 
Unfortunately, there has been no discussion about establishing an 
information clearing house for internet fraud. 
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5.8 Barriers of policing internet fraud by the police in South 
Korea 
There are four main barriers to policing internet fraud in Korea. First, a lack 
of understanding of the impact of internet fraud by the public sector could 
be the most serious barrier in policing internet fraud. The public sector has 
given little attention to internet fraud compared to other cybercrimes. This 
may be attributed to the complicated process inherent in proving criminality. 
Fraudsters usually deny their criminal behaviour and avoid their liability. 
Subsequently, it costs more money to prove criminality than to recover 
losses. 
Second, lack of investigative skill of the police deters victims from 
reporting incidents. Not many people report their losses or damage to the 
police because they believe that the police do not properly deal with internet 
fraud. Since police do not have sufficient experts at the local level, 
complicated incidents have to be dealt with by the computer crime unit at 
the regional or national headquarter level. CTRC (Cyber Terror Response 
Center) has developed more sophisticated methods and tools for responding 
to cybercrime, but it does not relate specifically to internet fraud. 
Third, lack of budget discourages people from reporting internet fraud to the 
police. Since internet fraud is not a high priority for the police, budget 
allocation for it is small. Investigation of internet fraud requires substantial 
cost and time since many sophisticated tricks are involved. However, there 
is no separate budget for internet fraud investigation. Internet fraud is 
considered to be a part of general cybercrime, as classified by the KNPA. 
This discourages the investigation of internet fraud. 
Fourth, lack of human resources makes it difficult to police internet fraud. 
Although KNPA (Korean National Police Agency) has trained and hired 
more cyber-cops, there are still insufficient personnel to respond to internet 
fraud. The rapidly growing threat of internet fraud needs more personnel to 
respond to it. Hiring more personnel costs less money than the total loss of 
e-commerce due to internet fraud. 
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In the next section, the tensions in both sectors are examined with particular 
regard to the similarities and differences of current partnership policing of 
intemet fraud. 
5.9 Tensions between private and public sectors in policing 
Internet fraud 
Similar to those reported in Chapter 3 (United Kingdom) and Chapter 4 
(United States), tensions are also found in South Korea. The), are lack of 
trust, lack of knowledge and under-reporting. Different cultural, social and 
political environments produce slightly different types of tensions. 
Compared to the UK and US, policing internet fraud in South Korea is less 
developed, because there is no independent government agency policing 
internet fraud, and there is a low level of public awareness of internet fraud. 
This environment offers less tight control of internet fraud by both sectors. 
The first tension is a 'lack of trust' between private and public sectors in 
policing internet fraud. This tension is also found in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. It is a fundamental tension that subsequently affects 
other tensions. Like other nations, private and public sectors do not trust 
each other. Historically, the public police lost their reputation while they 
protected the authority of the military government. Authoritarian style 
policing worsened the relationship between the private and public sectors. 
Although the police have changed with democracy, old traditions are still 
embedded and public relations tend to lack in building partnerships with the 
private sector. Recently, private and public sectors have talked through 
various communication channels such as conferences, seminars and 
roundtables. However, there have been some criticisms in that the meetings 
have not discussed sensitive issues. When the government agency organized 
a conference, most participants were pro-government scholars and 
companies. Thus, almost the same participants are seen at different 
conferences organized by other government agencies. For better 
communication, the public sector has to listen more to the private sector. 
Lack of trust can be solved if the tw-o sectors truly communicate ýN ith each 
other. Through this communication, mutual respect and cooperation can be 
achieved. 
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The second tension is 'lack of knowledge' between private and public 
sectors in policing internet fraud. Although the two sectors have approached 
internet fraud in terms of crime prevention and laýN enforcement, their 
knowledge about internet fraud is insufficient. Not many people who 
monitor internet fraud understand the skills and methods used by fraudsters. 
As mentioned earlier, social engineering is a common method used to 
deceive victims, but few people know how to protect from it. For internet 
fraud prevention, the private sector has greater knowledge than the public 
sector, since they have to protect their assets. Compared to the private sector, 
public police and other regulatory agencies show less interest in the 
prevention of internet fraud. Practically, famous portal site companies, 
online auction companies and financial institutions have much greater 
knowledge with regard to internet fraud control. Therefore, private sector 
security experts tend to look down on the capabilities of the police in terms 
of their response to internet fraud. 
The third tension is 'under-reporting' between private and public sectors in 
policing internet fraud. This tension is found more at the individual victim 
level. Comparatively, a small amount of loss makes a victim more hesitant 
to report the incident to the police. Small amounts of loss Nvill eventually 
become large amounts of loss if ignored by victims and law enforcement 
agencies. Fraudsters take advantage of the fact that victims of small 
amounts of loss tend not to report to the police, therefore they deceive 
innocent internet users with minor deceptions by selling low-priced items 
and game money. These items attract people to pay small amounts of money 
without suspicion. At the corporate level, private companies have low 
expectations for successful investigations by the police because they do not 
believe that the police have sufficient capabilities to deal with internet fraud 
investigation. 
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5.10 Conclusion 
A range of tensions in policing internet fraud between the two sectors has 
interrupted the motivation for partnership policing: they are lack of trust, 
lack of knowledge and under-reporting. Although different cultural. political 
and social backgrounds are evident, lack of trust is the most common 
tension found in all three nations, including South Korea. InteragencN, 
conflict, bureaucratic conflict and technological intervention have also been 
found to be negative factors for adapting effective public policing, NN hereas, 
political and legal barriers interrupt the active participation of policing 
cybercrime by the private sector, particularly in South Korea. In order to 
establish effective partnership policing for internet fraud, mutual needs for 
the successful partnership have to be prioritized. To do that specialized 
internet policing units in private and public sectors have to be established. In 
order to provide more effective policing, establishment of an information 
clearing house is also necessary. Without recognizing its imperativeness, 
effective policing of internet fraud cannot take place in South Korea. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Findings 
This chapter will consider, in three parts, the most serious tensions affecting 
the policing of internet fraud, both between the private and public sectors. 
and within the public sector. It will also suggest resolutions for tensions and 
outlines expected forms that a proposed model for partnership policing 
could take. The current condition of policing Internet fraud in South Korea 
is outlined based on comments from private and public sector experts. 
Through the process of analyzing interviews, the conceptual framework and 
research expectations of the study will be used as a theoretical framework 
for the comparison and interpretation of the findings. Through analýtical 
comparison of the data collected from the interviews, an effort will be made 
to identify factors that are readily apparent from the data. 
6.1 Part 1: Most serious tensions affecting the policing of 
Internet fraud 
This part gives context to the question of tensions between the private and 
public sectors of policing internet fraud by exploring current practices and 
issues that negatively affect partnership policing. 
The most serious tensions between the public and private sectors 
Interviewees were asked to explain the three most serious tensions they 
perceived to have an affect on policing of internet ftaud in Korea. Basedon 
respondents' answers those that responded negatively to influences on 
policing internetftaud were used to structure the first part of this chapter: 
Tensions between the private and public sectors (see Table 6- 1) 
Lack of trust between the private and public sector (both) 
Different investigation philosophies (both) 
Lack of legal perception (public) 
Negative publicity (private) 
Adverse impacts on stock value (private). 
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The three most serious tensions between the private and the public sectors 
vary across different companies and agencies; however, respondents report 
that 'lack of trust' overlaps the two sectors. Along with this tension. 
different investigation philosophies and lack of legal perception ýNere 
chosen as the three most serious tensions by the public sector. Negative 
publicity and adverse impact on stock values were chosen among the three 
most serious tensions by the private sector. 
6.1.1.1 Lackoftrust 
The lack of trust is heightened by the belief that law enforcement fails to 
investigate internet fraud and other non-internet related crimes by the 
private sector. Previously, during the military regime, policing was 
exclusively owned by the state. The emergence of private security is a 
recent event coinciding with the democratization of Korea. Since the early 
90s, Korean society has developed and demanded a more international 
standard of policing mechanisms. As a result, terrestrial levels of policing 
that are shared with the private sector have increased. For terrestrial policing, 
it is relatively easy to make a distinction between the public and private in 
terms of jurisdiction. Terrestrial policing activity is obviously seen and 
monitored by many interested parties. 
However, the policing of internet fraud is highly indistinguishable because 
there is no physical boundary in cyberspace (Post, 1996; Richman, 1996) 
and there is no specified law to define the ownership of policing cyberspace 
because physical boundaries have characteristically outlined legal 
boundaries (Logan, 1999). This uncertain situation makes policing internet 
fraud more complicated than the terrestrial level of policing. 
The respondents interviewed in this study expressed their opinion based on 
this uncertainty. The respondents in both sectors provided the same answer, 
but each sector had different grounds to explain why "lack of trust' ýýas 
chosen by each sector in answer to this research question. 
The respondents of the public sector including the National Police Agencý 
(CTRC: Cyber Terror Response Center), The Supreme Prosecutors' Office 
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(ICIC: Internet Crime Investigation Center). the National Intelligence 
Service (NCSC: National Cyber Security Center)ý the Financial Supervisory 
Service (FSA: Financial Security Service), the Korea Information Securitý 
Agency (KSRC: Korea Spam Response Center and PRIVACYNET) and 
KrCERT/CC (Korea Information Security Center) provided their 
professional perspectives to why lack of trust is included as one of the three 
most serious tensions. 
The public sector respondents who were interviewed conveyed a belief that 
cooperation and assistance from telecommunications providers and Internet 
Service Providers are essential in dealing with internet fraud because most 
of the national information infrastructure is owned and operated by private 
corporations (Cordeiro and Hawamdeh, 2001). This information 
infrastructure contains digital evidence, which may prove wrongdoings. 
however, private corporations do not usually cooperate with an investigation 
in the absence of a Court warrant. What follows are two examples of this: 
Upon urgent requests for cooperation to investigate and examine their 
log-file and copies of e-mail communication documents, private 
companies tend to pay no heed to our request. When this happens, we 
obtain an official warrant from the Court and levy on their property 
before those documents can be damaged or destroyed (#I). In the 
instance that evidence is compromised, they may be charged for civil 
liability (#2). 
It seems very strange to us that private companies would hesitate to aid 
our investigation as we have no intention to cause harm. We investigate 
only the incident and do not seek to interrupt their private business. We 
assume that the negative relationship has been exacerbated by previous 
police activities against ISPs that occurred between 7-8 years ago when 
we cracked down on a few companies for copyright violations. 
Consequently, they are resistant to cooperation (#5, #6). 
Non-police respondents in the regulatory authority who control intemet 
fraud through monitoring ISPs provided slightly different points of view to 
interpret the current situation. They want to be differentiated from the IaNý 
enforcement agency, however, they are still considered public agencies by 
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the private sector, whether they have law enforcement authoritý, or not (ý5. 
#6): 
Private companies do not cooperate with us although we are not a law 
enforcement agency. For their eyes, all public agencies are the same as 
law enforcement agencies. Because of this reason, they don't trust us. 
Besides, there are some rumours about our information leaking to the 
law enforcement and intelligent agency (#5). 
In this study, the respondents from the private sector, including Ahniab 
Coconut, KOSCOMASAC (Koscom), CONCERT, Auction, BC Card. 
Daum, GCN (National Council of the Green Consumer's Network in Korea) 
and the YMCA (National Council of YMCA's of Korea), expressed an 
uncomfortable relationship with the police and criticized the partnership 
policing against internet fraud. 
Most business enterprises in Korea have experienced uncomfortable 
relationships with the police because the police are recognized as a 
notorious agency. The police lost their accountability as public servants for 
long periods during the modern political history of Korea NNhen military 
dictators ruled former governments (Lee, 2004). During this period of 
military dictatorship, the Korean public police served as puppets for 
dictators to protect their political regimes (Lee, 2005). Although the Korean 
political environment has significantly changed during the last decade with 
the adoption of a democratic system, the image of the Korean public police 
agency still remains an undependable organization in the eyes of the private 
sector. Because of their negative reputation, the private sector still prefers 
to maintain some distance from the public sector (0). 
Most respondents from the private sector believe the police do not focus on 
the case reported by them. They explain: 
When we report the incident to the police, they do not focus on the 
incident itself They always look for other information about our 
business and company. They are sniffing us! Like a hunting dog! I heN 
were not asked to collect other information about us. They have still kept 
the old image of the police. We feel uncomfortable with their 
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interventions in our investigation. There is also lack of feedback from 
the police about the progress of the investigation. This leads us not to 
expect any cooperation from the police with respect to the iný estigation 
(#9). 
However, police respondents criticized the fact that private companies tend 
to hide information when they report incidents so that it is often necessary to 
look up other related information to find what they did not disclose. 
Sometimes that information can be an important tip for the investigation. 
Too many different views create the gap between two sectors. 
Meanwhile, NGO (Non Government Organization) respondents argued that 
the police do not immediately respond to internet frauds that involve small 
amounts of monetary loss (#10). As an advocate for the citizens, NGOs 
often represent victims of internet fraud and other cybercrimes. NGOs have 
more sympathy with the victimization of internet fraud than the police, so 
many individual victims have reported issues to such NGOs. They haN, c 
worked for the benefit and right of citizens so their activities have often 
conflicted with the public sector: 
It takes a long time to commence the official investigation by the police. 
Police do not like to investigate fraud cases since it is difficult to prove 
their criminality and intentions. Police don't like our involvement in the 
investigation of internet fraud (#11). 
However, respondents from the police refuted the fact that the delay of 
investigation was usually caused due to insufficient evidence and falsity 
provided by victims. The respondents also said that it takes at least a few 
weeks to hold a cross interrogation for parties involved in a case. 
We can prove only about 10% of all cases reported to the police and 
prosecutor's office. Since fraudsters and victims have known for a 
certain period, it is difficult to prove the criminal intention of an accused 
person (#2). 
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6.1.1.2 Different investigation philosgphy 
Different investigation philosophy is also believed to be one of the most 
serious tensions by the both sectors, indicating a critical difference between 
the two sectors. Divergent goals with respect to investigations are often a 
cause of conflict, which too often results in the nullification of cases (#L i"? ' 
#3). Whilst the private sector conducts an investigation for the recovery of 
loss, discovery of weak points and termination of the activity (Davis, 
Lundman and Martinez, 199 1), the police conduct their investigation NN ith 
the goal of achieving criminal justice; this often results in the modification 
of policies and implemented regulations in order to prevent future offences: 
We have observed many cases that were legally nullified due to damaged C7 -- 
evidence and illegal procedure; actions that were intended to reduce 
losses incurred to the private sector. The private sector has dealt with 
many fraud cases independently, eventually compromising the case in a 
manner that makes it impossible for the public security sector to recover 
any conclusive evidence. Therefore, we have sometimes felt unmoved to 
assist with cases already handled by the private sector (#2). 
Contrary to the police, the private sector maintains a completely different 
point of view upon conducting their investigations: 
In the face of huge amounts of economic loss, sometimes we have to 
conceal an internet fraud case in order to protect indiscernible assets, 
such as our brand name, reputation and e-marketing. Should details of 
an incident leak, the public will not want to use our site for purchasing 
merchandise, so we have to maintain the confidentiality of an occurrence 
for the sake of safe marketing. When bad news leaks to the market, sales 
will be significantly hindered and the company may fall into a deep 
slump. Although we know that we have to punish those fraudsters, it 
may be at the expense of financial damage to our e-business (#10). 
The respondents in the private sector reported that they focus more on 
business outcomes while the public sector focuses more on legal issues. The 
private sector has often used an investigation process as a fraud control 
strategy (#12). If fraudsters know that investigation has taken place. they 
may not continue their criminal activities. As described earlier, each sector 
has different interests to pursue in order to achieve their aims and objecti,, es. 
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For the private sector, the goal of criminal justice does not fit their aims and 
objectives. Private Justice focuses more on loss preN, ention and risk 
management. Deterrence and prevention of fraudulent actiN ity is better for 
the private sector than the arrest of offenders. 
Arrests of criminals and successful prosecutions are important to 
accomplish the goal of the public security and criminal justice. Ho%ýeýer, 
private companies prefer not to involve the formal investigation. It costs 
more money than what we have lost (#11). 
The private sector prefers to handle Internet fraud through their corporate 
expertise while they maintain the reputation of having safe business 
environments. They believe that the news of a fraud incident would cause 
more forfeiture than the internal make up of loss due to Internet fraud (#11). 
Corporate security departments are usually under the supervision of 
corporate legal office, but some of them work independently depending on 
corporate structure. Corporate lawyers often advise the security department 
on how to deal with serious fraud cases. Private companies tend to solve 
problems discreetly because it is usually not worth reporting to the police 
because of cost and outcome (# 12). 
6.1.1.3 Lack of legal perception 
Lack of legal perception is believed to be another of the three most serious 
tensions between the two sectors, as chosen by the public sector respondents. 
Since the private sector tends to lack sufficient legal knowledge, they often 
break the law without intention. However, regardless of whether or not they 
do have the intention of breaking the law, legal infringements will 
nonetheless be punished (#2): 
Because of the internet's relatively short history, people often do not 
know what may be deemed as a violation of law. Due to this lack of 
awareness surrounding security laws, ISP provided personal information 
without the permission of user, and thus unknowingly committed an 
illegal act. In order to avoid future prosecution due to the violation of IT 
related laws, they must educate themselves on these laws and maintain 
awareness of them! It does not work to say we did not know' (=-2). In 
practice, almost every ISP has had to pay fines for the absence of 
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provisions in their service at some point in the past. Ho, ýN- ridiculous! 
They have interest in making money but did not know how to prevent 
any potential liability they might face (#2). 
Sometimes, private security departments have overreacted during 
investigations and have embarrassed the police and related prosecutors. 
Tracking down and hacking a private person's computer is still an illegal act 
in Korea. The best thing they can do is to report the incident or location of 
offender to the police. Without reporting an incident to the police, loss of 
fraud cannot be recovered by the insurance. The private security sector 
should have enough legal knowledge before theý conduct their own 
investigation. Breaching of the criminal procedure will eventually lose a 
case and the offender (#1). 
Protection of private information law prohibits any person to look up the 
private information without permission of the person. Many private 
sector investigators have ignored and broken this law for their 
investigation. -It will cause the loss of the case due to illegal acquisition 
of private information (#2). 
IT security staff in the private sector do not have sufficient legal study 
background so they have often ignored how to respond to fraud incidents. 
Their decision making processes often cause them to make mistakes in 
terms of legal procedure. Sometimes, they do not know whether it is a civil 
or criminal matter. Despite this, the private sector is well equipped with 
high technology; humans are the main actor of the decision-making process 
(#2). 
There is growing concern about the legal education of IT company's 
employees with the development of Information Technology. The law is 
always one-step behind technological development. As technology advances, 
criminals are getting smarter and crimes are getting more complicated. 
Providing legal education to security staff must come first in order to 
respond to those smart fraudsters. Some fraudsters who commit large scale 
fraud have better legal knowledge than security staff members (;; 2). 
Recently, the internet has become a good communication tool for 
exchanging useful fraud skills among criminals. Fraudsters have a forum for 
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exchanging criminal information and updated scams for possible projects 
(410). 
Fraudsters are very smart. Smarter than you think! They are \ý ell aware 
of laws. However, IT security staffs or ISP staffs are engineers. They 
are not really true private security experts in other Westem countries. 
They do not have a legal mind, which security experts must have. Basic 
legal education and regular workshops are probably needed to improve 
the quality of security staff (#2). 
It has been advised that participating in workshops, seminars and conferences 
for the introduction of updated laws can improve the lack of legal perception 
of the private sector employees. Employment of experienced workers NN ho 
have a legal background would improve the staffing of an IT company and is 
believed to be another way to solve this tension. However, IT companies have 
rarely recruited in-house legal counsel. They usually outsource legal service 
for the protection of intellectual property and patent related works. 
Respondents from the public sector in this study reported that providing 
regular sessions of basic legal education gradually improves the legal 
perception of employees: 
Only a few Korean companies have provided legal education for the 
employee while IBM, Microsoft and other large IT companies have 
provided legal education for their employees in order to protect their 
valuable assets and prevent any legal liability. In Korea, more private 
companies have been recommended to prepare legal education 
programmes by regulatory agencies (0). 
As Korean companies depend on more laývsuits and litigations for 
protecting their intellectual property and assets, more legal education should 
be provided to their employees and customers in order to avoid any serious 
liability from unawareness or ignorance of related laws (#2). 
6.1.1.4 Negative publicity 
Negative publicity has been noted as another serious tension by the priN ate 
sector. According to Jones, 'many companies are afraid to report fraud 
incidents because of the potential for negative publicitý', and loss of 
goodwill' (Jones, 2006). The private sector tends to be hesitant to report 
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cases to the police out of fear for their brand image, which is an', compan"'s 
most valuable asset. Wall (2001: 174) argued that use of ýthe public criminal 
justice process may expose their weakness to their commercial competitors. ' 
Through the internet, negative publicity spreads by a mere click of the 
mouse, and can cause a wide variety of undesirable effects. NegatiN e 
publicity on the Internet is unfair and can damage any company 
significantly. According to a PWC (Price Waterhouse and Coopers, 2001) 
survey, 39% of UK companies did not report incidents to the authorities. 80% 
of companies who have been victims of fraud remain confident of their 
control systems, despite the high incidence of overall fraud rates and the 
apparent ineffectiveness of existing anti-fraud procedures (Out-Law, -100 1) - 
Private companies believe that the police cannot protect them from negative 
publicity (#10): 
Well, I don't like to say this, but it is true that the police do not consider 
how important it is to maintain confidentiality of a company's profile 
with regards to an internet fraud case. They often disclose information 
to reporters, and hence, embarrass us. For this reason, we usually find 
someone who can better trust the police and then report the incident 
through our reliable channel (#10). The police are much too bureaucratic 
in their political organization. They do not consider our situation in the 
competitive market (#10). Their bureaucratic culture does not reflect our 
needs. It will take a long time for the police to understand that the 
private sector's interest is also the public's interest (#11). 
Many companies believe that it takes quite a long time to recover from the 
loss of negative publicity. The value of breached firms could be damaged. 
Customers tend to avoid using incident prone ISP services and have looked 
for more secure business transaction methods. The recovery time for a good 
reputation and brand loyalty could consume more time and moneý than 
private companies have, and so they have overlooked or unreported 
incidents to the police (#12): 
We believe that it takes too much time to catch up the loss of negatiN'e 
publicity. Once a company's reputation goes bad, a negati,, e image of' 
the company will stay for long time. Rein over the good reputation of 
company is more difficult than to make a brand new one. Look at the 
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Hanhwa scandal; the misconduct of its CEO has critically ruined his 
company's reputation (# 13). 
The respondent of the public sector in this study reported that Internet 
fraudsters have continuously penetrated the private sector where theý 
deceive someone to steal from private companies and their customers. 
Internet fraudsters know that private companies tend not to disclose their 
victimization and have used this vulnerability for continuous attacks. The 
fear of negative publicity has frightened private companies and has 
discouraged them from reporting all incidents. Because of this reason, both 
sectors' respondents have suggested a mandatory reporting policý (#]. #2, 
#10, #11). 
Negative publicity can be prevented if companies announce their damage 
or loss caused by fraudulent activity as soon as company recognizes it. 
Insurance will pay for its damage to their customers. They don't need to 
hesitate to inform their victimization. If they attempt to conceal their 
incident to protect for their brand image and customer loyalty, it will cost 
more than they had to pay for it. Negative publicity that is made from 
the incident that happened is less than the negative publicity that is made 
from the dishonest act done to their customers and the public (#I). 
Insurance investigators report on company staff and clients of an% doubt, 
and give vital independent corroboration of the company position %%ithout 
exposing it to the negative publicity a police inquiry might generate. 
6.1.1.5 Adverse impact on stock value 
Adverse impact on stock value is believed by individuals in the private 
sector to be another source of serious tension in their sector. This has a 
causal relationship to negative publicity. When an author or a newspaper 
editor posts an article with the intent to influence a stock value, its value 
could be changed. Practically speaking. the stock market is verý, sensitive 
and unpredictable, and when a police investigation is made knoN%n to the 
public, falling stock value may cause the company to collapse. even if the 
company is not necessarily at fault. 
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It was previously suggested that private companies should announce the 
incident before any negative news is broadcasted. The official 
announcement of an incident may direct the public to consider it not as 
serious as the actual damage is, which could positively affect the stock value. 
However, no one can guarantee how the general public would react after he 
or she heard about the incident. Therefore, at this point in time private 
companies cannot easily decide whether they ýýish to publicize incidents of 
fraud or not (# 13). 
The rise and fall of stock value cannot reflect how much a company is 
honest or not. Investors would like to maximize their investments so that 
they do not give any credit for the incident reporting. Whether an 
incident happened or not, companies have to maintain that their stock 
value has continuously ascended (#10). 
Avoidance of adverse impact on stock value cannot be guaranteed although 
there is a confidential investigation and embargo of media reporting. The 
stock market has its own intelligence network to exchange necessary 
information. Compared to other private companies, stock market 
intelligence is very accurate and reliable. Usually, intelligence is produced 
among stock analysts and fund managers through IR (Investor Relations) 
among the major stock companies. This intelligence is not shared outside of' 
their network and it is meanwhile preserved for them only, however, 
alarming news goes out quickly and it significantly influences stock value. 
We have to consider the balance between stability of business and justice. 
If we could prevent adverse impacts on stock value with a reasonable 
amount of money, it would be much better to pay for the loss without 
reporting to the police. Once an incident report goes to the public, we 
have to pay more money than was our loss caused by fraud (#10). 
Efficiency in police investigations and conviction rate when combined ýN ith 
the revision of the Acts on Promotion of Telecommunications Netivork 
Utilization and Information Protection in 2007 would reduce loss from 
internet fraud. 
Other serious tensions 
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Interviewees were asked to consider other serious tensions they perceived 
to have an effect on the policing of internet fraud in Korea. Based on 
respondents' answers, the perceived negative influences on policing internet 
ftaud were used to structure the secondpart of this chapter: 
Tensions between the private and public sectors (see Table 6-1) 
Lack of sharing information 
Lack of convincing material 
Lack of communication 
Political influence. 
6.1.1.6 Lack of sharing information 
The respondents from the public sector reported that they shared limited 
information with other sectors such as crime reports and security levels of 
networks. Other important information sharing has been done through 
human relationships between people who have previously worked together 
or have otherwise known each other. One of the respondents from the 
public sector reported that there is too much competition among public 
agencies for them to become major partners of cyberpolicing with the 
private sector. Recently, the NCSC (National Cyber Security Center) 
signed a MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with many private 
companies to develop internet security software together and share the 
updated information. Because of this support from the private sector, the 
public sector has expected a more cooperative environment toward a 
partnership to police internet fraud together. According to McKenzie (2006: 
271), 'partnership meant information sharing. ' 
We, the police, have put a lot of effort to develop a better relationship 
with the private sector. However, the private sector has confused which 
agencies to share their information with because many public agencies 
have participated in policing internet fraud. It also needs an 
establishment of information sharing system within the public sector (#1). 
The respondent in the private sector argued that the public sector asks more 
confidential information from the private sector while theý provide the 
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general public with information that they can find on the intemet. An 
asymmetrical flow of information creates more tension between two sectors 
and a hostile relationship. However, public sector respondents reported that 
symmetric information sharing is impossible since the public sector has too 
much information that is protected by the protection of personal information 
law. 
I believe that the protection of personal information law has promoted 
the problem of asymmetric information flow. In order to promote a 
better information and communication process, another law to support 
effective communication between the two sectors must be established 
(#2). 
The respondents in both sectors reported that more interchange of 
information, knowledge and other resources would help to understand each 
sector's upfront issue. Personnel interchange between sectors was 
considered the most effective way to do this; however, it has been 
implemented in only limited areas of business with the government agency. 
Close cooperation between private and public sectors of security is 
considered an important factor to improve the overall capacity of policing 
internet fraud; however, each sector has not prepared to disclose its own 
weakness to their major competitors. 
6.1.1.7 Lack of convincinR material 
The respondents in the public sector have often felt that their activities were 
misunderstood by the private sector although the public sector has had good 
intentions to do them. Unfortunately, there is no convincing material to 
explain what they are doing and how it is beneficial for them. Convincing 
material is a tool of communication for the private sector by having the 
advantage of boasting volumes of readers and the capacity to preserve 
materials. However, the production of convincing material costs money and 
professional effort. Therefore, many public agencies have not carried this 
out (#2): 
Our work has often been misunderstood by the private sector since Nve 
cannot provide any material that explains our purpose of work. So we 
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have to provide more convincing materials and public awareness 
programmes for the general public (#2). 
Distribution of convincing material to the private sector xvill improve their 
relationship and prevent possible disagreements in future projects. However. 
organizational culture and budgetary restrictions have impeded the 
production of convincing material and have caused some tensions between 
the two sectors. 
NCSC/NIS as a part of the intelligence agency has distributed much 
convincing material to the private sector in order to receive more support to 
become a central player in cybersecurity while other laýv enforcement 
agencies have not yet attempted it due to insufficient budgets and 
administrative procedures. 
You can see that the National Cyber Security Center Brochure to public 
and private organizations is a good example of the distribution of 
convincing material which other public agencies have not attempted due 
to substantial cost (#1). 
The respondent also reported that convincing material is different from PR 
material in terms of promotion of partnership policing internet fraud. It 
should have a good explanation of partnership policing and guidelines to 
partnership policing so that the private sector is able to carry out all 
necessary functions. 
6.1.1.8 Lack of communication 
The respondents in the public sector argued that lack of communication was 
created by the self-centeredness of the private sector. Although some efforts 
have been made by both sectors such as co-hosting conferences and 
workshops, they are still in the beginning stages of creating a partnership 
and they need more efforts to develop the appropriate communication 
system to link the two sectors together for effective partnership policing 
(#2). 
CONCERT (consortium of KrCERT) is a good example of a 
communication venue for the purpose of exchanging and sharing 
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information in order to protect our information nemork systems. More than 
300 private security units and government agencies are sharing information 
through CONCERT's communication channel. CONCERT members are 
able to send real time messages and any inquiry can be distributed all 
members to obtain their expert opinion: 
I think that it is the fastest way to get help when any incident occurs 
online. Our members are very cooperative and reliable so I feel very 
safe as if I have my own back-up troop. CONCERT emergency alarm 
system runs for 24 hours per day, 365 days per year (#11). 
The respondents in the private sector criticized that the lack of 
communication was a product of the former authoritarian governments. 
During the authoritarian regime, only one-way communication NNas really 
practiced by the public sector. Even though Korea's authoritarian 
government has been overturned, its conservative culture has still remained 
in some parts of the public sector and their communication practices ha--ve 
not satisfied the private sector: 
Well... [there have been] a lot of changes in the public sector. They now 
know how to communicate with the private sector. And, theý have to 
put more effort into establishing a better communication channel with us. 
It is however necessary to appoint a communication or liaison officer 
who is to maintain a regular communication channel (# 13). 
The respondent from the public sector reported that a personal, relationship 
rather than an official communication channel has made the most 
communication headway. The respondents reported that the official title of 
'Information Officer' (10, NCSC) and 'Liaison Officer' (NPA) sometimes 
hinders increased communication with the private sector. 
When we go out the field, we want to be called by first name or brother. 
We do not want to be called by our official rank such as 'Inspector' or 
-Superintendent'. Those call-names create a gap between the informants 
and us (#I). 
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6.1-1.9 Political influence 
Political influence that deters the growth of private policing has been f-Ound 
to be another tension between the private and public sectors. According to 
Napoli (2001), communication policies and regulations are products of 
institutional power dynamics and struggles and have social. cultural and 
political influences. Generally, authority and wealth cannot be given to one 
single party in Korean society. Because of this deep-rooted principle, the 
private sector was given limited power to participate in policing cý berspace. 
This is also likely to further exacerbate existing political and competitive 
tensions between the two sectors. 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2005: 13) said this is where 'policing ends and 
private security begins. ' However, contrary to Western nations, Korean 
society has not prepared to adopt the full package of private policing which 
has perceived the private sector as a formal partner to policing cyberspace. 
Private policing is still seen as auxiliary to public policing (#L 42). %Maný 
large private companies want to expand their security business' capabilities 
to be entitled to police cyberspace but the government has not given aný 
sign of approval for their active participation because their participation 
may disregard the public sector's position in the policing of cyberspace 
(#11). 
The public sector does not allow the full ownership of policing internet 
fraud whether the private sector has better knowledge and technology or not 
(# 
As a profit organization, we are not supposed to participate in policing 
internet fraud without an official letter of support from the public sector 
for our cooperation in an investigation. We provide only secondary work 
although we have professional knowledge (#11). 
A recent announcement declared that the Presidential Commission on 
Judicial Reform made a decision that judicial reform Nvill be carried out 
which may encourage development in the privatization of Internet policing 
in Korea. Beginning in 2012, the current Korean Bar Exam ýNill be 
abolished and it will be substituted Nvith a law school system. As a result of 
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this judicial reform, the Korean criminal justice system will be changed. 
mimicking the US system, and will hence need more support from the 
private sector. 
From a private policing perspective, this is a very good opportunity to 
implement a more effective and efficient policing system in Korea. To date, 
judicial reform has halted the reformation of the policing sý stem due to 
criminal procedure law. Independent police investigations %\ill be 
implemented if the current criminal procedural law also changes. 
Privatization of policing will also develop at a fast pace, as police reform 
will take place. Eventually, policing internet fraud by the private sector %\ill 
not be affected by any political influence. 
The most serious tension of all 
Internet fraud experts in the private and public sectors interviewed for this 
study reported that lack of trust is the most serious tension, ý\hich as a 
consequence deters the efficacy and efficiency of policing internet fraud. As 
reported, this tension is caused by mutual scepticism by both sectors. Both 
sectors reported lack of trust to be the most serious tension between them, 
however, each sector had a different rationale for this belief. 
For the public sector, it was believed that the lack of trust between the 
sectors is a fundamental demoting factor for the cooperation between 
sectors to police internet fraud. 
Private companies and NGOs do not trust us so we have a hard time dealing with 
internet fraud. In fact, we have lost many cases that had been compromised due to 
the inadequate investigation by the private sector. They must know that the police 
are not working for the clean up of ruined investigations by the private sector (#I). 
The private sector believes that the lack of trust is a critical factor in 
deciding whether or not the private sector will report a fraud incident. It 
seems that the private sector recognizes the lack of trust in terms of police 
accountability. The difference in responses suggests that the public sector is 
more concerned with the mechanism of policing, whilst the private sector is 
more concerned Nvith the outcome of policing internet fraud. 
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We have been disappointed to see hoA the police handled intemet fraud 
cases. In order to prove any criminal intentions in a fraud case, an 
agency needs to be prepared from the initial stage of inNestigation and if 
they fail to be so, they will inevitably release the criminals. Ho%ý'e'. 'er, 
the police have dealt with internet fraud as the same as conventional 
crime. Even at the terrestrial level of fraud, cases require a lot of effort 
to prove their intentions; internet fraud has to be dealt with special 
expertise (#11). 
Too many different perceptions of tension between the mo sectors make it 
even more difficult to reconcile their peace talks. Neither of them would 
like to give up their current position even to pursue their ox\n interest. 
Although both of them are aware of an overlap of interest ýýith the other 
sector, their cross-sector power game does not allow them to provide any 
ground to surrender their advantaged positions. 
6.1.1.10 Rational of selection 
Why do you believe that is the most serious tension between the sectors? 
Respondents in both sectors interviewed in this study reported that lack of 
trust is the most serious tension since public and private sector security 
cannot effectively control internet fraud while criminals are getting smarter 
and crimes are getting more complicated. Tensions between the tNvo sectors 
may create a blind spot that will not allow each sector to reach their ideal 
policing authority level. However, it is necessary to make sure there are no 
dark comers where internet fraud can occur (# 1. #2, #3, # 10, # 11, # 12, # 13): 
We have to draw a clear line of jurisdiction in order to avoid overlapping 
or missing place in cyberspace. Too much check and balance between 
two sectors makes blind spots so that criminals are acting in the 
vulnerable areas (#2). 
From the public sector's perspective, lack of trust has negativelý' affected 
their partnership with the private sector in terms of police accountability. 
Although they have tried to overcome the shortcomings, long-time distrust 
cannot be easily removed. It needs more time to change. 
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For the successful investigation and prosecution, trust bemeen the 
private and public sector is an essential tool to link each sector. Without 
trust, each sector has to waste energy on psychological warfare in order 
to get more power to police internet fraud (#1, #2). 
From the private sector's perspective, lack of trust has negatively affected 
partnership with the public sector in terms of a policing division of labour. 
Pluralization and multi -lateral izati on of policing is an international trend. 
however it has been believed that Korean law enforcement agencies and 
other related public sectors do not want to break up and give their 
cyberpolicing area to the private sector. 
As you know that the policing of internet fraud by the police is verý 
limited since the police do not have sufficient know-how to investigate 
cases. However, the police do not want to be treated as a partner of the 
private sector. Despite the horizontal relationship between the týNo 
sectors, the public sector always wants to control the private sector (#11). 
Origins of tension 
Why are those tensions produced? 
Respondents in both sectors in this study reported that the self-interest of 
each sector has created those tensions in order to take an initiative of 
policing internet fraud. The private and public sectors separately 'seek to 
establish monopoly control over areas which are CUrrently in the public 
domain of cyberspace' (Wall 2001: 169). Policing internet fraud is not done 
solely by the public sector. Most Internet fraud occurs in the private domain 
so the private sector naturally has a better know-how to respond to the fraud 
incident. In particular, financial fraud requires great professional expertise 
for the investigation. There has to be someone who knows the banking 
system well enough to track down the criminal. However, the private sector 
does not have any legal authority to investigate that type of criminal activity. 
Thus, fraud incidents should be reported to the police for formal 
investigation. Because of this complicated nature of internet fraud 
investigation, the two sectors have to assist each other to perform to their 
full capacity of investigation with the expertise they can both contribute. 
Therefore, policing internet fraud cannot be owned bý aný one sector. 
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Monopoly of ownership of policing internet fraud or cý bercrime is 
impossible because cyberspace cannot be owned by aný one sector. 
Cyberspace is a new arena for all sectors so it does not allo%k- any 
exclusive ownership of its territory. It is a land of freedom (, 49). 
The private sector respondent argued that the public sector investigators 
tend not to share the merits of successful investigation N\ith the private 
sector. However, the respondent said that they would like to share the 
liability of any malfunction of policing or investigation \\ ith the other sector. 
This contradiction has exacerbated the public sector's view of its 
relationship with the private sector. It has been claimed that there will be no 
true partnership policing until the public sector truly realizes the importance 
of the private sector. 
The public sector does not know our capability and potential power. 
They just think us as an 'extra side dish' of policing. Without our 
assistance, they cannot respond to internet fraud. Internet fraud requires a 
more advanced level of investigation, which is obtained from the private 
sector's support (#12). 
The third party experts reported that tensions were created due to po\\ er 
struggles between sectors. Each sector has attempted to obtain the 
hegemony of cyberspace and to draw a line around their jurisdiction in 
cyberspace. There is no mechanism to manage this situation and there is a 
need for more appropriate laws to define what kind of act can be done by 
each sector. Clear responsibility of each sector would remove tensions (#], 
#29 #9, #10): 
Simply, cyberspace is a ground where the competition has not been 
finished. No one knows who is going to win. It appears that one sector 
cannot compete alone. Anyway, competition surrounding the ownership 
of policing internet fraud by two sectors will contribute to crime 
prevention in cyberspace if they have good intensions for it (# 13). 
Influence of tension 
How have those tensions in uencedyo ur working practices for response" Ifl 
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The respondents in the public sector reported that those tensions haNe 
significantly influenced working practices in two výays: deception of' 
evidence from the private sector and failure of prosecution. The deception 
of evidence from the private sector has often occurred due to the understood 
tensions: lack of trust, lack of legal perception and different philosophy of 
investigation. Because of those tensions, the police and Prosecutors' Office 
tend not to trust evidence from the private sector and they confirm many 
facts before commencing the formal investigation. They list what theý 
receive from the private sector. The private sector has often been confused 
whether an incident is civil or criminal, due to lack of legal perception. 
Sometimes, fraud incidents have been reported and in the end are found as 
minor civil cases which exhaust police and further stiffen tensions. 
Fraud incidents must be passed to the police quickly without aný 
contamination of evidence. However, the private sector tests so many 
things until they find that they cannot properly handle these cases. 
Because of tainted evidence, we have lost many of these cases (#I). 
In order to accomplish a successful prosecution, there must be good 
collaboration between sectors for the investigation, thoughtful preparedness 
of legal procedure and purpose of justice attainment. Without support of 
these conditions, successful prosecution cannot be achieved. From the initial 
stage of investigation to the litigation, the private and public sectors should 
perform good cooperation in order to beat criminals (#I). 
Perfect condition of criminal investigation would bring out successful 
prosecution. If any insufficient conditions exist, failure of prosecution 
may result and criminals will be released without any legal action (#2). 
The respondents in the private sector of this study reported that those 
tensions have been significantly influenced by working practices in two 
ways: private sector use of private connections for police investigations and 
by reporting only serious incidents to the police. 
In cases of internet fraud, private sector investigators contact an 
acquaintance in the police to solve the problem. They do not want to report 
to unknown people in the police force Nvho may not help them NNith the 
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result of the investigation. If the investigation result goes to the public. 
negative publicity of their company's network system may result and have 
an adverse impact on stock value and decrease in sales. For this reason. 
private companies hire former high-ranking police officers as securit) 
managers who could influence the direction of police investigation. 
Private companies prefer to handle incidents internally as long as they do 
not find any significant difficulties in their investigation. If they do find 
difficulties they find serious legal breaches. Confidentiality of investigation 
and non-legal solutions have been preferred by senior staff of companies 
and so, private sector investigators reluctantly report only serious incidents 
to the police. The selection of serious incidents that require reporting to the 
police depends on the volume of victimization. If many victims are 
involved, confidentiality of the internal investigation with the private sector 
is impossible. 
We would like to handle the incident internally if there are only a small 
number of victims involved. However, phishing and pharming involve 
too many victims so that it is better to report those cases to the police. 
Redemption of loss from those incidents is almost impossible. Since 
offender, server and wired money are all physically located in different 
places it takes a long time to investigate those incidents (# 13). 
Most serious tensions within the public sector 
Interviewees were asked to explain the three most serious tensions within 
the public sector that they percei . ved to have the most effect on policing 
internet fraud in Korea. Based on respondents' answers those that 
responded negatively to influences on policing internet fraud were used to 
structure the following part of this chapter. 
Tensions within the public sector (CTRC, NCSC, ICIC, FSA, KISA. KTFE, 
KrCERT, KSRC): 
Lack of trust 
Control of investigation results 
Lack of appropriate laws 
Accountability 
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9 Different aims 
" Role play 
" Different levels of power 
" Special law enforcement powers 
Table 6-2: Tensions within the public sector 
Public What are the three Why those tensions How do those 
agency most serious are produced? tensions influence 
tensions? your work in 
terms of your 
working practices 
for response? 
CTRC/NPA Lack of trust, Monopolization of Depression of 
control of investigations occupation 
investigation 
results, and lack of 
appropriate laws 
ICIC/SPO Lack of trust, Challenge to the Repetitive 
control of criminal procedural investigation 
investigation law 
results, and lack of 
appropriate laws 
NCSC/NIS Different aim, role Lack of More efforts to 
play, lack of understanding of our convince others 
appropriate laws mission 
FSA/FSS Lack of Special knowledge Heavy work load 
accountability, 
appropriate laws, 
special law 
enforcement powers 
KFTC/MFE Lack of Organizational Heavy work load 
accountability, role power game 
play and 
appropriate laws 
KISA Role play, different Ambiguous status Limited power 
KrCERT level ofpower, lack between the public without law 
KSRC of appropriate laws and private sectors enforcement 
6.1.1.11 Lack of trust within the public sector 
The three serious tensions within the public sector varý across different 
agencies. The respondents in the National Police Agency (NPA) and the 
Supreme Prosecutors' Office (SPO) reported lack of trust, control of 
investigation result and absence of appropriate laws to be the three most 
serious tensions. These tensions overlap between the two agencies. Lack of 
trust was also found between the private and public sectors. Simply put, 
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policing bodies do not trust each other in terms of cN, ber-hegemony. There 
is currently a war *without sounds of shooting within the public sector' (# 1, 
#2, #3). 
The respondents interviewed in this study reported that the characteristic of 
'lack of trust' within the public sector is different from the characteristics of 
lack of trust between the private and public sectors. While the lack of trust 
between private and public sectors have been found due to a hostile 
relationship between sectors, the lack of trust within the public sector has 
been found due to a competitive relationship within the sector. 
Policing internet fraud as a part of the governance of cyberspace is 
considered a most important activity by many public agencies in the 
information age. The internet has been used as a great force to craft man', 
things although it can also be misused as a criminal tool. The control of the 
use of the internet is a key factor to obtain the political power that involves 
policing activity (#2). 
Now, policing cyberspace has become a major issue among all law 
enforcement agencies. Every agency wants exclusively to obtain the 
power to control the internet and its users. Internet will continuously be 
used as a great force for human society although it will also be used as a 
criminal tool. Internet will ceaselessly shape our society (#2). 
Digital government is a popular term used by the government in Korea. 
This implies that public organizations transform through digital 
technologies. From local governments to the central government, digital 
technologies have connected all agencies within the public sector. For 
example, the police share useful criminal information with local police 
forces across the country. 'Most wanted' criminals are online and Interpol's 
'red notice' can be seen on the Interpol website to be publicized. Patrolling 
police officers can confirm anybody's identification through hand-held 
mobile equipment. The Prosecutors' Office can see the progress of the 
police investigation through the internet. The Court receives important legal 
files from the Prosecutors' Office through the internet. Thus, all important 
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criminal justice information is being processed through the internet todaN 
(# 1, #2, #3). 
The concept of e-government, digital government and c,. ber government 
has been used by many nations. Without talking about information 
technology, public administration seems outdated and inefficient. We 
have invested huge amounts of money to transform our system to a 
digitalized one because it will build a true competitive power for the 
nation (#3). 
However, some criminal information is not shared among agencies due to 
its high value for the particular agency. This self-interest of organization 
further generates the lack of trust within the public sector. Nlaný 
respondents in the public sector reported that important information is not 
shared by other agencies although some cases require strong cooperation 
with other agencies. Nevertheless, each agency wants to achieve the merit of 
performing successful investigations. Ownership of policing cyberspace is 
another factor that promotes a more competitive working environment 
among public agencies. Policing internet fraud has attracted many public 
agencies to take part since police or non-police agencies can respond to 
internet fraud. Every agency wants to become a major actor of policing 
cyberspace since there are no qualifications yet defined (41,42,43. #4, #5, 
#6, #7). 
it is impossible to give up our policing activity in cyberspace since it is a 
new opportunity for developing our agency to govern the new territory 
of the future. Competition for the ownership of policing is a very natural 
phenomenon (#2). 
The respondents interviewed in this study uniformly reported that lack of 
trust can be removed within the public sector if there is no competition 
among the public agencies. However, it is practically impossible as 
long as 
multiple policing bodies exist. The majority of respondents 
believed that the 
establishment of clear jurisdictions and duties for each agency would relieve 
the competitive environment. Without establishing strict regulations or 
laws. 
each agency will continuously compete for the ownership of policing 
internet fraud (#2, # 12): 
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This boiling competitive environment produces a lack of trust among 
agencies to compete for the ownership of policing internet fraud. Until 
we find out who is the winner of the game, competition and lack of trust 
will not disappear (#I). 
6.1.1.12 Control of investigation results 
The control of investigation result is one of the most serious tensions within 
the public sector. Particularly, this tension between the prosecutor and the 
police has been known as' the most serious one. The results of an 
investigation can be different depending upon the main agent of 
investigation. The current Korean criminal justice system has tNNo main 
investigation bodies, the prosecutor and the police. In general, the police 
conduct most criminal cases. According to the criminal procedure laN\. the 
police begin and end an investigation under the supervision of the 
Prosecutors' Office. Generally, 90% of cases investigated by the police have 
been accepted by the Prosecutors' Office without any significant changes. 
The prosecutor only conducts the investigation when the internet fraud case 
has been directly reported to them or when some serious case was detected 
by the Prosecutor's intelligence. If a directly reported case is not serious 
enough, the case will be sent to the police for them to conduct the 
investigation. As a subordinated agency, the police have often found that 
their investigation results change at the Prosecutor's Office. 
The police often feel enervated when prosecutors change investigation 
results without reasonable explanation. Because of the right of arraignment 
from the prosecutor, offenders tend to confess more crime facts to the 
prosecutor. Although Korean criminal justice procedures do not allow a 
plea bargain, offenders believe that their punishment can be reduced at the 
Prosecutor's Office if they confess or provide more important crime 
information (#1): 
Career criminals know that their punishment will be reduced if they 
provide more criminal information before the prosecutor so that they 
tend not to disclose all information at the police department (#I). 
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From the prosecutor's perspective, the police are the gatekeepers of the 
criminal ustice system because offenders are arrested and booked by the 
police. Some prosecutors believe that the police sometimes do not pass what 
they find from their investigation to the prosecutor for many reasons 
We had to investigate many cases that were not completelý investigated 
by the police due to complaints from victims. It is a waste of time and 
money for taxpayers. Because of this reason, we are stronglý opposed to 
the independent investigation of the police (#2). 
Similar tension has also been found between the police and non-police 
public agencies. Non-police public agencies have an authority over private 
companies through administrative sanctions to restrict their business 
activities. The non-police agencies concern is the police or prosecutors who 
have too much power whereby they are not able to have control over the 
results of investigations. Sometimes, similar offences result in totally 
different outcomes. Law enforcement agencies, for example, have a greater 
understanding of public interest and criminal justice, whilst non-la\\ 
enforcement agencies have more socio-economic or political considerations 
for Chaebol (business conglomerate): 
Law enforcement agencies always solve their problems as criminal 
matter so private companies have maintained some distance with the 
police and the prosecutor. They do not know the soft way to handle their 
cases. According to our experience, many cases can be solved by non- 
criminal justice procedures (0). 
The respondents in the non-police agencies reported that inconsistency of 
investigation results diminish the reputation of the law enforcement 
agencies whereas consistent investigation results NNould help to build the 
accountability of the related law enforcement agencies. It would also 
remove tension within the public sector. 
For the same case, investigations completed by police and prosecutors 
are sometimes too different. How we can understand this happening? 
More harmonization is needed between the police and the prosecutor's 
investigations (#6, #7). 
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6.1.1.13 Lack of appropriate law 
An absence of appropriate law is selected as another serious tension ýNithin 
the public sector. This lack of legal foundation has caused a chaotic 
environment of policing internet fraud, as each agencý does not know Ný hen 
they have to be involved in their investigations. This confusion has also 
negatively affected the private sector in that they do not know NN'hich agency 
is to be the main investigator of the incident: 
Too many agencies put their spoons on the same table! It is ridiculous 
that no one knows how much food each can eat (#2). 
The public sector is concerned that the current law does not preciselý 
describe their activities and does not clearly define each agency's role and 
responsibilities. For this reason, potential conflicts exist Nýithin the public 
sector in terms of competition for jurisdiction (# 1, #2, #3): 
I believe that the current Internet related laws are like stopgaps that 
contain many blind spots. They do not fully cover what they are 
supposed to do. We did not have the sufficient knowledge and vision to 
see into the future when we made the laws. Law professors, a computer 
science professor and telecommunications experts made them; however, 
no single person understood everything as a whole. Laws were made to 
include various concerns but they are not consistently linked each other 
so we have gradually revised them and now many problems have 
become evident to us (#10). 
Like other public sector respondents, the respondent from NCSC/NIS 
criticized that there is no appropriate law to define which public agency has 
to deal with internet fraud as the main actor of investigation. The current 
Criminal Law and The Acts on Promotion of Telecommunications Network 
Utilization do not precisely describe what constitutes Internet fraud and 
where incidents should be reported. Many' respondents of this study reported 
that internet fraud should be policed by both sectors and the laýý must 
preserve the investigation authority for the private sector. 
The respondent from the FSA in this stud), had also seen it as a serious 
tension because this anarchic situation forces public agencies into confusion. 
There are many questions raised about who is the main actor of 
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investigation of internet fraud. The existing law does not prescribe internet 
fraud as a single category of crime. It can be punished by the current 
Criminal law (Article 347-1,347-2) and The Acts on Promotion of 
Telecommunications Network Utilization (Article 48-3. Article 62-5). The 
making of internet fraud law has been debated by man), scholars. 
KISA and its subsidiary agencies: KrCERT and KSRC found that existing 
laws cannot appropriately control the use of the internet. Criminal law 
(Article 347-1,347-2) and The Acts on Promotion of Teleco mm un ical ions 
Network Utilization (Article 48-3, Article 62-5) have been used to deal with 
internet fraud and other internet crimes. However, this law and acts cannot 
completely cover all internet fraud. Internet fraud is distinct from 
conventional fraud in that it occurs in cyberspace. A different model of 
policing and law should respond to it. However, there has been a lack of 
study with regard to this subject, and so making appropriate laws is not an 
easy task. More efforts to make laws from both sectors ýý111 solve this 
problem. 
6.1.1.14 Different aim 
The respondent of the NCSC argued that other public agencies do not need 
to compete for the ownership of policing internet fraud with the NCSC. 
Since the NCSC has a different aim of policing cyberspace, its activity 
cannot be compared with other public agencies. As an intelligence agency, 
there are many clandestine operations for national security, and no matter 
what they cannot disclose their original intentions. Secrecy of the agency 
has always amplified their surreptitious power and has kept away other 
agencies and organizations. However, the NCSC has strongly persuaded 
other groups that policing cyberspace or internet fraud is not a major 
activity of the NCSC- What the NCSC has focused on in the matter of 
policing cyberspace is the control and coordination of the security network 
among government agencies. 
As you know, we are not on the same ground that other public agencies 
compete for. According to the National Cyber Secunty Regulation, 
Presidential Direction No. 141, we protect the national infrastructure 
system of telecommunications and networks. As you knoýý, we do not 
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have any law enforcement power except for espionage. If ýýe find any 
criminal information, we pass it to the police or the prosecutor to handle 
it (#3). 
Other public agencies have been blamed for participating with the 
NCSC/NIS in policing cyberspace. The NIS participation in policing 
cyberspace has shrunk the power of other policing agencies. The NCSC has 
stepped into policing cyberspace after other public agencies spent more than 
10 years in the field. The NCSC revealed their superior budget and power 
of agency and have taken over the first place in policing cý berspace 
although they have a different aim for policing cyberspace. Their 
allegations still have not convinced other public agencies in terms of 
participation of policing cyberspace. 
However, third party experts argued that the establishment of the 
NCSC/NIS has contributed to the protection of the national information 
infrastructure and network system. The respondents also argued that their 
security activities are not the same as the police provide in terms of policing 
cyberspace. Therefore, other agencies do not need to compete for the 
ownership of policing cyberspace with the NCSC/NIS. 
I know that other agencies have concerns about the NIS cybersecuritN 
activities in relation with the establishment of a special terrorism act. 
Some people also argue that the NIS will eventually take over the 
ownership of policing cyberspace. There had been exaggerated anxieties 
about this since the NIS had a notorious image of using their resources 
for illegal eavesdropping. I can say that NIS cybersecurity activities do 
not focus on policing activity but that it does focus on the protection of 
the national information infrastructure and network system (#11). 
6.1.1.15 Role-play 
The respondent of the NCSC/NIS criticized the fact that there is no clear 
role play defined for each agency within the public sector. Each agencý' 
should concentrate on its original role in policing cyberspace. For example, 
the NPA focuses on the prevention of crime, the FSA focuses on financial 
security and KISA focuses on the response of internet incidents. Ho%Noer, 
these agencies have acted outside of their original role and have 
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transgressed others' jurisdictions. It suggests that the policing of cyberspace 
is very attractive to all public agencies. 
Among the public agencies, KISA has a dual role to play in terms of official 
standing. KISA was established to support private sector companies. 
However, private companies consider KISA to be a part of a government 
agency so they do not fully trust KISA as an ally. The respondents from 
KISA blame the public sector for their ambiguous role w, ithin the public 
since it confuses others of KISA's characteristics. KISA's central position 
between the public and private sectors prevent it from carrying out more 
effective policing activity. 
We work for the private sector but private companies do not trust us 
because we are under the supervision of the Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MIC). Although KISA is a subordinate agency of, %IIC, 
we were established to support the network security of the private sector. 
However, many private companies misunderstand why we exist and 
what we do (0). 
Despite KISA's claims that they have supported the private sector for a long 
time, there are still rumours going around about the composition of 
executive members of KISA. Because there are few former NIS agents 
appointed as executive members, it has been continuously questioned 
whether KISA has provided to legally protect information from the 
NCSC/NIS or not. The respondent of KISA answered that they only 
provided the volume of internet incident data to the NCSC/NIS and it did 
not include detailed information. Since KISA has worked for the internet 
security of private companies, government agencies and other research 
institutes have often contacted KISA in order to obtain private companiesý 
related information. 
The respondent from the NCSC/NIS argued that other public agencies have 
to understand the difference between 'national security' and *crime 
prevention'. Policing cyberspace through the NCSC/NIS is not for crime 
prevention but is more focused on information security. The NIS does not 
have an investigation authority over cybercrime N\hile the police officiallý 
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has. Although the NIS does not have investigation authorit-N over 
cybercrime, they can directly report to the Prosecutors' Office NNithout 
passing by the police. Because of this reason, police agencies have felt that 
their policing authority has been challenged by the NCSC/-NIS. Actually. 
many high tech crime and industrial espionage cases have been informally 
investigated by the NCSC/NIS and passed to the Prosecutors' Office for 
further investigation and prosecution. 
We have passed many industrial espionage cases to the Prosecutor's 
Office with concrete evidence for the perfect prosecution. Compared to 
the police, we have more intelligence networks to collect criminal 
intelligence worldwide and more advanced technolo-, to pursue 
criminals. Our know-how and resources have been built up for the 
counter- i ntel I igence purpose so that it is much more sophisticated than 
you think (#3). 
6.1.1.16 Lack of accountabilily 
The respondent of the FSA believes that other agencies cannot fully conduct 
an independent investigation due to lack of expertise in a financial 
background. Therefore, they have often been called by the Prosecutors' 
Office for their assistance regarding financial investigation Ný hen cases of a 
serious calibre occur. Whether they would like to do so or not, the FSA has 
to cooperate with the Prosecutor's investigation. The FSA does not like to 
work as a secondary investigation agency as they have special knowledge to 
uncover financial fraud. For that reason, the FSA ý\ould like to have its own 
independent investigation power, but there was strong opposition by other 
law enforcement agencies. An SPO respondent argued that financial fraud is 
a criminal justice matter, not a subject of financial matter. The SPO 
respondent said that financial knowledge is an important part for the 
investigation, but it is not the only factor needed for the whole investigation. 
The SPO respondent believed that financial investigation must be done bý 
the law enforcement agency. However, the respondent from the FSA in this 
study believed that delegation of policing power based on professional 
expertise of each agency would improve the prevention of financial fraud in 
cyberspace: 
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Let's see ... Financial fraud in cyberspace should be policed by the FSA. 
Since we protect internet banking transactions, it is a more effective %Naý 
to prevent and investigate financial fraud compared to other law 
enforcement agencies. The FSA would be able to save time and cost 
when getting a response to a financial related crime (=4). 
Lack of accountability of the police was also mentioned bý the Prosecutors, 
Office since there have been some mistakes made bý the police. Prosecutors 
believe that insufficient legal training of police officers has often ruined 
criminal cases. Consequently, those mistakes made by the police have often 
resulted in the failure of prosecution: 
Well.... they did not follow the appropriate legal procedure so we lost 
the case in court. As you know the Court does not admit an), illegal 
interrogation occurred by the police or prosecutor so it is important to 
follow the appropriate procedures. Reforms to the criminal justice 
system should mainly concern the human rights issue in the investigation 
process 
6.1.1.17 Different level of power 
Different level of power was reported by the respondents of KISA and its 
subsidiary agencies (KrCERT and KSRC) as one of most serious tensions 
within the public sector. There is practically no chain of command among 
public agencies unless an office is a subsidiary agency or office. However, 
non-police agencies and the general public have perceived that the NPA, the 
SPO and the NIS to be powerful authorities within the public sector. For the 
same case, the outcome can be different depending on ýý, hether the police or 
the prosecutor investigates it. It seems that the level of power is decided by 
whether the involved agency has law enforcement authoritý, ' or not. 
As a regulatory agency, KISA has not received the same support that other 
law enforcement agencies have received from other agencies or private 
companies. Therefore, KISA has often felt that they need a more powerful 
position in the government for the effective response of Internet crime 
incidents: 
People know that we are not a law enforcement agency so they are not 
afraid of KISA's actions. Administration restraint is not enough to scare 
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them to follow our regulation. Many people break the la%k and simplý 
pay the fine. They do not think of it as a big deal. it is like a For them, 
parking ticket (#7). 
Some respondents in the non-police agencies have also argued that their 
agencies do not have the same power as the prosecutor and police do in 
terms of control of internet fraud. They are not afraid of a regulator,, 
agency since it does not have any law enforcement authorit)'. As a result. 
firaudsters have often not corresponded to their regulatory requirements. If a 
violation is serious, a regulatory agency has to accompany the la%v 
enforcement officer in order to carry out the Court order. 
The respondent from KISA reported that the cooperation of private 
companies is essential in order to respond to an Internet-related incident. 
However, some companies do not comply with the regulation: 
Private companies and ISPs have to report to us when an incident occurs. 
However, 80-90% of companies have shown a negative attitude toward 
incident reporting although we mutually signed for the protection of 
information. They continue to think that KISA is not able to provide 
necessary action against internet incidents. For this reason, they prefer 
to report to the police or the prosecutor who has law enforcement power. 
Without law enforcement authority, KISA's status is like a 'soldier 
without a sword'. Use of administration order and freezing licenses does 
not effectively control private companies and organizations because 
there are many ways to continue their businesses such as new licensing 
with other names or appealing to the court for taking more time (#7). 
6.1.1.18 Special law enforcement power 
The respondent from the FSA reported that they wanted to have special law 
enforcement power for financial crime investigations. They wanted to 
become an agency like a Secret Service or ATF under the Department of 
Treasury in the United States. In order to obtain this special law 
enforcement authority, it would be necessary to make a special law to 
approve their law enforcement authority. However, the process of la\ý 
making and the implementation of new policy are not simple tasks. 
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According to the respondent, it is not desirable to have to call the Prosecutor 
for assistance with their investigations. It makes the FSA feel as though they 
are a subordinate agency of the Prosecutors' Office while the FSA has many 
elite staff members within the government organization. It has been argued 
that the policing of internet fraud seems to be more appropriatelý 
investigated by the FSA than by other agencies since it causes a lot of 
monetary loss for financial institutions or their members. 
Given the special law enforcement power, the FSA would be a more 
effective help regarding the policing of Internet fraud. We can see many 
Western countries' financial agencies have special laA, enforcement 
power. We have heard that the police and prosecutors strongly oppose 
the implementation of special law enforcement powers for other agencies 
(#4). 
The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) also demanded 
special law enforcement power. The MIC is a main government body, 
which governs the national infrastructure system of information and 
communication. However, prosecutors and the police have not been allied 
with the body due to strong opposition. They do not allow in any other 
agencies that are capable of law enforcement authority. The failure of 
special law enforcement authority by the MIC shows why other agencies 
have not attempted to apply for special law enforcement power. 
As described earlier,, the Congressional legal committee members consist of 
former prosecutors and judges. It seems that they will not allow law that 
permits special law enforcement by other public agencies. It is practically 
impossible to obtain special law enforcement power unless the structure of 
the committee membership changes: 
I think that the appointment of the Congressional legal committee 
member should be changed and its candidate should be tested if they 
have any predisposition about the legislation. For a long time, legal 
committees have supported the interests of the Court and the Prosecutors' 
Office. No agency can challenge their privilege in Korea. Too much 
power is given to them and there is no mechanism to control them (#I, 
#4). 
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However, the recent discussion of the reform of the Korean criminal justice 
system implies the possibility of expansion of special law enforcement 
power since this reform of the criminal justice system imitates the American 
criminal justice system where policing is fragmented and decentralized. 
Despite strong opposition by the Prosecutors' Office and the police to giNe 
special law enforcement power to other non-police agencies nothing has 
deterred this provision of reform. Overall changes in the criminal justice 
system will make it possible for this provision to be implemented in order to 
maintain harmony with other non-law enforcement agencies. 
6.2 Part 11: Resolution of tensions 
Interviewees were asked to consider the possibilities for resolution of 
tensions in the policing of internet fraud. Three main questions were asked: 
Can government do anything to reduce these tensions? Can any other 
organizations get involved? and What is the best solution') Based on the 
interviewees' answers those which were relevant to the possibilities of 
resolution between tensions in policing internet fraud were used to structure 
this part of this paper. The responses to the three questions are listed as 
follows: 
Easy access to public information 
Confidentiality of investigation 
Sharing technological knowledge 
Cross-sector meeting at the low-levels of staff 
Establishment of appropriate laws. 
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Table 6-3: Resolution of tension (tensions between the private and public sectors) 
Can Can your Can any other What is 
government organization organizations the best 
do anything do anything get involved? solution? 
to reduce to reduce 
these these 
tensions? tensions? 
Public Allow easy Share NA Establishm 
Sector access to the technological ent of 
public knowledge appropriat 
information e la\\ s 
Private Confidentiali Hold cross- NA Establishm 
Sector ty of sector cnt of 
investigation meetings at appropriat 
low-levels of e laws 
staff 
Can government do anything to reduce these tensions? 
6.2.1.1 Easy access to public information 
Easy access to public information could reduce tensions between private 
and public sectors as reported by the majority of interviewees in the public 
sector. They believe that the security threshold of public information is still 
too high to be accessed by the private sector. Although there are many 
formal channels to access public information, procedures to obtain the 
permission to do so from the government is still seen as 'a very complicated 
process'. Since the emergence of the internet, the confidential lifespan of 
new information has become shorter than before. Today's important 
information could become unworthy public news tomorrow. The 
respondents admitted that the monopoly over information that the public 
sector has appears to be a very old-fashioned style of administration. 
Although there is a growing concern about the disclosure of sensitive public 
information, it is imperative for the public sector to provide easy access to 
public information in order to remove tensions. 
Due to the difficult access to public information, tensions between the 
private and public sectors are not disappearing. I think that the much- 
complicated process to access public information discourages the use of 
public information by the private sector. Therefore, people in the pri\ ate 
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sector tend to use unofficial communication channels or personal 
relationships to obtain the necessary public information (:: 9). 
Easy access to public information appears to be related to the lack of sharing 
information in terms of the use of information. Both sectors reported that 
sharing information is the most important factor for building, an effective 
partnership in policing. And easy access to public information could be the 
first step to developing the mutual trust needed for sharing information. 
How can we share information? It is not just 'sharing' tangible goods! 
We need some methods to do it. Easy accessibility is a keý factor to 
sharing information. Then there will be more steps to get closer to the 
sensitive information (#11). 
6.2.1.2 Confidentialily of investigation 
Private companies tend not to report cybercrime incidents since they have to 
consider the side effects of negative publicity and the subsequent adverse 
impacts. When the police release information from an incident, it could 
negatively affect their reputation, brand image and stock value. Therefore, 
many private companies tend to make deals regarding the confidentiality of 
investigation before they report to the police. Without promising 
confidentiality of investigation, private companies never report their 
incidents. Although the police recognize their incidents, private companies 
often do not cooperate with the police. It is important for the police to keep 
the confidentiality of investigation in order to save their relationships with 
private companies. 
As long as we can promise to keep the confidentiality of investigation, 
many private companies will report their incidents without hesitation. 
However, it is very difficult to keep this promise. As you know, reporters 
come to the police department everyday to collect information on various 
investigations. It is almost impossible to guarantee the confidentiality of 
investigation. To do that, we need to get cooperation from the media; 
however, investigation information sometimes still goes out to the public 
despite having any agreements with the media. With the competition 
among newspaper companies and TV companies, reporters often break 
their promises for the embargo. Regardless of this type of situation, 
tensions would be reduced if we could promise the confidentiality of 
investigations (#9). 
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Can your organization do anything to reduce these tensions? 
6.2.1.3 Sharing technological knowlgdge 
The public sector interviewees reported that sharing technological 
knowledge with the public sector would reduce tensions betxýeen the t-%N, o 
sectors. Generally, the private sector has a better capability to update its 
level of technology and knowledge. Public sector activities are restrained 
by definite budgets and strict regulations while the private sector has more 
financial resources and flexible rules. Today's hackers are well equipped 
with high technology and advanced knowledge. In order to respond to fast- 
developing cybercrimes, the public sector has to keep updating 
technological knowledge. Sharing of technological knowledge is not only 
for the benefit of the public sector but also for the benefit of the private 
sector. Although private entities do not have any law enforcement authority. 
the police could use the updated technology learned from the private sector 
to respond to cybercrimes. 
Too many Internet security-related companies are inventing new 
technologies everyday. Although we have developed our own 
technology for internet security, it is far beyond the private sector's 
technology due to a limited budget and limited resources. Sharing 
technological knowledge is very beneficial for us. Ultimately, sharing 
technological information is good for the private sector as well. Private 
companies could test their knowledge with the help of the police (#I). 
However, some interviewees in the private sector argued that original 
research intentions could become dull due to sharing technological 
knowledge between private and public sectors. The interview, ees said that 
some know-how should be kept and used for their business purposes only. 
If we provide everything to the public sector, the public sector would 
depend on us continuously. There are also some blurred distinctions 
between what we can share and what we cannot share with the public 
sector. Sometimes, our technological knowledge could be used for 
attacking another private company's tools (#9). 
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6.2.1.4 Cross-sector meeting at low-levels of staff 
The private sector interviewees reported that the establishment of regular 
meeting sessions would help to reduce tensions bemeen the t,, No sectors. 
Although there are already some regular meetings established within the 
sectors where other sector staff members are invited as guests, active cross- 
sector meetings are not available. It has been criticized that the participants 
of these meetings are high-ranking officers, agents and executives, while 
low-level staff members are actually the people working at the front line of 
Interriet security and crime prevention. Fortunately, there have been some 
efforts to develop the partnership between the two sectors through 
CONCERT (the consortium of CERT) but this partnership is still dominated 
by private entities. Recently, the NCSC/NIS (National Cyber Security 
Center/ National Intelligence Service) has organized regular cross-sector 
meetings and conferences to help build a stronger partnership NNith the 
private sector. However, these meetings are not private-driven and so 
participants cannot always fully address their concerns. Therefore, 
organizing cross-sector meetings is mandated by the private sector to 
address their concerns. 
Well, CONCERT is a good organization used to meet and share 
information between the two sectors. However, we always see the same 
people from both sectors. In particular, government officials are rarely 
changed. It could be attributed to the nature of their work or their 
position in the agency as they are usually high ranking government 
officials. Maybe this shows that they can best readdress the suggestions 
gathered from their sector meetings to the policy making? However, at 
the operational level, we do not know who actually responds to incidents 
or to investigations in the law enforcement agencies. For an effective 
partnership, we have to see people at the same level as us who are 
responsible for crime prevention (# 11). 
What is the best solution? 
6.2.1.5 Establishment of appropriate laws 
Interviewees in both sectors reported a lack of appropriate law to be used as 
a mechanism for removing tensions. From the private sector's perspecti\ e, 
current law does not protect private companies from negative publicit% and 
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adverse impacts on stock values when they report incidents to the police. 
From the public sector's perspective, current law does not provide them 
with sufficient law enforcement power to police cyberspace. IntervieNNees 
provided the same answer to the research question: What i's the best solutioi71 
although they gave different reasons for their answers. Both sectors' 
interviewees believed that tensions would be reduced if there Nvere 
appropriate laws established to protect their interests and to encourage their 
cooperative efforts. 
The public sector interviewees reported that the law restrains their actk ities. 
They rarely excise police discretion while they investigate cybercrime. 
They admitted that current laws do not have any special consideration for 
the protection of private interest while they investigate the private sector's 
incidents. In order to promote a partnership in the policing of cybercrime or 
internet fraud, it is imperative to establish clear laws to describe each 
sector's role, legal power and scope of operation. Current laýNs are mainlý 
concerned with public interest although the private sector's role in policing 
internet fraud has become more important. As a result of inadequate legal 
bases, tensions have not been reducing between the t\\ o sectors. 
Establishing more 'cyberpolicing-oriented' laws would reduce tensions 
between the two sectors and maintain a good balance between the two 
policing models. 
We can only work within the law that specifies our activity. Personally, 
I understand all of the issues surrounding policing cybercrime but I 
cannot do anything beyond the law. As you know, the law and other 
regulations restrain our activities. Not much flexibility is available for 
the field officer to excise police discretion. Conducting an investigation 
is then followed by criminal procedure, which guides our professional 
conduct. Too many people from the private sector ask us to give favours. 
However, we do not have much capability to provide what they want to 
receive from us. Prosecutors may have more flexibility to give them 
favours for confidentiality and other secrecy. Unless the law clearly 
defines our additional power to protect the private interest, ýNe cannot 
arbitrarily do any favours for them (#]). 
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The private sector interviewees reported that the best solution to reduce 
tensions between two sectors is to make an appropriate laxN to promote 
partnership policing. They argued that current ]a-vN, s discourage the private 
sector from reporting their incidents to the police while internet fraud is 
increasing in their domain. As stated in Chapter 2, internet fraud has special 
characteristics and requires cooperative efforts to respond to it. Howeý-er. 
Korean law ignores the private sector in the investigation process eN en 
though private companies prefer to monitor all processes (because their 
incidents are directly related to any negative publicity and adverse impacts 
on stock values). The interviewees suggested that an updated-intemet fraud 
law should include the provision of the protection of private interest. 
We want to build a good relationship with the public sector. However, 
current laws appear to hinder rather than promote the cooperation 
between the two sectors. Police and law enforcement agencies ask us to 
provide substantial amounts of personal information without a court 
warrant. When we refuse to provide it without a warrant, they deem us 
uncooperative. In the past, we used to provide noticeable amounts of 
personal information to the police and other law enforcement agencies, 
for investigation purposes, through unofficial channels. These daý s. 
congressional auditing activities have been enhanced in order to protect 
human rights and privacy. Anyway, we did many things for the public 
sector although many acts were not legally protected. However, the 
public sector has not worked for our interest, They only take advantages 
for themselves. I think ... this kind of situation creates tension 
between 
two sectors. Establishment of appropriate laws and regulations for 
policing Internet fraud would define the clear role of each sector and 
scope of work and would eventually reduce some levels of tension (#14). 
Plural policing models? 
Interviewees were asked to answer questions concerning the concept of 
plural policing models in the way of policing internet fraud. 
217 
Table 6-4: Plural policing models 
When is it more When is it more How do Ho -*, v, 
appropriate to appropriate to you work often do I 
involve private involve public with the vou work 11 
rather than rather than other with the i 
public policing private policing sector? othei 
mechanisms? mechanisms? sector? 
Public Minor fraud Serious fraud that Formally Vm- often 
Sector within the threatens public and 
private domain security informally 
Private As long as Outside of private Formally Often but 
Sector private policing policing authority and 
handles properly informally 
6.2.1.6 When is it more appropriate to involve private rather than public 
policing mechanisms? 
The public sector interviewees reported that it is more appropriate to involve 
private models of policing when an offence is not serious and the process of 
the private justice system can compensate victimization. Since public 
policing is limited by definite resource and legal restraints, private police 
could more effectively treat minor offences. As explained earlier, the 
private sector has more profound resources to be able to police cý berspace 
than the public sector does. However, the range of minor offences is not 
clearly defined yet. Generally, they include auctions, internet shopping 
malls and game-money related frauds. Sometimes minor offences could 
become serious offences that result in significant impacts and large volumes 
of victimization. As mentioned in Chapter 22, fraudulent activity through 
phishing and pharming are good examples. However, some interviewees 
argued that private companies should keep incident records so that public 
police can review them whenever necessary. Sometimes, minor incident 
records can be used as very useful evidence for tracking fraudsters in future 
investigations. The interviewees in this study were united in expressing a 
general perception of plural policing that, to them, delegating the policing of 
cybercrime to the private sector is a big challenge. However, the 
interviewees recognized that policing cyberspace through the private sector 
would help to reduce overall cybercrime and would save the public the cost 
of the crime prevention. 
I think that minor offenses committed in the private domain and \\hich 
are related to the private interest should be responded to bý private 
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policing. it could be a more effective and efficient way of controlling 
minor offences. We do not have enough resources and time to respond 
to minor offences that are usually committed by non-career criminals. 
What we can do is maybe ... impose a small fine for the offender if ýýe 
pursue the case. It is futile to spend time and money for us. However, 
private companies have pursued different goals. They have to avoid net 
financial loss and they need to stop illegal activities so that theý can 
more actively respond to lesser serious and minor offences (#I). 
In later interviews, non-police government agencies expressed little concern 
about proactive policing by the private sector. Giving more police authorit-N 
to the private sector of security may take away the policing functions of 
non-police government agencies. Overlapping of cyber-jurisdiction WOUld 
occur between them. 
Although private policing would help overall cybersecurity issues, there 
is no clear distinction between non-police government agencies in terms 
of use of authority. Previously, we were in the middle of continuum but 
we will soon be the same with the private sector (M). 
In general, delegation of policing cyberspace authority to the private sector 
is an unavoidable step in plural policing which has now become \\ idely 
accepted on the terrestrial level of policing. 
Look at other countries - their policing is fragmented and decentralized. 
Korean policing is too centralized and monopolized by the government. 
For the prevention and response of internet fraud, a plural form of 
policing would be a more effective policing model, Policing internet 
fraud is not traditional police work (#9). 
The interviewees from the private sector agreed that minor offences should 
be responded to by the private security whenever they detect them. They 
also agreed that the concept of plural policing should be implemented in 
policing internet fraud. Moreover, they said they would like to have more 
independent police power to control minor fraudulent cases in their domain. 
They believe that the private model of policing more effectiNely control 
minor offences. Because these minor offences occur in the priN'ate domain, 
they are in direct relation to their business activities. PriNate companies 
have experienced many harmful activities against their companies and 
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customers through internet websites. They have argued that the public 
model of policing cannot cover minor offences. However, for private 
companies, these harmful activities are potential threats that may develop 
into serious cases in the future. Auction companies have been particularly 
concerned about minor fraudulent activities that have occurred on their 
websites. Too many complaints have been reported stating buý-ers do not 
receive their items although they paid for them. 
See what kind of results you can get from reporting minor fraud cases to 
the police. Actually, you will be asked to take legal action a-gaInst the 
offender however, its process can give you even more stress than what 
you had when initially victimized. Although the cases can be 
successfully resolved with legal procedure, you only receive a small 
amount of redemption (# 12). 
From the customer's perspective, recovery of loss is more important than 
any other solution. Private models of policing mainly focus on the 
reinstitution of loss so that their customers do not need to take legal action 
individually or collectively. Besides this, private models of policing are 
usually integrated with insurance companies for the recovery of costs from 
losses and other damages. It shows that a private model of policing 
provides more customer-oriented service to the customers in their domain. 
6.2.1.7 When is it more appropriate to involve public rather than private 
policing Mechanisms? 
The interviewees in the public sector reported that it is more appropriate to 
involve a public model of policing when an offence is serious and recovery 
of loss cannot be achieved without public intervention. Public intervention 
achieves a deterrent effect for future crime. Contrary to the private model of 
policing, public models of policing have pursued the goal of attaining public 
security so that it strictly applies the law to respond to internet fraud. 
Serious fraud cases usually involve multiple numbers of victims and huge 
amounts of monetary loss. Often, offences have to be dealt \\ ith by more 
than two jurisdictions. The location of the offender, server and victims are 
different in most cases. They are international ly dispersed so that 
international cooperation is essential to respond to serious fraud. Howe\ er, 
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international cooperation in the private sector has worked through each 
nation's CERT without law enforcement power. 
The interviewees in the private sector agreed that serious fraud has to be 
responded to by the public model of policing. Since prk'ate securitý does 
not have law enforcement authority, it cannot effectively respond to serious 
fraud. However, private security nevertheless wants to observe the process 
of investigation as a way to increase their ability to prevent future 
occurrences. 
As long as we can retrieve our losses from such incidents, it is much 
better to report to the police in order for them to commence a speedy 
investigation. However, it is very difficult to distinguish between minor 
and serious offences due to the nature of internet fraud. Unless 
fraudsters leave concrete evidence, it takes a lot of time to piece together 
the whole picture. Therefore, we'd like to participate in the fraud 
investigation from the beginning stages (#13). 
In spite of its effectiveness in the ability to respond to serious Internet fraud, 
the public model of policing has a disadvantage, which is that it does not 
have any flexibility in investigations. Private companies are not able to 
control the process and result of an investigation. Sometimes, negative 
publicity and adverse impacts on the stock values are unavoidable so private 
companies have to consider whether they report incidents to law 
enforcement agencies or not. 
6.2.1.8 How do you work with the other sector? 
The interviewees in the public sector reported that cooperation with the 
private sector has sometimes been made through an official letter of 
cooperation made by the head of each office or department. Most 
cooperation is made through law enforcement agencies that oversee 
personal information such as log-in data or e-mail accounts. However, the 
enactment of the Personal Information Protection Act prohibits any informal 
access to personal information. Unless there is an emergency situation, laN\ 
enforcement agencies have to obtain a court warrant to look up any personal 
information. 
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For a response to Internet fraud or cybercrime, the use of informal channels 
of cooperation is more prevalent between public and priNate securit\ 
personnel. The use of informal channels of cooperation is Nery effectiNe in 
terms of speedy responses therefore both sectors' experts use informal 
channels of cooperation as long as it does not negativelý affect their 
investigations. 
There is no time to follow formal procedures to get the necessary 
information. We have to respond to such incidents immediately. It's 
time fight! (#I). 
Some interviewees in both sectors were concerned that the use of informal 
channels of cooperation may in the end nullify a fraud incident. 
Because criminals become very smart they know how to escape from 
legal procedures. If they find out someone looked at their data or record 
without warrant, they would make a complaint about it (#9). 
It appears that law enforcement, government agencies and private 
companies' security experts routinely exchange information through 
messenger and e-mail. Recently, mobile communication makes it more 
convenient to exchange necessary information whenever they need useful 
information. 
6.2.1.9 How often do you work with the other sector? 
The majority of interviewees in the public sector reported that they 
frequently work with the other sector. Prior to making a formal legal action 
or commencing an investigation, public agency staff or police investigators 
collect primary information about an incident and the offender and they 
contact the IT security team or CSO (Chief Security Officer) in the ISP or 
private company. Depending on the seriousness of the offence, they have to 
decide whether to take formal action or not. 
As you know internet fraud and other cybercrimes are occurring 
continuously we have to work closely with the private sector. They are 
like our 2 nd division! Without cooperation from the private sector, it ý% III 
cost more money for the response to internet fraud (#1). 
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Like the public sector interviewees, the private sector intervieNN-ees reported 
that they have often worked with the public sector. They criticized that thev 
have to work for the public sector as an auxiliary unit. It appeared that more 
inquiries came from the public sector. 
Our position is very passive although we work together very often. It 
seems very unfair that inquiries that come from the public have to al Ný aN s 
be taken care of. Our requests have often been ignored (#14). 
Throughout the interviews, it was revealed that the frequency of cooperati-ve 
work does not give any credit for the real meaning of cooperation in 
policing internet fraud. More efforts to understand what the other sector 
would like to achieve have to be seriously considered by each sector. Thus, 
as yet, the concept of plural policing has not been fully implemented for an 
internet policing model for internet fraud in South Korea. 
6.3 Part III: Partnership policing for internet fraud 
Interviewees were asked to consider the meaning of partnership policing 
with regard to policing internet fraud. 
Table 6-5: Partnership policing 
Do you believe What would How would How would 
that a the ideal you promote ideal policing 
partnership partnership the look at local, 
created to help look like? partnership? national and 
police Internet international 
fraud is either levels? 
necessary or 
helpful? 
Public Yes Mutual Formalize a Protection of 
Sector respect contract or private and 
law public interest 
Private Yes The sharing Make Protection of 
Sector of liability appropriate individual and 
laws commercial 
victims 
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Do you believe that a partnership created to help police internet 
fraud is either necessary or helpful? 
The interviewees from both sectors were assured that partnership policing is 
imperative and inevitable for an effective response to internet fraud. 
However, the operative meaning of partnership is slightly different in each 
sector. What the public sector wants is to have a pro-government 
partnership while the private sector wants a pro-business partnership. 
We hope that private companies show more respect and trust in our 
investigations. Hostile relationships could contribute to the creation of a 
dark comer in policing internet fraud (#]). 
Not surprisingly, the interviewees in the private sector indicated a 
completely different point of view. 
As you know, authoritarian-conservatism has been rooted for a long time 
in the public sector. Public agencies have to change their thoughts and 
attitudes in order to develop our nation. However, we have not seen any 
significant change in them throughout our modem history. Despite 
private companies constantly changing their structure and policies for the 
their betterment, the public sector still wants to be on top of the private 
sector controlling it. Without a change in the make-up of the public 
sector, no true meaning of partnership will ever be implemented (r; 9). 
It is advised that both sectors have to re-consider what style of policing 
would be best for the most effective policing of internet fraud. If 
partnership is the answer, both sectors have to offer some capitulates to 
create the forthcoming environment. 
What would the ideal partnership look like? 
The interviewees in the public sector believed that the ideal partnership 
should be built on mutual respect. The majority of interviewees also said 
that negative sympathy is prevalent between the two sectors and unethical 
practice by both sectors has created more gaps between the prk, ate and 
public sectors of security. The interviewees in the public sector humbIN 
admitted that they have not fully attempted to develop an effective 
partnership. 
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The main point is we do not respect each other. Traditionally we look 
down on the private sector and treat them as our secondary division. 
Maybe that makes them annoyed. We feel it is kind of late to build a 
good relationship through spoken dialogue. There should be a special 
momentum to change both sectors. Mutual respect means having a 
horizontal relationship as opposed to the current vertical relationship Nýe 
have in terms of policing structure (#I). 
Contrary to the public sector, the majority of interviewees in the private 
sector reported that an ideal partnership meant sharing liability Nvhen an 
investigation goes bad. They said that the private sector couldn't solely be 
responsible for the failure of ajoint investigation. Partnership policing must 
be based on a mutual agreement and so blame has to be shared by both 
sectors. 
What we want to do is, 'live and die together with the public sector'. But, 
whenever joint-investigations go bad, we become a target for the blame. 
The public sector silently escapes from liability. How we can trust them 
if similar situations continuously occur? Merit and responsibility cannot 
be separated. The result of aj oint- investigation has to be shared by both 
sectors (#11). 
In spite of slightly different answers, both sectors mentioned organizational 
behaviour related issues. They both believed that mutual respect and sharing 
of liability are their priorities in order to contour an ideal policing 
partnership. This crucially implies that the respondents in both sectors 
perceived organizational behaviour to be the most influential factor for 
forming an ideal partnership; more than any other external factor, such as 
the criminal justice system or laws. 
How would you promote the partnership? 
The interviewees in the public sector believed that the promotion of a 
partnership would not be achieved through informal agreements or working 
practices between sectors. They believed that a partnership should be 
formalized through a contract or law. 
As you know, we have failed to establish a truthful partnership through 
informal efforts such as the sharing of information and holding 
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conferences and meetings. These are not secure methods to promote 
partnership. I believe that a formalized contract or law could promote a 
policing partnership (#2). 
Some of the interviewees disagreed with the idea that a formalized contract 
or law would promote partnership. They believed that a formalized contract 
or law may limit the full capacity of a partnership through prescribed 
contents. 
Once we make a contract or law, we have to work within the boundar,., 
of that contract or law. That's another factor toward the hindrance of the 
promotion of partnership policing (#6). 
Similar to the public sector, the interviewees in the private sector reported 
that the making of appropriate laws to promote partnership policing has to 
come first. The absence of related laws makes both sectors uncomfortable 
to initiate a joint-investigation. They advocated that the promotion of 
partnership policing would happen if there were appropriate laNN s to support 
the private sector's legitimate involvement in the investigation of Internet 
fraud. 
The answers provided by the interviewees in both sectors indicate that their 
perception concerning partnership policing is not significantly different. 
Interviewees in this study seemingly share similar values and perceptions 
about current policing of internet fraud regardless of their membership. 
How would ideal policing look at local, national and 
international levels? 
The interviewees in the public sector agreed that the ideal model of policing 
internet fraud should maintain good partnership between public and private 
sectors at the local, national and international levels. However, the', did not 
know what exactly would make it an ideal model for policing internet fraud. 
Since the Korean public policing system is a centralized national police 
system, distinctions between local and national were blurred. 
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Our police are not fragmented like the USA and UK. The 'National 
Police Agency supervises more than 250 police departments. When 
CTRC (Cyber Terror Response Center) receives a fraud report, CTRC 
passes to the local police department where the victim or offender 
resides. If fraud victimization is nation-wide, CTRC directly inýestigates 
the case with the support of the local police department (#]). 
Recently, police stopped taking online internet fraud reports due to 
excessive false reporting. Therefore, victims of internet fraud have to visit 
the police to report the incident in person. This procedure has deterred third 
party private intervention, such as The Cheat and Catchall. A lack of 
anonymity in crime reporting makes it even more difficult for victims to 
report fraud to the police. 
As you know that police officers treat victims like another criminal when 
they conduct the interrogation so that we do not want to report minor 
cases to the police unless we know someone in the police (# 15). 
The majority of private sector experts complained that police do not care 
about minor Internet fraud victims and do not target Internet fraud as a 
police priority. Individual victims of internet fraud, especially minor fraud 
victims, actually have few places available to help. In this regard, the 
emergence of The Cheat and Catchall became beneficial for minor internet 
fraud victims and for potential victims. However, some concerns are arising 
in that those involved in private policing internet fraud may position 
themselves in the wrong place within the larger context of policing internet 
fraud in Korea. At the same time, local police departments have gradually 
given up on the policing of internet fraud in their original police work. If the 
current situation persists, the policing of internet fraud will be left 
untouched by the public police and this would damage our criminal justice 
system in terms of intemet fraud control. 
Since local police departments and individual Nlictims have to interact to 
deal with internet fraud in the first place, easier reporting and rapid 
investigation are important when creating an ideal model for policing 
internet fraud at the local level. Many internet fraud N-ictims argue that 
obtain the police assistant is not easy. Each police department has a different 
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capability for policing internet fraud therefore it is necessarý' to establish 
standardized internet fraud investigation procedures. 
Although most internet fraud incidents reported by indkiduals are relatiN, elN, 
minor in comparison to fraud incidents reported by the commercial sector. 
partnership is still vital to succeed with investigation. User group NNebsites 
such as The Cheat and Catchall may receive more information than a police 
website since many people feel more comfortable discussing their cases on 
the user group website. 
Internet users feel uncomfortable registering their real name on the 
police website in order to discuss or to report fraud information. As you 
know citizens and police are not close each other. They prefer to use 
private channels to exchange information about internet fraud (# 16). 
To maintain ownership of the policing of internet fraud. local police 
departments should not overlook minor internet fraud cases. In order to give 
more attention to the minor fraud case, easier reporting systems have to be 
established. False reporting problems can be solved if the police \Nork 
together with Internet user groups. The internet user groups could filter 
internet fraud incidents that require formal police investigation. 
It is a win-win strategy to beat the fraudster! Through our filtering of 
incident cases, police could save a lot of time and labour while they 
achieve the goal of criminal justice. Actually, police have to pay for our 
labour (# 15). 
The public sector interviewees expressed concern that overload from minor 
internet fraud investigations might paralyze other cybercrime priorities. 
They emphasized that the ideal model of policing internet fraud would have 
to consider the protection of private and public interest. Therefore, it would 
be imperative to establish the priority of the investigation on behalf of the 
protection of private and public interest. This consideration may conflict 
with the rights of the individual victim of internet fraud. 
For the protection of public interest, individual victimization of internet 
fraud may be neglected due to lack of police labour and resources. 
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Between the private and public interest, public interest always has a 
priority to be protected (#2). 
Interviewees of GCN and YMCA refuted the fact that protection of the 
individual victim should be treated as equally as protection of the public 
interest. They believed that the protection of the individual victim is the 
protection of the public interest and a small unit of victimization eý entually 
threatens public security. 
However, it is questionable as to what kind of law would support their 
online community policing activity. How could private internet user groups 
or organizations represent victims of internet fraud? Who would be 
responsible for the result if the investigation went poorly? The private sector 
interviewees criticized the protection of the individual and felt that the 
commercial victim needs more attention from the local police even when 
minor losses occur, while the public sector interviewees were concerned 
with protection of the private and public interest. 
At the national level, both sectors' experts recommended that the 
establishment of a central reporting agency like an IC3 in the US XNould be 
necessary in order to perform successful partnership policing. They believed 
that establishment of a central reporting agency would contribute to the 
development of policing internet fraud in Korea. Particularly. this agency 
would be able to collect and analyze incidents for the prevention of possible 
online fraud activity. The absence of a central reporting agency has hindered 
the laws and regulations for policing internet fraud in Korea. Without 
reliable internet fraud incident data, some felt it was not worth discussing 
partnership policing of internet fraud. 
As you know that we do not have any public agency to respond to 
internet fraud so we do not exactly know what is happening. We onlý 
have officially reported fraud data complied by the police and prosecutor 
but these cannot represent the real occurrence of internet fraud. Without 
reliable data, it is difficult to determine the correct balance of policing 
(#9). 
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From the perspective of the public sector, internet fraud is not seen as a 
major threat for national cybersecurity. However. this may be attributed to 
the absence of reliable data showing exactly how it can create damage. 
Other nations' law enforcement agencies are ýýell aware of the significance 
of internet fraud and have thus founded special units in national and federal 
law enforcement agencies, such SFO (Serious Fraud Office) and FBI's IC3 
(Internet Crime Complaint Center). The interviewees agreed that their data 
is unreliable. 
You know that the current police and prosecutor's office data do not 
completely reflect the real level of internet fraud since reported fraud 
incidents are a small part of the total number of internet fraud incidents. 
Uncountable numbers of minor internet fraud have not been reported to 
the law enforcement agency (#1). 
The interviewees in both sectors suggested that the establishment of a 
central reporting agency like an IC3 in the US would form part of an ideal 
model for policing internet fraud. However, management of this central 
reporting agency is another issue. Making it a subsidiary of each agency 
would enhance the power of policing internet fraud. Therefore, NPA 
(National Police Agency), NIS (National Intelligence Service) and SPO 
(Supreme Prosecutor's Office) would compete to host this central reporting 
agency, if the government did decide to build it. The private sector does not 
have any choice in being able to do anything until the government decides 
upon its establishment. 
Currently, the most similar agency to IC3 in Korea is the NCSC (National 
Cyber Security Center) of the NIS (National Intelligence Service). Although 
it was not founded to respond to internet fraud, it could provide a good 
model for a central reporting agency. In order to establish a central reporting 
agency, political decision by the President or Congressional approval would 
be essential. For example, The Presidential Direction Vumber 141 - 
National Cyber Security Management Regulation (Januarý, 2005) founded 
the NCSC. In addition, enactment of special law for the establishment ofa 
central reporting agency and its activity would be needed. 
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At the interriational level, both sector intervieýýees agreed that partnership 
policing has to be enhanced but few people knew how intemational 
cooperation could be practiced. Although the Korean gover-nment reg,, ularlý- 
hosts international cybercrime conferences and forums, local participants 
are always high ranking govemment officials and scholars so working level 
investigators do not get the chance to build knowledge about the 
international level of partnership policing. 
Since many of the reported internet fraud incidents indicate that offenders 
are living in other nations, Korean police do not have any legal 
responsibility to perform any appropriate action for those victims. Many 
victims experience problems after using internet shopping malls or auction 
sites abroad. If they have not used reliable payment methods to purchase 
their items, such as PayPal, recovery of their loss is almost impossible. 
Especially for minor fraud incidents, police are unable to obtain an), 
international law enforcement assistance. 
The private sector experts said that partnership policing is more effectively 
practiced among private entities such as banks, credit card and insurance 
companies. These financial institutions are using the private model of 
policing to protect their assets and customers from any possible threats. It 
was advised that benchmarking of the private model of policing Internet 
fraud could be very useful for the aspect of prevention and control. 
Historically, financial institutions have used the most advanced security 
methods to control fraudulent activities. As indicated in Chapter 2, CAPA 
(Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants), NeIBA (The Internet 
International Business Authority) and FACI (Forensic Accounting and 
Corporation Investigation) are good examples demonstrating the 
international level of the private model of policing. 
One of the interviewees from a law enforcement agency said that the 
establishment of an Asian Police Agency is essential in order to link 
Europol's ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) 
and the Interpol at the same level. Since ENISA and Interpol's activities 
focus on Europe and American regions, an equivalent international IeNel of 
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agency should be founded in Asia. It was alleged that the foundation of an 
Asian Police Agency would help successful international cross-sector 
partnership. 
We have experienced how international cooperation of police 
investigation is difficult at the terrestrial level. How many cases are 
cleared through Interpol? How long do we have to wait for criminal 
repatriation? Even offline partnership proves extremely difficult! So how 
we can expect online cooperation! Partnership policing with the private 
sector has to be discussed after we successfully link with Interpol and 
Europol through an Asian Police Agency (#I). 
Overall, partnership policing between the private and public sectors at the 
international level would be very beneficial for internet users worldývide. 
However, there are many prerequisites that would have to be discussed and 
solved. In contrast to other levels of partnership policing, international 
partnership policing includes numerous issues, such as international IaNý, 
jurisdiction and cost of policing. Efforts are being made to consider these 
factors, as can be seen from the 7 th International Conference on Cý bercrime 
which addressed the issues of organizing more training sessions and joint 
efforts by all the multilateral agencies for working out a comprehensive 
International convention (Patil, 2007). 
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Chapter 7: Towards an ideal model for policing Internet fraud 
7.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this study has been to determine the correct balance 
of policing models by analyzing and examining tensions; both between the 
private and public models and within the public models of policing 
fraudulent activities in cyberspace, with special reference to the Korean 
context. The primary research material used in the stud), was the result of a 
series of semi-structured qualitative interviews with 16 internet fraud 
investigators in the private and public sectors. To achieve its objective of a 
theoretical explanation of policing internet fraud, the study employed a 
conceptual framework, the primary assumptions of which have been that: 
0 the governance of internet fraud/cybercrime is characterized by a 
complex 'assemblage' of networked nodes of security that shape 
virtual behaviour (Wall, 1997; 2001: 171; 2002: 192, Walker and 
Akdeniz, 1998: 8; Newman and Clarke, 2003: 160) 
0 'much policing is now taking place beyond the auspices' of the 
public police (Crawford and Lister, 2004: 426) 
Based on this conceptual framework, the study sought to provide a 
structured and systematic description of the component elements that are 
involved in the policing of internet fraud, and to formulate research 
expectations that can guide and direct the work of the research. 
Throughout this research, the 'internet's order maintenance assemblage 
model' by David Wall (2007) was used to compare three nations' policing 
practices for internet fraud. As a result, it was possible to find out the 
similarities and differences among three nations. Seven different groups of 
policing actors were also found in the three nations. Although there are 
minor differences in policing among three nations' policing actors, overall 
the practices are very similar. Govemance providers and sanctions in the 
three different nations are seen as almost same, although there are small 
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differences in the scope of sanctions. In contrast to the United States and 
the United Kingdom, South Korea does not have any specialized intemet 
fraud policing bodies in both private and public sectors. While N'W-3C and 
IC3 are working in response to internet fraud in the United States. and the 
SFO and NFRC8 are dealing with online and offline fruad in the United 
Kingdom. It suggests that more specialized internet fraud policing bodies 
are necessary in South Korea. 
In this chapter, promotion of efficient policing of internet fraud, 
consideration of the required balance between private and public models 
and ideal models of policing internet fraud were discussed based on Wall's 
(2007) 'internet's order-maintenance assemblage' model introduced in 
Chapter 3 and Kozlovski's (2005) *cyberpolicing' model in Chapter 4. A 
combination of the two models provides very useful information regarding 
aspects that this research attempted to tackle. The aims of this final chapter 
are threefold: 
0 to uncover constructive factors that may promote the policing of 
internet fraud by analyzing and examining the tensions between 
private and public and within public sector models of policing-, 
to determine the correct balance of policing models by analyzing and 
examining tensions between private and public sectors; 
* to present a conceptual framework developed for the study as an 
'ideal policing model' that can be applied in future studies, to better 
understand and analyze the policing of internet fraud. 
Attention will also be given to the larger implications of the study, including 
its relevance to the field of cyberspace crime, its limitations, and 
suggestions for future research. 
UK government will establish the National Fraud Reporting Centre (NFRC) 
by 2009. 
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7.2 Promotion of effective partnership policing of internet 
fraud in South Korea 
Tensions between the private and public sectors 
Chapter 3 outlined the tensions that reside between private and public 
models of policing internet fraud, which may affect the effectiveness of 
policing by two sectors. Later, those tensions confirmed though interN, iews 
in Chapter 6 led us to suggest the implementation of a successful 
partnership for policing internet fraud. Interviews with public and priN, ate 
sector experts indicated that most tensions in this study were also found in 
previous studies relating to policing e-crime or cybercrime, although some 
of the tensions were less emphasized due to different political and cultural 
environments. 
In order to achieve the first objective of this study (to reveal constructive 
factors to promote the policing of internet fraud by analyzing and examining 
the tensions between private and public and within the public sector models 
of policing), interviewees were asked questions such as: What are the three 
most serious tensions between the sectors? Can government do anYthing to 
reduce these tensions? Can your organization do anything to reduce t17CSe 
tensions? What is the best solution? 
Interviewees in both sectors reported that tensions should be removed in 
order to promote effective partnership policing of internet fraud. Although 
some tensions could be positive stimuli, most tensions hinder the promotion 
of effective policing. According to interviewees, lack of trust remains the 
most serious tension between the two sectors and this tension negatively 
affects the desire for building a partnership. However, lack of trust cannot 
be easily overcome unless the surrounding environment and conditions are 
changed since it is not a factor that can be fixed by systematic efforts. 
The findings suggest that information sharing is one of the most effectiNe 
operational factors to promote cooperation between the private and public 
sectors. Sharing of information is an important routine activitý' which ývould 
facilitate effective policing by two sectors. Ho\\e\, er. their hostile 
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relationship hinders the bi-directional sharing of information. Analysis 
shows that each sector does not want to share its important information with 
the other sector since the majority of investigators deemed possession of 
more information to be possession of power. 
Interviewees in the public sector argued that the protection of 'personal 
information law' restricts the disclosure of information to the prk ate sector. 
However, private sector interviewees believed that the police just do not 
want to share their information with the other sector. It is unlikely that more 
information sharing will follow in the absence of appropriate la%\s to secure 
the legitimate transaction. 
The majority of public sector interviewees recommended that easier access 
to police information could promote effective partnership policing. This is 
also relevant to the sharing of information. However, an intervieNNee in the 
law enforcement agency argued that the personal information of the victim 
and offender should be protected. Alternatively, police could charge for the 
use of police information by the private sector, in addition to an agreement 
of confidentiality. This would introduce a new police role as an information 
brokering service, as mentioned by Ericson and Haggerty (1997). 
Among various tensions, negative publicity and adverse-impact on stock 
value were the most serious tensions chosen by the private sector as they 
were believed to cause harm to the reputation of private companies. For a 
serious case, a company may have to close the business due to those 
tensions. The interviewees suggested that confidentiality of police 
investigations must be kept and the process of investigation should be 
reported to the victimized party. However, these cannot be guaranteed bý 
informal agreements between the two sectors. The absence of protection of 
'business secrecy law' or any provision of criminal procedure has created 
more tensions in the private sector. 
These tensions are also relevant to the under-reporting of incidents to the 
police. Since private companies do not trust the confidentialitý of 
investigation by the police, the), tend not to report these incidents. To 
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receive compensation of insurance premiums they have to report their 
incidents to the police. It appears that the involvement of an insurance 
company as a third party facilitates mandatory incident reporting to the 
police whether private companies like it or not. This shoýýs that the 
insurance company is to some extent participating in the policing of internet 
fraud. It seems that insurance policy may be a more powerful tool to control 
human behaviour. This implies the participation of the insurance cornpaný 
as a formal partner in policing internet fraud. 
Cross sector meetings at the working-level of staff was suggested as one of 
the most effective methods to promote partnership policing of internet fraud. 
What investigators expect is to share their investigation experience with 
other sector investigators. However, there is not much opportunity to meet 
other sectors' investigators at the working level. Most meetings are held at 
the management level of staff, such as directors and deputy -d i rectors 
because the position of public relations officer tends to be assigned to high 
ranking officials. Particularly, public agencies tend to control the 
communication channel only through the high level office so that working 
level staff members do not have enough voice to discuss with private sector 
investigators. 
Considering that working-level staff conduct most investigations, regular 
meetings for the exchange of criminal information and investigation 
methodologies should be held at the working-level. Forums such as 
conferences, round-tables and regular meetings were suggested as useful 
means for sharing information. Some interviewees recommended that cyber- 
forums could be used for the sharing of information which would mean that 
investigators could remain in the workplace. Interviewees believed that 
information technology would make it possible to establish cyber-forums 
without any difficulty. Currently, CONCERT (Consortium of CERT) 
operates online communication channels, but its participants are limited to 
membership companies who pay an annual fee. 
Interviewees of the public sector expressed concem about a lack of legal 
ZI perception from private sector employees. What the public sector su(,,, ested 
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was to licence the private investigator. In order to obtain an official licence. 
they would have to study and pass an exam. Currently, South Korea does 
not have any licences for internet fraud or cybercrime inýestigation. 
Therefore, police do not believe that the private sector has sufficient 
capability to conduct proper investigations. Although some prk ate sector 
employees have CISA (Certified Information Systems Auditor), CISSP 
(Certified Information System Security Professional) and SIS (endorsed bý' 
KISA), these licences are not for the investigation of Internet fraud. For 
terrestrial level fraud investigation, CFE (Certified Fraud Examiner) is 
internationally renowned. However, its training programme does offer a 
course for Internet fraud investigation. 
In order to perform to their full capacity in an investigation. private 
investigators should be trained to the same standard as police investigators. 
However, there is no mechanism for providing cross-sector training services. 
Practically, cross-sector training is not easy; therefore, licensing of internet 
fraud or cybercrime investigators was suggested. However, it is highly 
political. Since Korean law does not permit private investigation. the birth 
of the licensed private investigator has been left pending. Unlike other 
Western nations, Korean society appears to be far from ready to implement 
the licensing of private investigators, both online and offline. 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, the government exclusively owns' policing so 
the licensing of a private investigator could prove very challenging. 
However, the successful reform of public policing would allow the licensing 
of private investigators. Private sector investigators advocate the fact that 
licensing of the private investigator will eventually be beneficial to the 
police and the retired police. However, police do not recognize its necessity 
in Korea. Along with the wait for licensing of the private investigator, 
licensing of internet fraud or cybercrime investigation has become a less 
important issue. 
One of the interviewees in the public sector recommended that production 
of convincing material would help people to understand what the public 
sector is doing and aiming to achieve. It is well kno\\n that public sector 
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people tend not to mention what they are going to do. The passke role of 
private companies has depreciated their relationship. Misunderstandiný,:; s 
between the two sectors due to miscommunication could be reduced if there 
was convincing material, such as regular e-mail ne%ýs or monthlý 
publications provided to the private sector. In contrast to law enforcement 
agencies, non-police government agencies hm-e produced man), public 
relation materials that explain their action plans and programmes to the 
private sector. However, law enforcement intervieý, vees said that they 
couldn't provide such materials due to limited budgets and the nature of 
their work. Now, they believe that providing public relation materials would 
help to recover the mutual trust between the týý o sectors. 
Finally, the interviewees were asked how they Ný, ould promote the 
partnership. The public sector interviewees suggested that making a formal 
contract or law would promote partnership policing. They believed that an 
informal partnership does not secure the process and outcome of the 
investigation. Under this circumstance, each sector could blame the other 
sector in case of failure of the investigation or lack of prosecution. Although 
some official MOUs (memorandums of understanding) were made at the 
individual agency level, no detailed operational provisions NNere included. 
Besides, their MOUs were usually about the exchange of technological 
information but did not relate to partnership policing. MOUs thus become a 
mere scrap of paper. Similar to the public sector., private sector interviewees 
suggested that the creation of appropriate law could promote their 
relationship with the public sector. What private sector interviewees said 
was not much different from the public sector. They believed that the 
current legal system does not support partnership policing of Internet fraud. 
Tensions within the public sector 
In Chapter 6, public sector interviewees provided controversial vie\ýs of 
tensions within the public sector. It is not usual to report any conflict within 
the public sector. They revealed that serious tensions exist bemeen and 
among government agencies over the policing of cyberspace. The majoritý 
of interviewees believed that ownership of policing cyberspace is 
considered a possession of power in the digital era. Taking over the policing 
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of cyberspace is directly related to the police interest while other 
government regulatory bodies have attempted to take away their initiative 
from the police. At the very least, other government agencies xNould like to 
share policing authority with the police. Unlike tensions bem een the private 
and public sectors, tensions within the public sector are seen as more 
politically vulnerable. 
Particularly, tensions between the police and Prosecutors' Office are the 
most serious. As indicated earlier (Chapter 5), the police criticized the fact 
that the Prosecutors' Office often over-turned what the police believed to 
have been perfectly investigated. However, the police have to follow what 
the Prosecutors' Office says and decides according to criminal procedure 
law in Korea. There is no distinction between online and offline criminal 
procedure. Although the District Prosecutors' Office has a small-sized unit. 
criminal procedure law makes it possible for them to superNise how the 
police control the policing of cybercrime. 
Police believed that the prosecutor could control their investigation outcome 
whenever they felt it necessary, while the prosecutor believed that rejection 
of police investigations wouldn't happen if the police provided concrete 
digital evidence. However, the police did not believe that the prosecutor's 
rejection was due to the lack of evidence or tainted evidence, although it 
would be difficult to prove the police's argument. 
The findings suggest that a transparent process of prosecution is necessary 
to remove any suspicion due to control of the police investigation outcome 
by the prosecutor. By implementing a clear process of prosecution. the 
police could see how the prosecutor has reviewed their investigation. The 
police could accept reasonable objection even if they did not expect it. 
However, this suggestion is unlikely to be accepted by the prosecutor. The 
prosecutor would like to maintain the doctrine of convenient prosecution in 
criminal procedure. This means that the prosecutor flexibly decides ýNhether 
to prosecute or not depending on his or her Nvillingness. According to this 
doctrine, the prosecutor can stop and close the case Nýhenever necessary. 
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From the prosecutoCs perspective, there is no reason ýýh. % theY should have 
to convince the police of why they have rejected the outcome of a police 
investigation. 
Moreover, political influence was attributed to the rejection of police 
investigations. Hostile relations between the police and the prosecutor due 
to the mandate of independent police investigation power could be one of 
the reasons. This problem appears to have formed a foundation for conflict 
between the police and the prosecutor. In contrast to other Western 
countries, the Korean criminal justice system places the police under the 
supervision of the prosecutor. Lack of trust between the two sectors arises 
from this politically and legally controversial issue. The previous Roh. the 
Moo-Hyun administration, attempted to reform the provision of police 
investigation in the criminal procedure law, but it failed due to extreme 
disparity between the two sectors. It appears that the provision of police 
independent investigation will not change until public consensus mandates 
its change. 
Interviewees in the non-police public agencies suggested that empo\\, crment 
of special law enforcement for them is imperative to promote the policing of 
internet fraud and other cybercrime. As indicated in Chapters 2 and 4, police 
alone cannot prevent and investigate internet fraud therefore division of 
policing labour has to be implemented. The Financial Security Agency 
(FSA), the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and Korea 
Information Security Agency (KISA) have sufficient aptitude to exercise 
law enforcement power. Compared to the police, they have more knowledge 
and technical capability to carry out their mission to protect citizens and 
public assets. 
Increasing numbers of law enforcement agencies for policing internet fraud 
would reduce tensions due to different levels of agency power in the public 
sector. With the empowerment of special law enforcement to the public 
agencies, the concept of partnership policing would settle down in the 
Korean criminal justice system. Partnership policing for internet fraud could 
be a good example since internet fraud tends to occur more in the private 
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domain. If special law enforcement power is not provided to those public 
agencies, a complete version of partnership policing cannot be expected. 
Analyses suggest that lack of appropriate law promotes a more chaotic 
situation for policing internet fraud within the public sector. At a first (Jance, 
it is very confused as to which government agency should have the primarý 
jurisdiction over internet fraud. Ultimately, it seems that joint investigation 
is a key factor to succeed and be effective and efficient. But ýNhich agency 
should become a central coordinator for the investigation of internet fraud? 
How should the agency coordinate among other agencies? Is it necessary to 
enact a special law to do this? Some suggestions were made from the 
Department of Homeland Security model. It will be discussed in the later 
part of this chapter. 
7.3 Balancing the private and public models of policing 
Internet fraud 
Chapter 3 introduced the balance of policing internet fraud between the 
public and private models in nations that appear to have a more advanced 
form of policing than that currently practiced in South Korea. Partnership 
policing of internet fraud does not formally exist in Korea because policing 
activity by the private sector is not legally permitted. Therefore, it is 
difficult to determine what a correct balance between the two sectors should 
be. 
In order to achieve the second objective of this study (to determine the 
correct balance of policing models by analyzing and examining tensions 
between the private and public), questions such as When is it more 
appropriate to involve private rather than public policing mechanisms? and 
When is it more appropriate to involve public rather than private policing 
mechanisms? were asked to both private and public sector experts. 
This Study suggested how the disproportional policing of Internet fraud 
between private and public models could be balanced. Currently. the 
policing of internet fraud attaches too much work to the public sector, 
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whereas it should be reasonably distributed between the t-, N,, o sectors. As 
indicated in Chapter 2, most fraud incidents occur in the private domain so 
it is more appropriate to use private policing in the response to Internet 
fraud. 
Through the interviews, it was initially discovered that 'seriousness of the 
offence' was a standard through which it Nýas decided who N\ould 
investigate: the police or private. The public sector intervieNN-ees suggested 
that the public police or regulatory agencies should investigate serious fraud 
cases while private sector people could conduct relatively minor fraud cases. 
They believed that the public model of policing rather than the priNate 
model should respond to serious fraud cases since most serious fraud cases 
were subject to criminal laws. However, this criterion is not clear because 
minor fraud cases can be also subject to criminal laws. The distinction 
between serious and minor fraud is also very blurred. 'What intervievvees 
mentioned was a very abstract concept of classification. Therefore, more 
objectively acceptable measures or standards should be made in order to 
distinguish between serious and minor frauds. For example. felony and 
misdemeanour cases are distinguished based on the length of imprisonment: 
i. e. over a year or less than a year, in many jurisdictions in the United States. 
Korean Criminal Law does not have a concept of felony and misdemeanoLir 
or distinguish them based on the length of sentence. As indicated in Chapter 
5, fraud is considered a very serious offence in Korea. 
0 Article 347-1: a person, if convicted for fraud, could face a 
maximum of 10 years in prison or a fine of up to 20 million Won. 
Article 347-2: Illegal use of a computer to process false information 
or incorrectly attempt to make money could face a maximum of 10 
years in prison or a fine of up to 20 million Won. 
As indicated above, fraud is not categorized as misdemeanour under Korean 
Criminal Law. Because of this reason, classification bemeen serious and 
minor fraud cases is difficult. In Chapter 6, the public and priNate 
interviewees indicated that recovery of loss and attainment of public 
security are important factors for choosing between the public and pri\ ate 
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models of policing. For minor fraud, rapid recovery of loss is more 
important than any other factor because victims w'ould like to reclaim their 
losses as soon as possible since their losses are relatively small. For serious 
fraud, achieving the goal of public security and deterrent effects are 
predominant issues. This suggests that the balancing of policing bet\ýeen 
the two sectors is not only affected by efficiency (fast recoverý). but also 
effectiveness (deterrence) of policing. 
According to private security experts, public police have rarelý responded to 
minor fraud cases due to constraint of budget and human resources. 
However, private securities, both in-house and contract-out, have to perform 
their duties to protect their customers and assets. The majoritý of public 
security suggested that minor fraud occurring in the private domain has to 
be dealt with by the private model of policing. Although private interest is 
public interest, insufficient resources and human personnel of the public 
sector meant they would not be able to pay attention to minor fraud cases 
that tend to occur in the private domain. Like terrestrial policing. a clear 
boundary of policing has to be defined by the law. Particularly, who paý s 
for the police service is important issue. The public sector interviewees 
argued that taxpayers' money should not be used for the protection of 
private company assets or their customers. However, Internet fraud does not 
equally occur in both sectors so it is difficult to determine the correct 
balance of policing. It is not clear what standard has to be used for deciding 
the correct balance of policing. There were some examples of standards 
introduced, such as frequency of incident, amount of loss and numbers of 
victims. These standards can be used as important factors to decide which 
policing model is more suitable in the response to internet fraud. 
Higher incident rate, monetary loss and victims in a certain sector should 
not be pivotal criteria to decide which policing model would be more 
appropriate in the response to internet fraud. It was already mentioned that 
most internet fraud incidents occur in the private domain. As suggested 
earlier, effectiveness and efficiency of policing models have to be 
considered in order to decide upon more appropriate policing models. 
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It was advised that minor fraud that occurred in the priý ate domain such as 
internet shopping malls and auction sites could be policed by the private 
model of policing since their policing is more effective and efficient than 
public policing in terms of cost of fraud prevention and recovery of loss. If 
minor fraud is reported to the police, it takes too long to commence the 
formal investigation due to the heavy workload of the police and the lack of 
priority of the investigation. However, private companies would not ignore 
minor internet fraud because it directly relates to the reputation of their 
company and the sale of their products. Therefore. private companies would 
be more likely to rapidly respond to internet fraud to retrieN e their 
customers' losses. Sometimes, they have to spend more money to retrieý e 
their loss. For the long term, it involves risk-management strategy to protect 
their potential assets and customers. 
Like a minor fraud case, the private model of policing could be also used for 
a serious fraud case. However, the private entity does not have any legal 
authority to punish the offender. Their sanctions are limited to frozen or 
cancelled membership and referral to the police. If they continue the 
investigation, the obtaining of evidence is the last stage for them. For the 
serious fraud case, the court may require police reinvestigation in order to 
prove the reliability of evidence. In consideration of efficiency, redundancy 
of investigation by both sectors is an abuse of cost, time and labour. 
The handover of policing minor internet fraud to the private sector is not a 
simple task since the Korean policing system has maintained a centralized 
national police force. Generally, policing is 'owned' by the sovereign state., 
thus the government has a duty to provide a police service for public safety. 
Since the Korean public policing system is not fragmented, handover of 
policing internet fraud to the private sector would involve an 
innovative 
restructure of policing division of labour. If the police officially 
handover 
minor fraud cases to the private sector, it could be seen as a privatization of 
policing for internet fraud. Therefore, the majority of public sector experts 
were still hesitant to support the private model of policing 
internet fraud 
even though they recognized its efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Howeverg the private model of policing internet fraud would have to be 
legally implemented in order to respond to the widespread nature of internet 
fraud. As Bayley argued (1994: 3), 'The police do not prevent crime'. 
Policing division of labour is an unavoidable issue in policing cyberspace 
crime. Ownership of policing internet fraud should not be claimed for a part 
that the police cannot actually accomplish. Balance between the private and 
public models of policing internet fraud would protect the symbolic power 
of the police as a public service agency. If the police do not handover minor 
fraud investigation to the private sector, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
policing of internet fraud will continuously decline. 
Experts suggested that establishment of a central reporting agency. \Oether 
sponsored by a private or public fund would help to determine the correct 
balance of policing internet fraud. Similar to an IC3 (Internet Crime 
Complaint Center) in the United States, which is a good example. If a 
neutral agency recorded the statistics of incidents with detailed information 
it could be used for guidelines to determine the correct balance of policing 
internet fraud between the private and public sectors. This central reporting 
agency would recommend the reported frauds to the appropriate model of 
policing to respond to them. 
In order to adjust the balance in policing internet fraud, mandatory incident 
reporting law has to be implemented. Without implementing mandatory 
incident reporting law, no reliable data will be available to detect trends and 
patterns of internet fraud and it will not be possible to classify which cases 
have to be passed to the private or public sectors. The collected data should 
contain volumes of incidents, types of frauds, amount of loss, demographic 
factors of victims and other useful information. These collected data could 
be reviewed by both sectors whenever they wanted to see them. This agencý 
should also have a reviewing board so that unsolved cases could be passed 
to the other sector to investigate. Over the period of operation, the correct 
balance of policing between the private and public models of policing would 
be established so that efficiency and effectiveness could be accomplished. 
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7.4 Ideal model of policing internet fraud 
Chapter 4 introduced Kozlovski's (2005) *cyberpolicing' and Wall's (2007) 
*Internet's order-maintenance assemblage' models. These mo models 
suggested how policing eybercrime should be done and considered NNhat 
kind of policing models should be implemented in order to create an ideal 
policing model. Based on these two models, an ideal model for policing 
internet fraud in South Korea will be suggested. 
In order to achieve the third objective of this study (to present the 
conceptual framework developed for the study as an *ideal policing model' 
that can be applied in future studies, to better understand and analyze 
policing internet fraud), questions such as: Do you believe that a 
partnership created to help policing internet fi-aud is either necessatý' or 
helpful? What would the ideal partnership look like" Hoit- would , 1,011 
promote the partnership? How would ideal policing look at local, national 
and international levels? were asked to both private and public sector 
experts. 
This study now suggests how an ideal policing model could be constructed. 
Since there has been insufficient partnership policing of internet fraud 
practiced in Korea, but existing studies and the current research showed that 
partnership policing is the most appropriate model for internet fraud control, 
this study will help to guide the establishment of an ideal model of policing 
internet fraud. 
For the third research objective, three different levels of policing are now 
discussed: local, national and international. 
Local level 
Interviewees in both sectors suggested that the establishment of partnership 
policing between the private and public sectors is most important since the 
local police department has an investigation authority over most internet 
fraud cases, while serious internet fraud cases are investigated by the CTRC 
(Cyber Terror Response Center) at the National Police Agency. 
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At the local level, easier reporting by the individual victim is the most 
important priority to be solved for the development of partnership policing, 
because at the moment victims of internet fraud do not know hovN to deal 
with the incident when they are victimized. It was also belieNed that the 
police do not pay attention to minor fraud cases. Victims of minor internet 
fraud said that they were not able to obtain the necessary support from the 
public sector. Therefore, victims of minor internet fraud established internet 
fraud monitoring groups such as The Cheat and Catchall to exchange 
critical information to detect and catch fraudsters in Korea. HoNveNer. those 
victims' policing activities are very restricted due to legal constraints, so 
they have to depend on the information that other victims publicize. These 
groups control internet fraud using *rnoral censure, cold-shouldering. 
lobbying, reporting, hacktivism' (Wall, 2007). For extension of the interest 
groups, online virtual environment managers and security "for online role 
playing/game playing, chat-rooms, discussion lists, e-auction rooms, 
cyberworlds' (Wall, 2007: see also Table 5.1) are good participants of 
policing internet fraud. In Korea, 'cyworld', 'naver-blog' and 'auction' are 
good models for this category. They can help to control the level of internet 
fraud using 'removal of access rights and exclusion from the environment' 
(Wall, 2007: see Table 5.1). 
Analyses in Chapter 6 suggested that partnership with internet user groups 
would enable the assimilation of previously unrecorded minor internet fraud 
incidents. The study found that individual victims tend not to report to the 
police and they prefer to get assistance from internet user groups. The 
primary advantage of partnership with internet user groups is to save costs 
and labour of the police, because the internet user groups vi'ill filter reported 
incidents and only pass on cases that need formal police investigation. 
As Kozlowski proposed in Chapter 4 (see Table 4-1). the policing 
cybercrime structure has to be transformed from a law enforcement model 
to a cyberpolicing model, which has a multiplex organizational structure, 
decentralized command, is non-territorial, and invokes delegation of 
policing function and empowerment of individual users (self 
help). This 
organizational structure can be applied to the local level of policing 
intemet 
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fraud. Particularly, participation of the individual user is emphasized. Wall 
(1998: 205-206) proposed the importance of individual cyberpolicing in his 
early work where he is quoted as saying that the internet is Ný'ell-known for 
4voluntary policing' of the activity of users. 
According to Wall (2007: 188-189), 'Internet users and user groups exert a 
very potential influence upon online behaviour through censure, usuall, \ 
after the occurrence of signal event, which are behaviours that may not 
necessarily constitute a major infraction of criminal IaNN, but 'nonetheless 
disrupt the sense of social order' (Innes, 2004: 151). This statement shows 
that the individual user is the smallest unit for the policing of cýbercrime. 
Therefore, local level policing of internet fraud has to promote partnerships 
between internet users and user groups. For the police to be most effectiýe 
in policing cyberspace, they will have to take on new ideas and accept other 
networks of communication. Forging new relationships with other 'nodes' 
(Wall, 2007) will enable transformations to take place in the basic structure 
of the current model of policing for internet fraud and NNiII enhance 
effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. 
National level 
Throughout this research, the findings have shown that the establishment of 
a central reporting agency (the so called 'National Internet Fraud Reporting 
Center') is a high priority for internet fraud control in order to perform 
partnership policing in Korea. The absence of reliable data and a neutral 
agency is the main factor aggravating the chaotic situation of policing 
internet fraud in Korea. 
Yar reported (2006: 93) that the IC3 (Internet Crime Complaint 
Center) in 
the USA could be a good model for institutional innovation. The 
IC3 model 
presents a dual benefit. First, IC3 is a centralized national contact point 
for 
complaints and IC3 passes Internet fraud cases to the most appropriate 
IaNý 
enforcement agency for investigation and action. 
Second, IC-3) records 
incidents and uses the data for the future crime detection. 
Yar aroLied that 
'where national Internet crime agencies haNe alrcadý established, online 
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fraud may not necessarily be included within their present remit (as in the 
case of the UK's National Hi-Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU). \\hich does not 
deal with fraud complaints' (2006: 93). 
According to IC3's mission statement, 'significant and supplemental to 
partnering with law enforcement and regulatory agencies, it will remain a 
priority objective of the IC3 to establish effective alliances with industry'. 
IC3 links the private and public sectors and works for the benefit of the 
public. Although IC3 is co-sponsored by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the National White Collar Crime Center (NWC3). it performs as a 
neutral agency that does not show bias to the public sector. Simply. it looks 
like any other public-funded fraud-reporting centre. 
The IC3 model is very similar to the NCSC (National Cyber Securltý Center) 
of the NIS (National Intelligence Service) since it is funded and operated bý 
the NIS. However, NCSC does not deal with Internet fraud rather it deals 
with the protection of the information infrastructure and networks in Korea. 
The establishment of the NCSC shows how the Korean government could 
launch a central reporting agency for the response to internet fraud. 
The Korean criminal justice system does not have a secondary law 
enforcement agency such as SFO (Serious Fraud Office) and SOCA 
(Serious Organised Crime Agency) in the United Kingdom. Under the 
supervision of the Prosecutors' Office, the Korean police exclusively deal 
with internet fraud. Other regulatory bodies have participated in policing 
internet fraud, but they are not law enforcement agencies. Therefore, 
partnership policing with the private sector is a very important task for the 
police. However, the competitive political situation with other public 
agencies deters the development of partnership policing. Therefore, 
establishment of a central reporting agency is essential, but it first requires a 
presidential decision (as when the NCSC Nvas founded in 2005). 
Taken together the analyses show that the policing of Internet fraud needs a 
quick response and data preservation so it is imperatiN, e to establish a ceiltral 
reporting agency. Since the policing of cybercrime is not fragmented in 
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Korea, operation of a central reporting agency would proN ides the 
foundation for partnership policing of internet fraud. It could remoNe the 
issue of the monopoly of policing cyberspace by the police. 
International level 
For the public sector, the 'most prevalent and formal mechanism of the 
policing of the internet fraud can be through diplomatic missions making 
use of the multilateral and bilateral instrument of cooperation' (Patil. 2007). 
For overall cybercrime, 'three multilateral organizations are currently 
involved in shaping high tech crime policy the European Union (EU). the 
Council of Europe (COE) and the G8. Other organizations, such as the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD), the United Nations, 
Interpol and Europol have been involved to a lesser extent' (Williams, 200-5: 
3-4). 
In terms of law enforcement, Europol's ENISA and Interpol are the most 
renowned law enforcement agencies to deal with cybercrime. I lowever, they 
have not fully focused on partnership policing with the private sector since 
their partnership between national level agencies is still dormant (Yar, 2006). 
Meanwhile, it was suggested that the establishment of an Asian Police 
Agency, equivalent to Europol and Interpol, Nvould be beneficial. Like 
ENISA of Europol, an internet fraud investigation office to be built Nvithin 
an Asian Police Agency was suggested. Some concerns about international 
cooperation focus too much on the European and American regions. Current 
international cooperation through Interpol has shown its effectiveness for 
the investigation of major hacking and child pornography, but not 
necessarily for internet fraud. 
In contrast to the public model of policing, the private model of policing has 
performed better in terms of international cooperation through private 
networks such as CAPA (Confederation of Asian and Pacific Accountants) 
and NeIBA (The Internet International Business Authority). These agencies 
have maintained good communication among member companies and have 
produced useful solutions for internet fraud. International banking, credit 
cards and stock exchanges need the highest levels of online securit,, since 
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they deal with huge amounts of money on a daily basis. These financial 
institutes have used their own in-house security and contract out high-end 
security services. Whenever they need to investigate serious breaches. theýý 
hire the FACI (Forensic Accounting and Corporation Investigation). 
Analyses show that international cooperation between private and public 
models of policing is essential in order to respond to Internet fraud 
effectively and efficiently. These days, international shopping and trade is 
commonplace via the internet, consequently hardening and enhancement of 
online security has occurred. Therefore, security measures of global 
corporations are much more advanced than those of some nations. 
Meanwhile, private companies have also hosted man), conterences and 
offered training programmes. For example, VISA card and HSBC offer 
regular sessions in anti fraud programmes for their emplo) ces. 
International cross-sector partnership policing of internet fraud between 
private and public sectors should have more effective and efficient 
procedures for intra agency and industry cooperation and coordination. This 
could be accomplished through the establishment of a neutral non-profit 
international agency that links the two sectors worldwide. It could have a 
similar function to the IC3 model at the national level, but a much more 
advanced capability to monitor international online fraud activitý'. It could 
be called 'The International Internet Fraud Control Agency' (see Figure 7- 1). 
The International Internet Fraud Control Agency (IIFCA) would coordinate 
the national and transnational level of policing internet fraud. As illustrated 
in Figure 7-1, internet fraud incident reports would be collected from the 
local, national and international levels. The National Internet Fraud 
Reporting Centre (NIFRC) would collect the information from internet 
users/user groups, private companies, regulatory bodies and law 
enforcement agencies. These data would be available to the international 
level public and private agencies to review and to take necessary action in 
response to internet fraud. This model is an extensive structure of the 
internet's order-maintenance assemblage in Chapter 3 (see Table 5-1) bý 
Wall (2007). The operation chart below shows that 'Internet order 
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maintenance assemblage' has been converted to focus more on internet 
fraud control than overall cybercrimes. It indicates that various actors at the 
local level report directly to the National Internet Fraud Centre (NIFC) and 
then filtered information report to the international level private., 'public 
agencies such as CAPA and Interpol. Finally, these agencies report to the 
International Internet Fraud Control Agency for the further analYsis and 
reference. Since international response should focus on macro-transnational 
fraud activities, IIFCA would not directly deal with individual or local leý el 
agencies. 
Figure 7-1: Operation chart of the international fraud control agency 
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7.5 Conclusion 
Internet fraud is a serious problem in Korea, especiallý taking into account 
its rapidly growing occurrence and the degree of negative 
impact on C- 
commerce and online customers. Private and public policing agencies 
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involved in policing cybercrime have little experience in crime reduction 
programmes aimed at internet fraud. it is, therefore, suggested that the 
present study could make a valuable contribution to the development of 
policing internet fraud initiatives in Korea. The study offers possibilities for 
resolution of tensions and suggestions for maintaining a crood balance. This 
could be implemented through establishment of an information 
clearinghouse and creation of mandatory reporting law which would 
together reduce the level of internet fraud. In addition, this thesis proposed 
an ideal model for policing internet fraud at the three levels: local, national 
and international in order to introduce the idea of how the policing of 
internet fraud ought to be organized. Designing these models is important in 
order to develop effective policing strategies for the future. Partnership 
policing efforts to reduce the incidence of Internet fraud and to minimize 
monetary loss of those victimized are unlikely to succeed unless they are 
fully aware of the way in which tensions could be removed. Moreover, a 
visual example of the way a cooperative structure could work maý' help to 
alleviate current tensions as it would be a completely neý\ structure \\hich 
would inhibit the struggle for power between and within sectors. 
7.6 Contribution to the field of policing internet fraud 
In the study, the main focus throughout was to determine the correct balance 
of policing models by analyzing and examining tensions betýN, cen the private 
and public, and within the public models of policing fraudulent activities in 
cyberspace. The study aimed to also find an appropriate model for policing 
internet fraud by analyzing and examining the tensions. These matters are of 
great interest to criminologists who are concerned with internet fraud, rather 
than with theories of white-collar crime. Internet fraud does not 
conveniently fit into any category of crime. It is therefore forcefullý 
classified as a part of white-collar crime since there is a preconception that 
the internet is only used by well-educated groups of people. Howc\cr. 
although it shares a minimum part of its characteristics, internet fraud does 
not fit into the category of white-collar crime. 
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According to Wall (2007), policing cybercrime offers an approach to the 
study of policing cyberspace which is concerned less ýý ith theories of crime. 
than with tensions, strategy and structure of policing models: the focus thus 
being on the ideal policing model, rather than on internet fraud. In the 
consideration of tensions between private and public models of policing 
internet fraud as a serious problem needing a solution, it is proposed that 
this study makes a contribution to the field of policing internet fraud: and 
that it does so conceptually and methodologically. 
In conjunction with the following characteristics the study could be 
identified as being particularly significant and relevant. Firstly, the study 
provides a systematic explanation of tensions affecting the policing of 
internet fraud; and in so doing it emphasizes cross-sector cooperation and 
coordination at local, national and international levels in terms of 
partnership policing of internet fraud. Secondly, the study Nýas designed 
within the paradigm of qualitative research (although quantitative 
techniques were also used), and in compliance with a realist approach to 
research. With this philosophical basis, qualitative intervie\ý ing of the stud)' 
subjects provided an appropriate methodology for the research conducted in 
the study, research in which factors affecting the policing of internet fraud 
could be directly explained by the experience of experts in policing 
cybercrime and internet fraud. 
7.7 Recommendations for further research 
The study was based on semi-structured interviews conducted with experts 
of policing internet fraud in private and public sectors; and on secondary 
data sources that were used to verify the conceptual framework. An inherent 
limitation of this approach was that the findings of the study allowed for 
analytical generalizations that related to the research expectations of the 
study, which in turn were based on the conceptual framework. Although this 
study has wider application value in terms of its capacity to conceptualize 
the appropriate model of policing internet fraud, and to determine the 
correct balance of policing, the characteristics exhibited bý these factors are 
not necessarily valid for other nations. 
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To increase the reliability and validity of the study and, in turn, alloýý for 
broader generalizations with respect to both the correct balance of policing 
internet fraud between private and public sectors and the development of an 
ideal policing model of internet fraud, it would be appropriate to apply the 
conceptual framework in further related studies that NNould engage NNith 
other nations' contexts and situations. Undertaking such further studies 
would result in a more representative overall picture of policing internet 
fraud. 
Future research should also incorporate cultural factors affecting the 
policing of internet fraud and the environment in which such tensions are 
produced, which were held constant in this study. That incorporation would 
allow a more comprehensive investigation and analý sis of tensions between 
private and public models of policing internet fraud. Such factors could 
include variation in the reported tensions, to include, for instance. not only 
political conflict, but also legal constraints. 
Policing internet fraud is a new area of study in the field of criminal justice 
and criminology. Although progress has been made with regard to policy 
guidelines in respect to policing internet fraud, there is still a need for 
substantive and in-depth research to support these efforts-, and there is a 
need to monitor and evaluate the success or failure of partnership policing 
of internet fraud, including those concerned N% ith tensions. The opportunity, 
thus, exists to initiate policing model-specific research that aims to support 
defined policing internet fraud initiatives and to monitor and evaluate the 
progress of a partnership policing model of internet fraud, over a sufficient 
period of time. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Interview Schedule 
Explanation of study and the Interview Process 
This research aim is to identify a projected optimum ý\ ay to resok C tensions 
in order to deten-nine the correct balance of policing between the private and 
public sectors and thereby increase both effectiveness and efficiency. 
Through this interview, I would like to obtain a professional opinion based 
on your experience in order to identify the problems of policing internet 
fraud by the private and public sector of security. 
The results of this study will demonstrate which sector of policing is more 
appropriate for dealing xvith internet fraud. Based on these results, we can 
make a policy, which will be more appropriate to control internet fraud. 
I will discreetly handle your responses. Interview results will be used only 
for the research purpose and your identification will not be released. 
Digitally recorded interviews will be destroyed after completion of 
transcript. You may request a copy of the interview transcript if you want to 
check what has been written. 
Throughout the interview, you may ask any questions and stop the interview 
whenever you feel uncomfortable. 
Career Background 
I would like to ask about your individual career background if you are 
eligible to provide necessary answer. 
I. What is your role (orjob title) in this organization? 
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2. How many years you have been in your private, " public agency or 
organization? 
3. Do you have any special qualification or training in relation to 
policing intemet fraud? 
4. What job did you do previously? 
5. What are your usual day to day activities? 
6. Have you ever been a member of a law enforcement organization? 
7. Could you tell me your own experiences with an-. \ fraudulent cases? 
Approximately how many cases have experienced so far? 
9. What type of cases have you experienced so far? 
10. Generally speaking, what were the outcomes? 
Understanding of terminologies in the interview 
The next questions are about your understanding of the policing of internet 
fraud. 
Provide respondents with the definition of cybercrime, internet ftaud and 
tensions: 
a. Cybercrime. - is a criminal activity committed on the internet. This 
broad term describes everything from electronic cracking to denial 
of service attacks that cause electronic commerce sites to lose moneY 
(Computer Crime Research Center). 
b. Internetftaud. - is differentftont traditionalfiraud in ternis of the use 
of technology and some characteristics shared with true cYbercrimes 
307 
(criminal behaviours transformed or mediated by the internet and 
distinguishing them from more traditional forms of criminal 
behaviour) such as spam, phishing andpharming (Wall, 2006). 
C. Tensions: major tensions involved in policing internet fraud 
surround, for example, ownership of cases, competition for 
jurisdiction, and monopolization of information by, each sector. 
Ownership of cases and competition for jurisdiction can take placc 
within public policing bodies such as local and national police 
forces. Monopolization of information can take place between 
private andpublic policing bodies. The police are always concerned 
about the leaking ofpolice information before they arrest criminals. 
While private companies are always concerned about negative 
publicity and the adverse impact on stock value. Theref6re, theY do 
not want to share their critical information although it would make it 
easier to police internet ftaud This tension can hinder cooperatilIC 
efforts between private and public policing bodies in the response to 
internetfraud (Wall, 2006). 
Tensions between the private and public sector of security 
I would like to ask you some questions about any tensions that you have 
experienced or observed while you have worked in policing internet fraud 
within your sector. 
11. What are the three most serious tensions? 
12. Why those tensions are produced? 
13. How those tensions influence to your Nvork in terms of your working 
practices for response? 
14. Why there tensions still exist while the government has encouraged 
the use of private policing? 
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Tensions within the public sector of security (ask only to members of 
the public sector). 
15. What are the three most serious tensions? 
16. Why those tensions are produced? 
17. How those tensions influence to your work in terms of your working 
practices for response? 
Tensions within the private sector of security (ask onlý- to members of 
the private sector) 
15. What are the three most serious tensions within the pri\ate sector of 
policing internet fraud? 
16. Why those tensions are produced? 
17. How those tensions influence to your work in terms of your working 
practices for response? 
Resolution of tensions 
Here, I would like to ask questions regarding the resolution of tensions. 
19. Can government do anything to reduce these tensions? 
20. Can your organization do anything to reduce these tensions? 
2 1. Can any other organizations involved? 
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22. What is the best solution? 
Private and public policing models for internet fraud 
Nowq I would like to ask your opinion about the concept of a plural policing 
model with regard to internet fraud. 
Provide respondents with the concept ofplural policing model. - more than (I 
bifurcation of policing in terms of multiple policing actors participates to 
police in the cyberspace. 
23. When is it appropriate to involve (a) private rather than public policing 
mechanisms (b) public rather than private policing mechanisms? 
24. How do you work with other sector investigators? 
a) with who? 
b) what are the formal procedures? 
c) what are the informal procedures? 
d) does the link work satisfactorily? 
e) if not then how could it be improved? 
25. How often? 
Provide respondents with the meaning ofparinership policing: Assume that 
everyone not just the police owns and is responsible for tackling the 
problems that undermine community safety? (Nixon, 2002: 118). 
26. Do you believe that partnership created to help policing internet fraud is 
either necessary or helpful? 
27. What would the ideal partnership look like? Can you give aný examples, 
either currently existing in policing internet fraud (in Korea or elseNN here) or 
in other sectors that can be transposed. 
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28. How would you promote the partnership? 
29. Do you have any other comments? 
Thank youfor your co-operation! 
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Appendix 2: Introductory Letter 
Policing Internet Fraud 
I am Tae Jin Chung and am currently pursuing doctoral research in the School of Law at the University of Leeds. The aim of this study is to 
identify the tensions that surround the policing of internet fraud and haNe 
negatively influenced the maintenance of the correct balance between the 
private and public models of policing internet fraud. PrimarN objecti-Ves of 
the study are as follows: 
Identification of tensions produced by internet fraud. 
Definition and classification of internet fraud because internet fraud 
does not fit into the existing category of white-collar crime. 
Identification of correct balance of policing internet fraud. 
Examination of governance of internet fraud. 
Examination of relationship existing between and NN ithin the public 
sector. 
Investigation of major faults and lack of the South Korean policing 
system in respect to its treatment of internet fraud. 
Analysis of factors that promote and resolve tensions. 
Examination of internet fraud control at the local, national and 
international level. 
Most of the information for this study will come from face-to-face 
interviews and I appreciate your willingness to participate in the study. 
Participation is voluntary and you can end your participation at any time. 
The information provided by you will be regarded as anonymous and 
confidential. Your identity or identifying information will not be gathered in 
this interview. The interview is being undertaken for academic research 
purposes only in the hope that the information gained will be useful in 
helping other offenders. Thus, the results will be personally analysed and no 
government officials will have access to any of the results. A master copý 
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and transcripts of these interviews will be kept in a safe and secure location 
and destroyed upon completion of the study. 
The purpose of the interview schedule is to guide both the interviewer and 
the interviewee in the discussions and to make sure that we co\cr all the 
important aspects of the incident. Feel free to share more information on any 
other aspect if you would like to. 
Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated. 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
I agree to participate in an interview being conducted by Tae Jin Chung 
under the supervision of Professor David Wall and CliN-e \Valker of the 
University of Leeds. I have made this decision based on the information I 
have read in the infon-nation letter. As a participant in this study, I realise 
that I will be asked to answer various questions and I may decline to ansN\er 
any question, if I so choose. 
All information which I provide will be held in confidence and I \\ill not be 
identified in any way in the thesis or any subsequent publications. I 
understand that I may withdraw this consent at any time. 
I also understand that I may contact Tae Jin Chung if you have any concerns 
or comments resulting from my involvement in this research. 
Participant's Signature: 
Participant's Name: (Please print) 
Date: 
